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Naval vision documents place significant emphasis on information systems and anticipate
that the 21
st
century warfighter will leverage these systems to dramatically increase combat
effectiveness. Naval forces will rely on satellite communications (SATCOM) to provide the
information transfer capabilities that these vision documents require. Furthermore, commercial
wideband SATCOM assets will be critical contributors to any DoD SATCOM architecture. The
high cost of these space systems requires that a rigorous evaluation of proposed concepts be
performed before acquisition is begun. Accurately defining and articulating naval user needs and
performance measures that reflect these needs are critical components of the evaluation process.
The focus of this research is the development of a system effectiveness hierarchy that could be
used to evaluate commercial wideband SATCOM systems intended for naval use. The
performance measures presented are derived form the seven required characteristics as defined
in the Advanced MILSATCOM Capstone Requirement Document and relate Navy and Marine
Corps wideband requirements to SATCOM system design parameters. The evaluation hierarchy
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Joint and naval vision documents place significant emphasis on information systems and
anticipate that the 21
st
century warfighter will leverage these systems to dramatically increase
combat effectiveness while facing a diverse and highly unpredictable enemy. Joint Vision 2010
(JV2010) and naval warfighting concepts expressed in Operational Maneuver From the Sea
(OMFTS) direct extensive investment in information intensive command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, precision weapons
and combat support systems. Additionally, current and emerging operational concepts and
initiatives such as Copernicus, Information Technology for the 21
st
Century (IT-21), Sea Dragon,
and Network Centric Warfare, all require robust, fault-tolerant information systems for successful
implementation. Failure to provide the information transfer capabilities that these concepts and
vision documents rely on will negate the positive impacts that advancements in tactics and
weapon system technologies will provide. Therefore successful implementation of future visions
will not be possible without a well-defined, user needs driven, communications architecture.
Given the dispersed nature of the future battlefield it is clearly evident that an integrated
and robust communication architecture that meets the goals set forth in 21 st century vision
documents will rely on space based, satellite communications (SATCOM). Furthermore,
wideband 1 SATCOM assets to include commercial wideband systems will be critical contributors
to any Department of Defense (DoD) SATCOM architecture. The high cost of these space
systems requires a rigorous evaluation of proposed concepts before system acquisition begins.
The cost versus capability decision should be a negotiated trade between warfighter needs and
SATCOM system costs. Therefore, accurately defining and articulating user needs and
performance measures that reflect these needs are critical components of this decision process.
1 The Advanced Military Satellite Communications Capstone Requirements Document [CRD], (24 Apr
1998 pp. 4-7), defines wideband as "High-capacity circuits and networks in excess of 64kbps - Typically in
the multi-megabit range - Encompasses a variety of network topologies - Today principally broadcast and
switched/full Duplex."
A. GOAL
The purpose of this research is to state the naval warfighter's definition of value for
commercial (COMMER) wideband SATCOM service. Doing so will assist in the selection of
commercial wideband SATCOM service for naval forces. As Figure 1 shows the performance
parameters presented in this thesis are derived from the "required system characteristics" as
defined in The Advanced Military Satellite Communications Capstone Requirements Document
[CRD], April 1998. This research is not intended to provide an all-inclusive list of performance
parameters that uniquely define the overall system-of-systems military SATCOM (MILSATCOM)
architecture. Instead, the intent is to clearly articulate the required performance characteristics
that commercial (COMMER) SATCOM systems should display in order to effectively satisfy
threshold naval wideband communications requirements. In short the objective is to define the
characteristics of one of the components (systems) that will make up the overall system-of-
systems MILSATCOM architecture. It is expected that this analysis will be added to and used in
conjunction with the many other studies seeking to meet the 21 st century naval warfighter's
SATCOM needs.
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Figure 1. Thesis Goal
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of six chapters. A short description of each chapter is provided below.
• Chapter I - Introduction.
• Chapter II - Naval Force Profile. Through an analysis of relevant naval concept and
vision documents this chapter identifies the unique characteristics that define the naval
force profile. This profile will be integrated with the product presented in Chapter III to
form the intended performance parameters.
• Chapter III - Performance Parameters. Chapter III begins with a justification of the use of
the Advanced MILSATCOM Capstone Requirement Document {CRD) as a foundation
document for the development of performance evaluation parameters, and concludes
with a list of the derived evaluation measures.
• Chapter IV - Weighting and Utility Analysis. The goal of this chapter is provide a
"strawman" evaluation hierarchy complete with weights and utility curves. A discussion of
the user's utility for each evaluation parameter is provided as well as the process for
deriving relative weights.
• Chapter V - Implementation of the Results. Chapter V provides a discussion of how the
hierarchy can be used.
• Chapter VI - Conclusion. The conclusion provides an overview and presentation of
related topics for follow-on research.
• Appendix A - Cost and Cost As An Independent Variable. This appendix presents the
author's opinion on how affordability and cost as an independent variable should be
included in the selection of wideband COMMER SATCOM.
• Appendix B - System Engineering and Evaluation Regime (SEER). This appendix is a
paper written by employees of The Aerospace Corporation and Naval Space Command
and it describes a decision support tool called SEER.

II. NAVAL FORCE PROFILE
Despite streamlining introduced by DoD acquisition reform, lead-time for acquisition of
complex systems is often still long enough to cause the initial requirements to become outdated
prior to system fielding. This problem is further compounded for C4ISR systems, which are
subject to the rapid technology innovation cycle that currently exists in this industry. Efforts at
reducing a system's development timeline should be coupled with a well-defined requirements
definition process that includes the creation of a user profile. Characteristics that describe and
define a user profile are extremely valuable for making educated predictions about future
requirements. Given defined requirements and an accurate user profile, developers can design an
open system that allows for expansion and refinement along the bounds of the user's profile.
Simply stated, identification of user characteristics allow for the creation of a user profile which
leads to the development of a system that can flex to meet unanticipated requirements or take
advantage of emerging technologies. The intent of this chapter is to use DoD and naval doctrine
and concept publications to identify naval force characteristics and create a naval force profile.
This profile will be integrated with the product presented in Chapter HI to form the intended
performance parameters.
A. APPLICABLE CONCEPTS AND VISIONS
Two comprehensive 1997 studies, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
National Defense Panel (NDP) "both characterize the next century as one of crisis, conflict, and
chaos in the littorals brought on by rapid economic growth, increased competition for limited
resources, terrorism, technological diffusion, exponential growth in urban populations,
nationalism, ethnic and religious strife, and increasing access to modern conventional weaponry
and weapons of mass destruction." [Krulak, 1998, pp.16] These studies reflect an evolution
(shown in Figure 2) of thought initially "articulated by the President at the Aspen Institute on
August 2, 1990." [...From the Sea, 1996] The themes of the August 1990 address were
documented in 1992 with the President's publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and








Operational Maneuver from the Sea
Naval Operational Concept
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National Security Strategy forA New Century
Quadrennial Defense Review
Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010
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Forward...From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere
21st Century
Figure 2. Applicable Concept and Vision Documents
The NSS of 1992 and the DoN response, ...From the Sea, documented the DoD's
departure from the previously held strategic vision driven by a bi-polar (United States vs. the
Soviet Union) world. The fundamental change in policy reflected a shift "from a focus on a global
threat to a focus on regional challenges and opportunities". [..From the Sea, 1992] As described in
...From the Sea this shift in focus implied a redirection and expansion of the traditional
expeditionary role of naval forces. Although, naval forces were considered to be full participants in
each of the principal elements of the 1992 NSS (strategic deterrence and defense, forward
presence, crisis response and reconstitution), naval forces were identified as the primary
providers of the forward presence and crisis response elements. [...From the Sea, 1992] Naval
leadership made a clear association between the Force's expeditionary mindset and the NSS
elements of forward presence and crisis response. Naval expeditionary forces are capable of
conducting a wide range of operations (port visits to major offensives), from sea without host
nation support. In short "Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unobtrusive forward presence which
may be intensified or withdrawn as required on short notice." [...From the Sea, 1992] Having
demonstrated that naval forces were critical to the execution of the NSS ...From the Sea identified
four key operational capabilities that were required to successfully execute the new direction of
the Navy and Marine Corps:




Evolution of ...From the Sea was provided in 1994 with the publication of Forward... From
the Sea. Forward... From the Sea expands on the previous shift in focus and continued the
redirection of the "Naval Service away from operations on the sea, toward power projection and
the employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the world"
[Forward...From the Sea, 1994] In addition to reinforcing the expeditionary nature of the naval
forces, the 1994 document identified the Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) and the
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) as the "basic presence 'building blocks'" that are fully capable
of meeting the NSS's requirement for versatile, multipurpose forward forces. Finally the document
concluded with an expansion of the previously mentioned four key operational capabilities to five
fundamental and enduring naval force roles. These roles were:
Projection of power from sea to land




1996 saw the publication of three documents that further promoted and defined the role
that naval forces would play in the 21
st
century. These documents were, Joint Vision 2010
(JV2010), Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), and the Navy Operational Concept
(NOC). The three documents are highly complementary and are intended to be digested together
as an integrated concept. JV2010 serves as a strategic guidebook that seeks to channel the
individual Services' "distinctive capabilities, cultures, and traditions" towards the ultimate goal of
effective joint warfighting. [Krulak, 1998, pp. 18] To do this, JV2010 provides the Services with
four operational pillars, (dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and force
protection) which when tied together by a robust and superior information technology architecture
leads to (as described by JV2010) full spectrum dominance.
OMFTS and NOC are the Marine Corps' and Navy's description of how naval forces will
execute their missions in accordance with JV2010 and more importantly the NSS. Both
documents are entirely compatible with JV2010's operational themes and continue the emphasis
on littoral operations originally presented in ...From the Sea and Forward... From the Sea. The
fundamental premise behind OMFTS and NOC is the need to maintain a naval expeditionary force
equipped and ready to meet the challenges of the 21 st century. The following quote more fully
describes this notion.
To influence events overseas, America requires a credible, forwardly deployable,
power projection capability. In the absence of an adjacent land base, a
sustainable forcible entry capability that is independent of forward staging bases,
friendly borders, overflight rights, and other politically dependent support can
come only from the sea. The chaos of the future requires that we maintain the
capability to project power ashore against all forces of resistance, ranging from
overcoming devastated infrastructure to assisting a friendly people in need of
disaster relief to countering the entire spectrum of armed threats. [OMFTS, 1996]
OMFTS and NOC are closely coupled interdependent concepts. The critical difference
between OMFTS and historical (or traditional) operational maneuver is the "extensive use of the
sea as a means of gaining advantage, an avenue of friendly movement that is simultaneously a
barrier to the enemy and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements." [OMFTS, 1996]
The ability to rely on the sea as an avenue for movement depends on a force's ability to maintain
maritime superiority. The primary tenets set forth in the NOC call for the ability to gain and
maintain control of sea lanes, ocean areas critical to the success of the overall national strategy,
and operational sea control of contested littoral areas. [Copernicus, 1997] Therefore, NOC as an
operational concept directs naval forces to shape and dominate the littoral battlespace to ensure
maritime superiority for naval and joint force operations. Assured that maritime superiority is
gained and maintained OMFTS seeks to "combine doctrine with technological advances in
mobility, fire support, communications and navigation to rapidly identify and exploit enemy
weaknesses across the entire spectrum of conflict." [Copernicus, 1997] Critical to OMFTS is the
emergence of new technologies that will allow leaner, yet more capable forces to project power
from sea-based platforms without the creation of the traditional shore-based logistics and staging
areas. [OMFTS, 1996] Following this line of thought OMFTS provides six principles that clearly
articulate the essence of the concept. These principles are:
OMFTS focuses on an operational objective.
OMFTS uses the sea as maneuver space.
OMFTS generates overwhelming tempo and momentum.
OMFTS pits strength against weakness.
OMFTS emphasizes intelligence, deceptions, -and flexibility.
OMFTS integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.
May 1997 saw the publication of three high level documents that link naval force
characteristics and the United States' defense policy. The QDR and the President's publication of
A National Security Strategy for A New Century (NSS 1997) provides high level guidance to the
Armed Services. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication of Concept for Future Joint
Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (CJFO) provides an increased level of detail and
explanation of JV2010.
The cornerstone theme of NSS 1997 is "the imperative of engagement." [NSS 1997] The
"strategy of engagement presumes the United States will continue to exercise strong leadership in
the international community, using all dimensions of its influence to shape the international
security environment." [QDR, 1997] The President groups threats to the United States into three
broad intertwined categories; (1) regional or state-centered threats, (2) transnational threats, and
(3) threats from weapons of mass destruction. [NSS 1997] These threats are to be countered
using a three-prong engagement centered policy. The first prong directs U.S. forces to shape the
international environment, number 2 requires the Armed Forces to "maintain the capability to
respond to the full spectrum of threats", and the third and final prong instructs the Services to
"prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond." [QDR, 1997] Although NSS
1997 does not task naval forces to execute specific operations it is very important in that it defines




Published in the same month and year as NSS 1997 the QDR presents the DoD's plan for
implementation of NSS 1997. In short the QDR documents the implementation options that the
Armed Services analyzed during their search to define an overarching defense strategy. In
concert with NSS 1997 the QDR emphasizes the "shape-respond-prepare strategy." [QDR, 1997]
Critical to the shape and respond elements is the DoD's ability to maintain a continuous overseas
presence and the "ability to respond to a variety of smaller scale contingencies and asymmetric
threats." [QDR, 1997] Furthermore, the QDR recognizes that preparation for future threats, who
will also acquire new capabilities, is critical to the success of all US forces. Embracing the
concepts presented in JV2010 the QDR places notable emphasis on the development, fielding
and use of C4ISR systems. Finally the QDR states that the "U.S. military must be a capabilities-
based force that gives the national leadership a range of viable options for promoting and
protecting U.S. interests in peacetime, crisis, and war." [QDR, 1997] A force capable of this type
of full-spectrum dominance must possess a "balanced mix of overseas presence and power
projection capabilities." [QDR, 1997] Critical enablers of this balanced force are quality people, a
10
"globally vigilant intelligence system," a global communications architecture, superiority in space,
and control of the seas and airspace." [QDR , 1997]
Also published in May of 1997 CJFO further outlines how the DoD intends to execute the
shape-respond-prepare strategy. Evolutionary in nature the primary purpose of CJFO seems to
be to better articulate and describe the concepts originally presented in JV2010. The document
expands and clarifies the four JV2010 operational concepts (dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, full-dimensional protection, focused logistics) and how these concepts coupled with
the increased use of information technology will be used to achieved full spectrum dominance. An
important addition to CJFO that was not as well presented in JV2010 is a chapter-long discussion
of information superiority and its relationship to the four operational concepts. Information
superiority is defined as "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow
of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." [JV2010, 1996] It
consists of three components:
• Information systems - which collect, process, and disseminate information
• Information operations - the exploiting and denying of information
• Relevant information - full range of pertinent uninterrupted flow of information. [CJFO,
1998]
The fundamental premise that both JV2010 and CJFO provide about information superiority is
that it is the critical enabler of the four operational concepts and therefore crucial to the successful
execution of the shape-respond-prepare strategy.
Collectively the QDR, NSS 1997, and CJFO present a unified interdependent strategy for
the defense of the nation and progression into the future. The most recent naval response to
these documents, which is also definitely a continuation and refinement of the transformation
initiated in 1992, is the 1998 DoN Posture Statement, Forward...From the Sea Anytime,
Anywhere. This 71 page publication articulates what roles the Navy and Marine Corps will perform
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in the execution of the national shape-respond-prepare strategy. Forward...From the Sea
Anytime, Anywhere, skillfully and accurately states that:
Shaping and responding require presence -- maintaining forward-deployed
combat-ready forces. Being 'on-scene' matters! It is and will remain a distinctly
naval contribution to peacetime engagement.
It is plainly obvious that naval forces are uniquely tied to the nation's overall strategy of
engagement. Not only do naval forces provide peacetime engagement and deterrence but by
likening naval forces to a temperature control rheostat naval leadership states that these forces
provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with an adjustable response capability.
[Forward... From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere, 1998] 'The flexible, rapid movement of naval
forces at the onset of any crisis is an ideal way to signal our nation's commitment."
[Forward... From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere, 1998] Furthermore, the inherent self-sufficiency
and depth of capabilities that naval forces possess provides the NCA a range of balanced and
flexible options. Once stating this central precept Forward... From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere
proceeds with a review of the Navy and Marine Corps' performance during 1997 presenting past
operations as examples of doctrine in action. As evidence that the Navy and Marine Corps are
actually pursuing the themes that have been put forth the document concludes with an extensive
presentation of how the two Services will carry out the prepare portion of NSS 1997. Significant
emphasis is given to recruitment, retention and education of a quality work force as well as a
detailed discussion of each Services' major equipment modernization programs.
It is important to note that each of the Services are using experimental methods to ensure
that innovative technologies and techniques are evaluated. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
has developed a three phase, five year experimentation plan, commonly named Sea Dragon, that
provides the venue for conducting "concept-based experimentation and the introduction of
science and technology into the operating forces." [Forward... From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere,
1998] The Navy employs fleet units as At-Sea Battle Labs and has initiated a series of fleet battle
experiments (FBE) that use operational forces to "take forward-looking programs and integrate
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them with innovative operational concepts." [Forward...From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere, 1998]
As stated "these experiments focus on future programs that align the Navy with Joint Vision 2010
and other emerging operational concepts." [Forward... From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere, 1998]
One of the newest operational concepts that will significantly impact future naval warfare is the
emergence of network centric warfare. Unlike traditional platform-centric warfare network-centric
warfare:
Derives its power from the networking of a well-informed but geographically-
dispersed force. The enabling elements are a highly-webbed information service,
access to all appropriate information sources, weapons reach with precision and
speed of response, value-adding command-and-control processes -- to include
high-speed automated assignment of resources to need - and integrated
sensors hosted on the information network and closely coupled in time to the
shooters and command-and-control processes. Network-centric warfare is
applicable to all levels of warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy,
operations, and tactics. It is transparent to mission, force size, and composition,
and geography. [Forward...From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere]
Another emerging concept is the notion of complex adaptive systems (CAS) and treating
warfare as a CAS. The topic is discussed and related to warfare in Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication 1-1 Strategy, (MCDP 1-1) and the upcoming Marine Corps publication, Maneuver
Warfare Science 1998. Although a detailed discussion of CAS is not appropriate for this
document a brief discussion of the paradigm is applicable. Often labeled complexity theory, the
fundamental precepts recognize that the world is not "inherently mechanical, predictable, and
rational" instead the world is "flowing, adapting, nonlinear and holistic." [Upton, 1998, pp.1]
Furthermore, complex systems are inherently dynamic and unpredictable making it nearly
impossible to definitively predict the outcome of applied external forces. [Bassford, 1998, pp.1 4-
15] Equating warfare, that is the imposition of external forces on an enemy, with complexity
theory requires current military leaders to shift from their classical desire to impose order on
disorder and "live within chaos." That is, since complex systems are dynamic and unpredictable
the strategist must be prepared to adapt and exploit sudden opportunities or recover from
unexpected setbacks. [Bassford, 1998, pp.17] Although still in its infancy, and far from being
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accepted or understood by the vast majority of naval warfighters complexity theory has the
potential to revolutionize the way in which warfare is conducted. At a minimum the notions of
complexity and the idea that "military strategy demands a capacity for both painstaking planning
and energetic adaptation to unfolding events" are certainly applicable to the NSS 1997 shape-
respond-prepare strategy. [Bassford, 1998, pp.17] Therefore, it is vital that the critical elements of
network-centric warfare and complex adaptive systems theory are included in any characterization
of naval forces.
B. NAVAL FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
Forecasting future requirements so that developed systems are flexible enough to
accommodate growth is more accurate when an established theme or trend is available. Such a
trend is clearly visible in the series of doctrine and concept publications presented in the previous
section. This shared central theme assists in identifying the common characteristics that make up
a user's profile and therefore aids in describing the future requirements vector. More simply
stated, a trend has identifying characteristics, a collection of characteristics creates a profile, a
profile can be used to forecast future needs.
It is evident that a central theme of each document is that naval forces are critical to the
successful execution of NSS 1997. Due to their ability to provide powerful yet unobtrusive
presence naval forces are uniquely capable of executing the shape and respond elements of the
shape-respond-prepare strategy. Furthermore, "the purpose of naval forces is to influence events
ashore directly and decisively from the sea ...anytime, anywhere." [Forward... From the Sea
Anytime, Anywhere, 1998] Given the breadth of these statements it is important to further
delineate the characteristics of our U.S. naval forces. Naval forces are [...From the Sea, 1992]:
• Expeditionary nature - which implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces
that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly in austere environments.
• Structured to project power - from the sea when required by national demands.
• Self-supporting - self-sufficient forces able to sustain support for long-term operations in
remote areas of the world.
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Unrestricted - not restricted by the need for transit or over-flight approval form foreign
governments in order to enter the scene of action.
• Scalable - capable of withdrawing or intensifying operations on short notice.
The following text and Figure 3. Naval Force Profile, clarifies these characteristics further:
• Expeditionary nature, capable of:
• Operating forward - implies operating regionally as leaner dispersed forces away
from infrastructure - capable of a wide range of missions - closely associated with
self-sufficiency.
• Responding swiftly - timeliness is a critical component of success and if required
lethality, highly mobile forces "rapidly assembled for the mission at hand and able to
be rapidly extracted or relocated as the mission is completed" [Sea Dragon, 1997] - a
priori location information is a luxury- reduced planning time requires flexibility
across all warfare disciplines (C3
,
aviation, ground, sea).
• Structured to project power - all components of the force contribute to the force's
overall capability to conduct "coordinated and effective operations against a wide range of
enemy targets, facilities, and infrastructure over a larger area of action (AOA)." [Sea
Dragon, 1997]. - includes the use of long-range precision firepower and is closely
coupled with the concepts of sea-based support - implies the ability to unilaterally conduct
forcible entry from the sea, that is "project power ashore in the face of armed opposition"
without the use of established logistics lodgments on the beach. [Krulak, 1998, pp.19]
• Self-supporting - self-sufficient - independent forces capable of acting without the need
of host nation support or the buildup of ashore staging facilities - capable of executing
sea-based support and logistics - logistics on demand - high responsiveness and
reduced vulnerability (no ashore staging area to protect) - implies highly durable and easy
to maintain end items.
• Unrestricted - Not limited by accepted international regulations - strikes at the heart of a
naval force's ability to operate and maintain an effective presence in accordance with
accepted international boundaries - implies the use of standoff and over the horizon
weapon and transport systems not requiring the permission of neutral or passively hostile
countries for over-flight approval in order to enter the region of contention - closely
related to self-sufficiency in that there is an implied capability of self-reliance requiring little
to no need for use of "in-country" infrastructure.
Scalable - NCA rheostat - implies the ability to expeditiously size forces to meet the
strategic need - suggests the capacity to conduct a range of intervention options, from a
show of force to humanitarian assistance to full scale war - indicates the capability to
conduct covert (i.e. submerged submarine operations) or overt (i.e. CVGB steaming in
view of the coast) presence missions - the ability to provide a credible presence




* Regional vs. Global Threat * Strategic Deterrence and Defense *
* Forward Presence * Crisis Response * Reconstitute *
...From the Sea
* Naval Expeditionary Forces * Command, Control, and Surveillance *
* Battlespace Dominance * Power Projection * Force Sustainment *
1994
Forward...From the Sea
* CVBG and ARG are the building blocks * Projection of Power from Sea to Land *
* Sea Control and Maritime Supremacy * Strategic Deterrence * Strategic Sealift *
* Forward Naval Presence *
1996
JV2010
* Dominant Maneuver * Precision Engagement *
* Full Dimensional Protection * Focused Logistics * Information Superiority *
OMFTS
* Regional vs. Global Threat * Strategic Deterrence and Defense *
* Forward Presence * Crisis Response * Reconstitute *
Navy Operational Concept
Establish and Maintain Maritime Superiority * Control Sea Lanes and Ocean Areas
* Establish Operational Sea Control of Littoral Areas *
1997
National Security Strategy for A New Century
* Engagement * Shape * Respond * Prepare *
QDR
* Shape * Respond * Prepare *
CFJO
* Dominant Maneuver * Precision Engagement *
* Full Dimensional Protection * Focused Logistics * Information Superiority *
1998
Froward...From the Sea Anytime, Anywhere
* NCA Rheostat * Forward Deployed *




* Expeditionary Nature *





Figure 3. Naval Force Profile
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Finally, despite the numerous documents and writings describing naval warfare and naval
forces, ...From the Sea, the original publication that initiated the transformation of the U.S. naval
forces provides the most accurate definition of these forces.
American Naval Forces provide a powerful yet unobtrusive presence; strategic
deterrence; control of the seas; extended and continuos on-scene crisis
response; project precise power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale
warfighting scenarios emerge. These maritime capabilities are particularly well
tailored for the forward presence and crisis response missions articulated in the
President's National Security Strategy. [...From the Sea, 1992]
The integration required to mix these warfare tasks into a cohesive fighting strategy
implies the use of advanced sensors, portable real-time command and control systems, all-source
real-time situational awareness systems and a fault tolerant robust communications architecture.
This communications architecture must not encumber or negate any of the naval force's positive
characteristics, instead it must be an efficient multiplier acting to exponentially enhance naval
force effectiveness. COMMER wideband SATCOM systems will be crucial components of such an
architecture. Relating the naval force profile to COMMER wideband SATCOM systems is the
purpose of the next chapter.
C. WHAT IS WIDEBAND AND WHY DO NAVAL FORCES NEED IT?
1. What is Wideband?
The DoD definition of wideband as taken from the CRD is ""High-capacity circuits and
networks in excess of 64kbps - Typically in the multi-megabit range - Encompasses a variety of
network topologies - Today principally broadcast and switched/full Duplex." [CRD, 1 998, pp. 4-7]
Further characterization of wideband generically includes: none to low levels of protection;
capable of handling data rates for transmission of bundled voice circuits, large data files, and
video; and typically operating in the super high frequency bands (SHF) of C, X, Ku and Ka, with
future commercial expansion to the extremely high frequency (EHF) V band. [Finnegan, 1997]
Wideband SATCOM is also either simplex (receive only, broadcast) or duplex (user has transmit
and receive capability). Commercially the spacecraft industry refers to wideband systems as
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broadband systems, however neither of the two terms have clearly stated definitions. In either
case both wideband and broadband, are used to refer to SATCOM systems that possess a
communications capacity equivalent to terrestrial fiber optic cable.
2. Why is it Needed?
There are numerous needs that drive the naval forces' requirement for wideband
SATCOM. Most of them center on the requirement to transmit high volumes of information
between users and producers in a real time tactically significant manner. Typical uses of
wideband SATCOM include: imagery transfer, collaborative planing, video teleconferencing,
command and control systems exchange, tele-medicine, trunked telephone lines, and large file
transfer (e.g., the air tasking order). [Boyd, 1997] Furthermore, as naval forces continue to shrink
in size naval leadership must leverage C4ISR systems to enhance individual unit situational
awareness and operational effectiveness. Without wideband SATCOM future C4ISR systems will
not function. The bottom line is that wideband communications are required to ensure that the 21 st
century naval warfighter is adequately prepared to fight his enemy. Detailed listings and
descriptions of naval SATCOM needs are contained in the Integrated Communications Data Base
(ICDB) and the Emerging Requirements Data Base (ERDB). The ICDB lists Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) validated and approved MILSATCOM requirements and is revalidated
every two years. The ERDB is a "unit based compilation of future SATCOM requirements" and is
used in the "planning and sizing of future MILSATCOM architectures." [Finnegan, 1997]
Deciding what the future MILSATCOM architecture should consist of is an ongoing DoD
struggle. Although not the complete solution, commercial wideband SATCOM is seen as having
the capability to augment a DoD owned and operated wideband architecture. [SPACE NEWS,
1998, pp. 8] Naval forces have already seen the effective use of commercial wideband in its
Challenge Athena Program and in the joint service use of Phase 1 Global Broadcast Service.
Furthermore, under the Information Technology for the 21 st Century initiative (IT-21) Inmarsat B
will be used to provide 64kbps to deployed navy ships beginning in late 1998. [Hampton, 1997,
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pp.8] Clearly given the history of commercial use and the explosion and innovation that is ongoing
in the commercial SATCOM industry continued and increased future naval use of commercial
wideband is a reality. Deciding whether that use will augment or meet all naval MILSATCOM
wideband requirements is not the purpose of this research. Instead the goal is provide a format for
articulating naval needs so that source selection of commercial wideband service provider's is





The ultimate goal of this research is to present the naval warfighter's definition of value for
COMMER wideband SATCOM service. Doing so will provide a means for comparing different
COMMER wideband SATCOM systems and identifying which one best satisfies naval force
needs. As presented in Chapter II this research proposes that naval force needs be represented
by a user profile, composed of a set of user characteristics (expeditionary nature, structured to
project power, self-supporting, unrestricted and scalable). These characteristics identify U.S.
naval forces as unique contributors to the national security strategy. Use of an inadequate
communications system will inhibit the synergistic interaction of the characteristics and degrade
the naval force's ability to execute its portion of the national security strategy. Therefore, the top-
level question that this research seeks to answer is:
Does a particular COMMER wideband SATCOM alternative complement the
characteristics unique to U.S. Naval Forces?
"Complement the characteristics" is used instead of "meeting the needs" to indicate that
information systems are force effectiveness multipliers, and naval force effectiveness can be
improved by their use.
In order to conduct a thorough analysis and correctly answer the top-level question, naval
force characteristics must be connected to SATCOM terminology. In short, naval needs must be
equated to satellite and satellite constellation design (capability) parameters. Matching design
parameters with user needs is best performed using a hierarchical organization of evaluation
measures. This research uses a three tiered hierarchy. The highest level of the hierarchy
represents user mission needs with the goal of selecting the best alternative. The middle level
represents the functional objectives, "which are statements describing the tasks that a
communications system is expected to perform." [MILSATCOM Polar Adjunct, 1993, pp.3]
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Functional objectives "address specific goals that collectively satisfy the mission needs."
[MILSATCOM Polar Adjunct, 1993, pp.3] The lowest level consists of individual attributes grouped
under the functional objective which they define. These attributes are the initial nodes that link
system design parameters to user characteristics. The next section, Defining the Process, and
Figure 4. Hierarchical Organization of Evaluation Measures, describes the effectiveness hierarchy
in greater detail.
B. DEFINING THE PROCESS
System Effectiveness Value
Measures the degree to which all the functionaJ objectives are met.
The goal is to use System Effectiveness Value (SEV) to select the best alternative.
SEV = E(wi*MOEi)
Functional Objectives
Are tasks that the communication system is expected to perform
There are 7 of them and each one is reflected numerically as a measure of effectiveness (MOE).
MOEs measure the degree to which a Functional Objective is attained and MOE = 5j(wj*MOPj)
Measures of Performance
Are attributes that identify and define a functional objective (MOE).
The number of MOPs varies for each MOE.
MOPs measure the degree to which a critcal characteristic of a functiona} objective is attained.
Figure 4. Hierarchical Organization of Evaluation Measures
1. Level 1: System Effectiveness Value
The top-level question in this context is somewhat analogous to the idea of a single
mission needs statement. It is a consolidated statement that attempts to wrap-up user
requirements in one refined sentence and provides direction to the entire selection process. For
this research the mission needs statement, or top-level statement represents naval force needs in
the form of a question.
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Does a particular COMMER wideband SATCOM alternative complement the
characteristics unique to U.S. Naval Forces?
Satisfactory answers (acceptable alternatives) to this question fulfill naval user needs.
Results of alternative analysis are presented as a numerical score, the System Effectiveness
Value (SEV). SEV is a weighted sum of all the functional objectives (measures of effectiveness
(MOE)) and reflects the degree to which all the functional objectives are attained;
• SEV =Z(W| * MOEi)
• w, = the weight of the i
,h MOE
• MOEj = the i,h MOE that reflects the i,h functional objective
The SEV is a relative (ordinal) score. That is, if System A receives an SEV of 50%, it does
not indicate that 50% of naval needs are met; instead it implies that System A meets less needs
than System B which scored 75%. However, since the user's utility for alternative effectiveness is
non-linear it does not imply that System B is 25% more effective than System A. Utility is a means
for representing how much value a user has for a particular level of performance (SEV score). A
detailed discussion of utility theory and its use in this research is provided in Chapter IV .
2. Level 2: Functional Objectives
Functional objectives make up the middle level of the analysis hierarchy. Reported
numerically as measures of effectiveness (MOE) they reflect the degree to which a functional
objective is attained. This research uses seven functional objectives taken from the U.S. Space
Command's, Advanced Military Satellite Communications Capstone Requirements Document
(CRD). Defined by the CRD as required characteristics, and renamed functional objectives in this
research, these seven items are; coverage, capacity, protection, access and control,
interoperability, flexibility, quality of service. Individual clarification and discussion of these seven
functional objectives is the focus of a later section in this chapter.
Similar to the top-level question, each functional objective has a user needs derived
definition. Furthermore, this definition relates a SATCOM system's (user terminal, satellite and/or
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satellite constellation) design characteristics to user needs. Functional objectives translate user
needs into system capabilities and design parameters. Just as the SEV reflects the weighted
aggregation of MOEs, MOEs are the numerical result of the weighted sum of measures of
performance (MOP).
• MOEi=Z(Wj*MOPj)
• w, = the weight of the j
,h MOP
• MOPj = the jth MOP for the i,h functional objective (MOE)
Lastly, the CRD also presents affordability as an eighth consideration. "Although not
related directly to technical performance of an individual system, affordability is a fundamental
overarching consideration in cost constrained times." [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-1] This thesis focuses on
the technical parameters however a discussion of affordability in terms of a presentation of a point
of view is provided in Appendix A. Cost and Cost As An Independent Variable.
3. Level 3: Measures of Performance
Measures of performance are the lowest tier in the hierarchy. Each MOP is grouped
under a functional objective and directly relates a user need with a particular SATCOM capability.
Taken as a group the MOPs for a given functional objective define that objective. In essence,
MOPs restate user needs as specific SATCOM capabilities. Although not written to the level of a
traditional "detailed specification" MOPs should be viewed as the top level specifications that a
user desires a wideband SATCOM system to have.
There is no set number of MOPs per functional objective; some have more or less than
others. Although the desire is to fully characterize a functional objective, realistically this can not
be performed without an exceedingly large number of performance measures. The intent is to
identify MOPs that provide critical links between user needs and system design. Therefore, the
desire is to provide a useable list (i.e. not to long, not to short) of critical indicators (MOPs) that
adequately discriminate between competing system capabilities.
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Each MOP is weighted relative to the other MOPs within a particular functional objective
and the weighted sum of MOPs equals that functional objective's MOE. Since a user's attitude
towards value (risk) may be non-linear over his range of options (non-linear utility) the weighted
sum of MOPs results in a collection of ordinal MOEs. Therefore, attempts to state that System A
scores 25% lower than System B for the coverage functional objective are misleading. All that can
be stated is that System A is ranked lower than System B for coverage. The analyst must refer to
the functional objective's (MOE) utility curve to discern the value of the marginal difference
between System A and System B. As previously stated utility theory will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter IV .
4. Summary
The bullet list below and Figure 5, summarize the evaluation hierarchy.
Solution Effectiveness Value
SEV = 3>vt,M0Ei)
i i i I : I I I
Coverage Capacity Protection Interoperability Access & Control Quality of Service Flexibility
MOE1 MOE2 MOE3 MOE4 MOE5 MOE6 MOE7
Weight = w1 Weight =rw2 Weight = w3 Weight = w4 Weight = w5 Weight =w6 Weight =w7
MOEt = 2Iwj*MOPj) MC€2 = 5fwj',MOPj) MOE3=2>vj*MOPj) MOE4 =2(wrMOPj) MOES = gWj'MOPj) MOE6 =WMOPj) MOE7 = 2[wj'MOPj)
MOP1
' Weight = w1
MOP2






' Weight = w2
MOP3
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Figure 5. System Evaluation Hierarchy
• 1
s
Level: System Effectiveness Value
• SEV represents the overall goal of the decision process; selecting the optimum
alternative.
• SEV answers the top-level question; Does a particular COMMER wideband
SATCOM alternative complement the characteristics unique to U.S. Naval
Forces?
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• The top-level question is analogous to a mission needs statement and concisely
reflects the naval force characteristics; expeditionary nature, structured to project
power, self-supporting, unrestricted, and scalable.
• SEVs are ordinal, and are generated using SEV =I(Wi * MOEj).
2nd Level: Functional Objectives (MOEs)
• There are seven functional objectives; coverage, capacity, protection, access and
control, interoperability, flexibility, quality of service.
• They are reflected numerically as MOEs where, MOE, =Z(Wj * MOP,).
3rd Level: Measures of Performance (MOPs)
• The lowest level of the hierarchy.
• Directly relate a user need to a SATCOM attribute.
• Taken together the MOPs for a given functional objective define that objective.
C. THE CRD AND REQUIRED SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
1. What is the CRD, and What Good is it?
The Advanced Military Satellite Communications Capstone Requirements Document
(CRD) published by U.S. Space Command is intended as a resource that "is intermediate in
scope and detail between MNS (mission needs statement) and an ORD (operational requirements
document)." [CRD, 1998, pp.1
-3] In April 1996 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
approved the MILSATCOM Follow-on Mission Needs Statement (MNS), which addresses DoD's
need for increased satellite communication capabilities and capacity. [CRD, 1998, pp. 1-2] As a
high level document the MNS does not adequately articulate DoD MILSATCOM2 requirements
and U.S. Space Command was tasked to author "an over-arching requirements document
addressing the MILSATCOM user community's requirements for the future DoD space, terminal,
and control systems." [CRD, 1998, pp.1
-3] The CRD is intended to be a living document that will
2 MILSATCOM: Defined by the CRD; "as Military Satellite Communications, encompassing all
types of SATCOM systems and services used by DoD - both DoD-owned and operated SATCOM
systems, and DoD's use of commercial SATCOM services."
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be updated and kept current as ORDs for components of the system-of-systems MILSATCOM
architecture are approved and ultimately programmed for. The document defines top-level
characteristics for the overall system-of-system MILSATCOM architecture. These characteristics
were verted through a group of senior officials called the Senior Warfighter's Forum (SWarF) and
ultimately approved and validated by the JROC in April of 1998. As a JROC validated document
the CRD will not only guide the development of future MILSATCOM ORDs but it "will also serve as
the measure to judge how well those ORDs and plans collectively are doing in fulfilling the tenets
of the architecture and its associated programmatic course of action." [CRD, 1998, pp.1 -3] The
CRD does not supercede any of the existing DoD acquisition directives (DoD 5000/8000 series),
instead the intent is to provide a single source document that "sets the performance goals which
DoD's future MILSATCOM programs and commercial services should strive to achieve within



















Figure 6. Required System Characteristics [CRD, 1998, pp.4-2]
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As previously indicated and as shown in Figure 6, the CRD defines seven required
system characteristics. The CRD does a very good job developing these characteristics and
relating them to DoD's military operational requirements. The approach taken by the CRD is
similar to that taken in this thesis. The CRD constructs a DoD profile whose characteristics are
derived from JV2010 and reflect the unique and critical warfighting capabilities of current and
future U.S. forces. These capabilities are then associated with seven SATCOM terms, labeled
required system characteristics. Defined in terms of user requirements each of the seven
requirements directly relates a collection of user needs to SATCOM (spacecraft, constellation and
terminal) design characteristics. The next section, 2. The Seven Characteristics, describes each
in detail.
The value of the CRD is summarized below:
• It is an over-arching operational requirements oriented document that defines the
minimum performance requirements of the future MILSATCOM architecture.
• It is JROC validated and therefore is a valid and recognized source document for
MILSATCOM programmatic decisions.
• The document provides jointly agreed upon (SWarF reviewed and JROC validated),
required system characteristics for MILSATCOM systems.
2. The Seven Characteristics
The CRD presents the required characteristics as joint, DoD wide "capstone"
requirements that apply to all types of SATCOM, (refer to Table 1). [CRD, 1998, pp.1 -18] Each
characteristic is connected to DoD-defined mission areas and is intended to specify how mission
areas are supported by MILSATCOM. Furthermore, five characteristics have some attributes that
are "so critical to warfighters and their support communities they are designated as capstone
KPPs," (key performance parameters). "By definition, KPPs are those capabilities or
characteristics considered most essential for successful mission accomplishment." [CRD, 1998,
pp.1 -19] The KPPs are presented in Table 2. The CRD presents KPPs as system-of-system
threshold requirements. Use of KPPs as threshold requirements does not require every future
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component system of the MILSATCOM architecture to meet or exceed very KPP level of
performance, instead KPPs define the performance level of the entire architecture. Therefore:
• The seven required characteristics establish the link between the user needs and
SATCOM system attributes.
• KPPs provide specific guidance for threshold level performance of the entire architecture.
• It is understood that each component system will contribute uniquely to the overall
MILSATCOM architecture and that and trades will be conducted to optimize each
component towards obtaining a threshold capable system-of-systems.
• KPPs are JROC validated.
29
CATEGORY RATIONALE (WHY REQUIRED)
COVERAGE Global national interests and threat environment.
Regional conflicts/crises unpredictable in location, time, intensity and duration.
Smaller US force structure; globally dispersed land, sea, air, and space
operations.
Time and geographically varying user population densities.
CAPACITY Warfighter information demands are growing in response to doctrine and
technology.
Information + C4ISR + Precision Munitions = Combat Power
Connectivity cannot be a limiting factor in the application of combat power.
MILSATCOM = Assured warfighter connectivity when/where needed.
MILSATCOM provides dynamic, multiple information transfer capabilities.
PROTECTION Our C4I is a prime target and a center of gravity which we expect adversaries to
attack.
Must deny adversaries the ability to decapitate our C2 and 1ST capabilities.
Nuclear deterrence remains a top DoD priority (and requires survivable C2).
Must provide anti-jam, protection from SIGINT, information security, and other
defensive information operations measures.
ACCESS AND
CONTROL
Access to information and comm on-demand: fundamental need of the warfighter.
Warfighters must have control over their information and MILSATCOM domains.
Military resources must be rapidly and dynamically reconfigured to respond to
changing operational situations and priorities.
INTER-
OPERABILITY
MILSATCOM is the space portion of the Defense Information Infrastructure.
Most operations are joint in nature and execution (Land, Air, Naval, Mobility,
Combat Support and Special Operations Forces).
US Forces conduct missions with Allied, Coalition Partners, and Government
Agencies.
Warfighters use a variety of communications to effect needed information
transfers.
FLEXIBILITY Warfighters prosecute military operations across a wide spectrum of conflict.
Need to accommodate evolving doctrine, requirements, threats, and technologies.
Emphasis is on fast-paced mobile operations.
A wide variety of operating frequencies is required to support the warfighters'
needs.
Warfighters' must make efficient use of limited frequency spectrum.
Systems should be reliable, easy to use and safe to operate.
QUALITY OF
SERVICE
Supported warfighting and combat support systems drive performance criteria.
Information must be transferred accurately and unambiguously.
Table 1. Required System Characteristics [CRD, 1998, pp. 1-19]
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PARAMETER THRESHOLD(KPPs) OBJECTIVE
COVERAGE Ability to provide MILSATCOM when/where
needed in areas north of 65 degrees south
latitude
Ability to provide MILSATCOM
at all latitudes and longitudes
CAPACITY Provide requisite amounts of wideband and
narrowband capabilities (throughputs and
accesses) to the warfighters and their
supporting infrastructures:
-Wideband (symmetric, asymmetric and
broadcast)
>Focus on deployed forces and OCONUS
warrior support activities (e.g. DISN,
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service
[DTS], the intelligence community, etc)
-Protected communications (see below)
-Narrowband (netted and other topologies)




Support data rates up to 64
KBPS into handheld
narrowband devices.
PROTECTION Provide levels of protection to sub-sets of the
overall MILSATCOM capacities:
-Survivable and anti-jam communications for
NCA/SIOP forces
-Anti-jam for "front line" C2 and common-user
networks
LPI/LPD for critical tactical and strategic
covert/sensitive users
-US Control for selected users (e.g. vital
diplomatic and intelligence needs and selected
tactical)
Prevent unauthorized access to, or disclosure
of, information.
Threshold plus provide
AJ,LPI/LPD and/or US Control








CINCs/Joint Task Forces dictate resource
utilization over apportioned resources and can
plan, allocate, and schedule access within
fractions of hours to a few hours.
MILSATCOM resources can be rapidly and
dynamically configured and re-configured
within a few hours to fractions of hours
(selected networks within minutes).
Near-real-time authorization,
denial, preemption of access.
Accomplish dynamic resource




Interoperability between/among CINC and JTF
components (e.g. Land, Air, Naval, Mobility,
Combat Support, and Special Operations
Forces)
MILSATCOM is fully integrated as the space
Threshold plus interoperability
with allies and coalition
partners and other Federal
agencies (non-DOD).
Table 2. Capston Key Performance Parameters [CRD, 1998, pp. 1-20]
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The two previous tables provide the top-level connection between the required system
characteristics, the KPPs and user needs. Being a joint document that addresses all types of
SATCOM service, there are a subset of elements presented in the tables that are directly
applicable to the naval wideband discussion. At the very least the required characteristics and the
associated KPPs provide a legitimate baseline for the discovery and refinement of naval specific
performance measures. The intent of the remaining portions of this chapter is to use the CRD
required characteristics and KPPs to derive specific performance measures that articulate naval
wideband SATCOM needs.
D. SEVEN FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR NAVAL WIDEBAND SATCOM
The process of defining naval wideband SATCOM performance parameters is performed
using the CRD's required systems characteristics as a starting point. The CRD is straightforward
and intentional in its description of how the required characteristics and KPPs should be used.
The CRD states,
"The required system characteristics and associated thresholds and objectives
identified in this section are presented at a system-of-systems 'capstone' level.
They provide the capstone requirements framework and performance goals to
support the preparation of ORDs and other acquisition and leasing programs and
initiatives. They also provide a mechanism for the JROC to maintain oversight of
the mission area. The ORD remains the defining acquisition document for
individual system development and testing. When individual system ORDs are
developed they will contain detailed and specific KPPs and critical system
characteristics, along with specific and qualified objective and threshold values.
For their individual programs, supporting the obtainment, in whole or part, of the
capstone requirement contained herein. Additional required system
characteristics may be added, and some of the required system characteristics
identified here may be modified or combined to better describe specific system
requirements." [Cf?D,1998, pp.4-2]
The use of the required characteristics as the functional objectives of a system evaluation
hierarchy is in line with the intended use of the CRD characteristics. What needs to be done is
that the joint, top-level characteristics need to be refined and tailored to more closely match naval
wideband SATCOM characteristics. The translation of each of the seven required characteristics
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to naval wideband user functional objectives is begun in the next section and parallels the
development of the seven characteristics as presented in Section 4, Required System





Coverage refers to the "part of the Earth that a spacecraft instrument3 can see at one
instant or over an extended period" of time and is frequently a key element in spacecraft design.
[Larson, 1992, pp.161] This definition implies that coverage has two attributes, time and
geographic (earth surface area). A spacecraft's antenna technology, the number of satellites in a
constellation, and the constellation's orbital parameters are critically linked to both of these
attributes. Coverage is often the driving reason for selection of a space based system over a
terrestrial system and therefore significant design, cost and performance trades are made to
characterize a system's time and geographic coverage.
The CRD defines coverage as "the portion of the earth's surface and the airspace above
it which SATCOM services can be provided." [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3] This definition fails to account
for the time attribute, and therefore falls short of full characterization of coverage. Despite this
shortcoming the CRD does include the time element of coverage in the discussion of coverage
requirements and the refinement of the coverage KPP. Ultimately the CRD states that "the
essential element of coverage is the ability to dynamically focus required satellite caabilties where
the varieties of users are located across the face of the globe when they need it." [CRD, 1998, pp.
4-10] Clearly this definition of coverage is in line with a space system designer's definition of the
term. Therefore, the definition of coverage that will be used in this COMMER wideband evaluation
hierarchy is (refer to Figure 7. Coverage Defined):
3 Instrument in this context refers to the spacecraft's wideband communications antenna.
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COVERAGE
The ability to dynamically focus required satellite
capabilities when and where needed.
Figure 7. Coverage Defined
2. Why is it Required?
Given a definition for coverage the next step in the process is to identify what user
characteristics coverage encompasses. The CRD's capstone level justification of coverage must
be translated into naval warfighter characteristics, and coverage must support those
characteristics. This translation is displayed in Table 3. Coverage Justification.




Coverage Global national interests and threat •
environment.
Regional conflicts/crises
unpredictable in location, time, •
intensity and duration.
Smaller US force structure;
globally dispersed land, sea, air, •
and space operations.
Time and geographically varying
user population densities.
Expeditionary nature implies
unpredictable in location (global),
time, intensity and duration.
Structured to project power implies
coverage of unpopulated areas (the
sea).
Self-supporting implies coverage to
a smaller naval force structure;
globally dispersed land, sea, and air
operations.
Unrestricted coverage not limited by
accepted international treaty
Scalable implies the ability to
increase/decrease coverage to
meet operational need.
Table 3. Coverage Justification
To support the naval warfighter acceptable alternatives should not negate the naval
force's expeditionary and self-supporting nature. Ideally coverage must be available to all units, at
all locations with out the luxury of a priori location information. Furthermore, ships at sea (an
unpopulated area without a strong commercial market) must be able to participate in the naval
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network. Coverage must not be limited by international regulations that impose frequency
restrictions on ships operating in littoral areas.4 Lastly, coverage must be scalable, capable of
supporting peacetime operations up to a major theater of war (MTW).
3. Measuring Coverage, Where is Coverage Required?
In this evaluation hierarchy the coverage attributes time and geographic are used to
quantify a system's coverage. This section will address the geographic space performance
measures and Section 4. Measuring Coverage, When is coverage required? will address the time
driven measures.
In geographic terms coverage is defined as, the discrete portion of the earth's surface that
receives a usable amount of a communications system's power. Two elements of this definition
need refinement. They are, 1) the discrete portion of the earth's surface, and 2) usable amount of
power. In order to effectively refine the definitions of these elements two additional SATCOM
designer terms must be introduced, both of which contribute to the understanding of geographic
coverage.
These terms are:
Footprint Area (FA), also Field of View (FA) or instantaneous coverage area) =
the area that a spacecraft's antenna can see at any instant .
Instantaneous Access Area (IAA) = all the area that the spacecraft's antenna
could potentially see at any instant if it were scanned through its normal range of
orientations. [Larson, 1992, pp.1 61 -162]
As displayed in Figure 8, FA and IAA are clearly not equal surface areas. The lAAs of the
Global Broadcast Service (GBS) payloads hosted on the geosynchronous UHF Follow-On (UFO)
satellites 8, 9 and 10 are the discrete portions of the earth that any one of the three steerable
4Naval forces operating within a nation's territorial waters are subject to the radio spectrum usage
regulations that nation has established. These regulations can significantly restrict use of mobile
SATCOM if it interferes with terrestrial communications.
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downlinks (1 - 2000nm wide area, and 2 - 500nm spot beams) can be scanned through.5
Therefore, as shown in Figure 8, the black ovals correspond to the GBS lAAs, which are
approximately 150-degrees wide and encompass all latitudes between 65-degrees north and 65-
degrees south. Furthermore, although the name insinuates "instantaneous" scanning of the IAA,
this is not always the case. For example, for GBS antenna pointing (relocation of a spot beam)
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Figure 8. Example of FA and IAA [USPACOM GBS CONOPS, 1998, pp. 11]
Also represented in Figure 8, is the GBS FA. Since each GBS payload has three
steerable antennas there are three distinct FAs per payload. In the case of GBS there are two
5 Although GBS is not a two-way broadband system (users are receive only), GBS can still be
used in this example for explaining IAA and FA.
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500nm spot beams (FAs) and one 2000nm beam (FAs). Users who are within a particular GBS
IAA but not within a GBS FA will not receive the transmitted broadcast . The dramatic and
operationally significant difference between IAA and FA should now be clearly evident.
There remains a final point to fully define a satellite's IAA and FOV and that is; what is the
power level at the edge of the FA when it is located at the edge of the IAA? The goal here is have
a common standard for vendors to use when depicting IAA and FA. The result is the ability to
compare competing systems on equal grounds. The answer to the power level question is given
by the definition of the second element of the geographic coverage definition.
The second element of the geographic definition, usable power, is a multi-parameter
variable that is highly application dependent. A SATCOM terminal's usable power is a function of:
user population, terminal type, terminal size, operating frequency, weather, elevation angle,
desired data rate, desired bit error rate, and numerous other parameters that degrade signal
energy. Simply put, usable power varies with the situation. Despite this variability the user can
create a common, effective definition for usable power. An example definition of usable power is:
The power needed to provide a standard terminal a bit error rate (BER) of 10" 10 or better while:
• (Location) operating at the edge of the FA when it is located at the edge of the IAA.
• (Environmental conditions) in clear weather and stable sea conditions [Sea State 1]
• (Elevation angle) with an antenna elevation angle of greater than or equal to 10-degrees
Obviously each component of this definition needs some clarification. First and foremost,
in order to create a common point of reference for the comparison of different commercial
wideband service providers the user must define a standard terminal. Characterization of a
standard terminal should come directly from the market survey and should reflect the user's
needs. Because the characterization of a standard terminal is driven by user needs some degree
of subjective will be evident. Weight and size are the two most critical terminal characteristics.
Both the antenna and supporting hardware need to be included in the user's definition of a
standard terminal. In an effort not to unintentionally exclude service providers the user should
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characterize the terminal weight and size using acceptable ranges, or "not to exceed values".
Although antenna sizes are often presented in terms of dish diameter, antenna volume should be
used instead. In the naval environment (aboard ship, in a periscope mast, or on the top of a
vehicle), space for new equipment is often limited and severely constrained. Furthermore, harsh
environmental factors (humidity, salt, sand, mud, etc.) generally require that all sensitive
equipment be protected by some hood or casing. Environmental protection equipment can
significantly increase terminal volume. Therefore, specification of terminal weight and size should
include all terminal components.
The determination of an acceptable BER is probably the most important element in the
definition of usable power. Acceptable BER determines what products and applications the user's
terminal will support. As a critical component of the link budget equation, BER is a driving
component in the design of communication systems. Acceptable BER should be entirely user
determined and needs driven. Table 4 lists the acceptable BER for different applications (required
data rate). This chapter's later section discussing Quality of Service provides a greater
explanation of BER. The use of a BER better than or equal to 10" 10 was based on GBS Phase II




Computer Data - 1x10"6
Computer Networks 1x10
-7
Table 4. Standard BERs [Freeman, 1991, pp. 417]
Location of the terminal is another critical factor, in that transmission path losses are




Therefore, transmission losses are maximum when the edge of FA coincides with the edge of the
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IAA. Point A in Figure 8 represents such a point.6 The receive antenna elevation angle is also
related to transmission path loss. The lower the angle the greater the distance between the
transmitter and receiver and therefore the greater the transmission loss. Restricting elevation
angle to greater than or equal to 10-degrees establishes a common boundary condition that
reduces the parameters involved in determining available power. For reference, in order to block
the receiving antenna an obstruction (i.e., another ship) positioned 1.0 nautical miles from the
receiver would have to be over 0.176 nautical miles tall (327m) (refer to Figure 9. Elevation
Angle). In most cases only land or tall objects close to the receiver will obstruct its view.
<-
1 nautical mile
tan (10deg) = 0.176 nm
->
Figure 9. Elevation Angle
Specification of the operating conditions as clear weather and stable sea state [SS1]
further reduces the variables involved in the power determination problem and creates a common
point of reference for system comparison. Although the naval user does have requirements to
operate the terminal at greater than SS1 this does not need to be reflected in defining the
requirements for FA and IAA. Recall that the goal is to create a common reference point for
comparing competing system capabilities. Therefore, use of ideal weather and sea conditions
removes ambiguities that vendor's can introduce when trying to market their system.
6 Note: Use of GBS as an example does not imply that GBS conforms to the definition of usable
power presented above.
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The bottom line for characterization of a standard terminal is to create a user needs
driven definition that provides a common reference point for vendor comparisons. The desired
output is to have vendor's provide coverage maps (IAA and FA) that are based on identical
parameters.7 Furthermore, the vendor and the user have a mutual understanding of how
geographic coverage is defined. That is, geographic coverage is the discrete portion of the earth's
surface that receives a usable amount of a communications system's power. Given that the user
has clearly identified an acceptable BER for a standard (user defined) terminal. Armed with an
understanding of what capability a vendor's geographic coverage maps represent the user can
discuss coverage in operational terms as geographical focus areas.
a) How Does the User Describe "Where" He Needs Coverage?
Three terms commonly used to characterize coverage are global coverage,
geographic coverage, and worldwide coverage." DoD defined a fourth term, theater coverage, to
articulate the need to "provide for concentrations of in-theater forces." [CRD, 1998, pp.4-12]
Global coverage is defined as all latitudes and longitudes and geographic
regions."[CRD, 1998, pp.4-3] The need for global wideband coverage is directly tied to the naval
force global presence mission and expeditionary nature. Geographic coverage refers to any one





North Polar (all longitudes above 65-degrees north latitude)
7 Most coverage maps are based on "common" regulatory requirements and reflect a system's
IAA and FA as determined by frequency interference guidelines. Although important, these
coverage maps fail to adequately depict a system from a user's perspective. The common
reference point proposed in this thesis is user derived, and therefore is more directly meaningful
to the user and more valuable when comparing competing systems. The bottom line the coverage
map needs to directly represent where a user will get his desired level of service.
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South Polar (all longitudes below 65-degrees south latitude) [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3]
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Figure 10. Geographical Regions (Representative) [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3]
The driving need behind regional coverage is the requirement to support widely
dispersed naval forces operating in areas vital to the nation's interests. Additionally inter-regional
coverage is required to ensure that communications between CONUS and a given region is
maintained. The "sixth region, the South Polar Region, has had very few MILSATCOM
requirements identified in the past. However, that region may receive emphasis if DoD user
requirements emerge in the future," (see Figure 11). [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3]
On the other hand the North Polar Region (refer to Figure 12) has significant
historical and future importance to naval force execution of the national security strategy. Although
there are fewer requirements for North Polar coverage than any of the other four regions
(excluding the South Polar Region) the North Polar needs are considered vital to the national
interests and therefore receive high priority. More information concerning north polar
communications requirements are provided in the classified Polar System ORD, (see List of
References). [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3]
41
Figure 11. South Polar Region [CRD, 1998, PP. 4-13]
Figure 12. North Polar Region [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-13]
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"Worldwide coverage, is generally defined as the surface of the earth between
65-degrees south latitude and 65-degrees north latitude." [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3] Therefore
worldwide coverage encompasses the CONUS and Americas, Atlantic-Europe-Africa, Asian-
Indian Ocean, and Pacific geographic regions. The poles are not part of worldwide coverage. The
shaded region of Figure 13 represents worldwide coverage. Similar to the need for global
coverage, worldwide coverage is needed to support "dispersed, distributed, mobile, and
relocatable users... from anywhere... without the necessity of their time and location of access
always being known beforehand." [CRD, 1998, pp.4-11] This requirement clearly is in line with the
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Figure 13. Worldwide Coverage Area (65 Deg N - 65 Deg S) [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-11]
The final geographical region to be defined is the Theater coverage region. As a
joint level document the CRD presents the need for coverage in support of two near simultaneous
major theaters of war (MTW) or multiple small-scale contingencies (SCC). [CRD 1998, pp. 4-12]
As participants in a MTW naval forces share in the need for a SATCOM "surge" capability, to
support the greater communications demand in a MTW. However as potentially the primary
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participants in SSCs (i.e., an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with an embarked Marine
Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC)), naval forces have a definite need for
theater level coverage. Not only is there a requirement to provide coverage of a SSC theater but
there is an additional requirement to have the ability to "adjust the theater coverage in response to
the tactical situation." [CRD 1998, pp. 4-12] Additionally, the providing system must be able to
provide out of/into theater communications between in-theater forces and CONUS or overseas
support forces. [CRD 1998, pp. 4-12] As Figure 14 shows a SSC is approximately 1000 by 1000
km in size.
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Figure 14. Notional Theater Area [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-13]
b) Geographic Measures of Performance (MOPs)
The parameters defined in the previous sections: standard user terminal, usable
power, acceptable BER, IAA, FA, global coverage, worldwide coverage, regional coverage, and
theater coverage can be combined to form two MOPs that represent naval force geographic
coverage needs. The two MOPs are IAA and FA. That is, a candidate system's IAA and FA can
be defined by the level of coverage (global, worldwide, regional, theater) it provides. Then the
44
geographic coverage of competing systems can be compared based on their lAAs and FAs. Since
each system's IAA and FA should be defined in accordance with the definition provided in this
thesis, two systems claiming to have worldwide IAA and FA coverage should provide the same
amount of usable power to a user defined standard terminal. It is important to note that in most
cases IAA and FA coverage will not be equal. For example, as a system GBS Phase II (once
completed) has a regional IAA,8 and a theater FA (taken together the three spot beams can
adequately cover a theater). On the other hand Teledesic intends to use a large number of LEO
spacecraft each having numerous spot beams to effectively provide worldwide IAA and FA
coverage. Of course a single Teledesic satellite will not provide worldwide coverage, but the
Teledesic customer won't purchase service from a single satellite, they will purchase service from
the entire system. Although this may seem obvious, it is only intended to highlight the need to
evaluate competing systems at the overall service level not satellite level. With that said if a
company wants to sell regional coverage using a single GEO satellite then the overall service
level equals that single satellite's capabilities.
In summary geographic coverage is the discrete portion of the earth's surface
that receives a usable amount of a communications system's power. The user determines usable
power by defining the characteristics of a standard terminal (acceptable BER, location,
environment, and elevation angle). The difference between a system's IAA and FA is identified
and articulated in terms of global, worldwide, regional and theater coverage. Figure 15 provides a
graphical review of the terms presented.
8 Given the gap in coverage between UFO-8 and UFO-9, GBS Phase II is not a true worldwide
system. The central U.S. is not in the GBS IAA and therefore major commands in that region
(USSPACECOM, USTRANSCOM and USSTRATCOM) are not provided direct access to GBS
Phase II this gap prohibits classification of GBS as having worldwide IAA.
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MOE = COVERAGE
The ability to dynamically focus
required satellite capabilities
when and where needed.
GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
The discrete portion of the
earth's surface that receives a















Given a Standard Terminal:





Figure 15. Geographic Coverage Summary
Measuring Coverage, When is Coverage Required?
As previously stated coverage is the ability to dynamically focus required satellite
capabilities when and where needed. As described in Chapter II, naval wideband SATCOM users
will operate in a dispersed, highly dynamic environment, often requiring short notice relocation.
Therefore, naval users require wideband satellite services that provide coverage when and where
required "without the necessity of their time and location of access always being known
beforehand." [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-11] This does not necessarily imply that in order to be useful a
system must have 24 hour a day geographic coverage. What it implies is that usefulness, (value
to the warfighter) is the ability to rely on having coverage in a particular geographic area when it is
needed. Within this evaluation hierarchy accounting for reliable access is performed in two places;
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once under the coverage functional objective (this section) and again under the access and
control functional objective (in a later section). Accounting for time under the coverage MOE
provides a means for ensuring that access to the satellite is possible because the satellite is in
view of the user's terminal. Under the access and control MOE, it is assumed that the satellite is in
view of the user's terminal and that access is a function of transponder loading and user priority.
The difference is subtle but important. Furthermore, being in view of the satellite implies that the
user's terminal is within a system's FA and therefore can receive service from the system.
Therefore, time coverage answers the question; How long and how often does the user have
access to the FA?
The parameters that determine whether or not a satellite is in view of the user's terminal
are functions of the design of the overall SATCOM system. The primary drivers of "time in view"
are satellite altitude, inclination, and the number and spacing of the system spacecraft. A lengthy
discussion of orbital characteristics is not required, however it is important to have an
understanding that in general, (refer to Figure 16):
• Geostationary & Geosynchronous (GEO): satellites positioned above the equator at an
altitude of 19,323 nautical miles (35786 km) can generally be said to remain in a fixed
position relative to a position on the surface of the earth. Furthermore due to their
increased altitude GEO IAA and FA are often very large.
• Medium Earth Orbiting (MEO): satellites at altitudes between LEO and GEO move relative
to a fixed position on the surface of the earth. Time in view, IAA and FA for MEO satellites
varies and is greatly determined by the oblateness (eccentricity) and altitude of the
satellite's orbit.
• Low Earth Orbiting (LEO): satellites generally at altitudes of less than 540 nautical miles
(1000 km) move relative to a fixed position on the surface of the earth, and the average
time in view for the generic LEO spacecraft is less than 17 minutes. Furthermore, given
that the earth rotates underneath the moving satellite the time between opportunities to
view the satellite varies from a low of approximately 90 minutes up to a high of many
hours. In general LEO IAA and FA are much smaller than that of a GEO satellite.
These short definitions reveal the critical impacts that orbit selection has on the
warfighter. For example, it should be apparent that LEO and MEO systems will require user
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terminals to have a satellite tracking capability. 9 That is, the user's antenna will have to acquire
and then track the moving satellite. Although this problem is not technologically infeasible it does
increase the complexity of the system. However, a benefit of the LEO systems is that their relative
close proximity to the user generally allows the user to have a smaller less powerful terminal
compared to that needed for a MEO or GEO system. Less power translates into less complexity,
less logistics support, and decreased electronic signature. The underlining fact is that numerous
trades go into SATCOM coverage optimization. The naval user should remember that commercial
wideband systems will be optimized for the commercial (not naval) user, and therefore the Navy
and Marine Corps will have limited influence over system design.
Figure 16. Representative Satellite Coverage Patterns [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-5]
This brief introduction to the orbital operating regimes can be used to understand that
time coverage (access to the satellite) must be measured by two parameters:
9 A characteristic of the SHF frequency bands (the band in which most of the wideband systems
operate) is that their transmissions are highly focused and directional. This implies the need for
satellite tracking.
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Time in view (TIV): where TIV is the maximum continuous period of time that the
user with a standard terminal is within the system level FA, (i.e., the time that the
user is able to communicate with the system.)
Time between views (TBV): where TBV is the maximum continuous period of
time that the user with a standard terminal is not within the system level FA, (i.e.,
the time that the user has to wait to use the system.)
For the user the goal is to maximize TIV while minimizing TBV. For example Astrolink
(shown in Figure 17), a proposed wideband system supported by Lockheed Martin will employ
nine geostationary satellites in five orbital slots to ensure 24 hour worldwide coverage. Therefore,
since GEO satellites do not move relative to a position on the earth, system level TIV equals 24
hours, TBV equals hours 10 , an ideal system in terms of time coverage.
Contrast the Astrolink solution with a generic LEO system that consists of only one
satellite. Given that a LEO satellite moves quickly relative to a fixed position on the earth TIV is
approximately 17 minutes or less and TBV ranges from approximately 90 minutes to hours
depending on the orbital inclination and altitude. In order to get a system level TIV equal to 24
hours, and TBV equal to hours the LEO constellation must consist of a large number of properly
phased satellites. As currently planned, Teledesic, a proposed commercial wideband system,
intends on having 288 satellites in LEO 11 to ensure TIV equal to 24 hours, and TBV equal to
hours. 12[Teledesic, 1998] Again for the user this represents ideal time coverage.
10 This is assuming that Astrolink will provide both a worldwide IAA and FA.
11 Teledesic is filed to operate at an altitude under 1400km, which is still considered LEO.
[Teledesic, 1998]
12 Just as in the Astrolink case it is assumed that Teledesic will provide an effective worldwide
system level IAA and FA. Teledesic intends to do this by employing multiple overlapping spot













Figure 17. Astrolink Satellite Constellation [Astrolink, 1998]
5. Summary
In summary time coverage uses the measures of time in view (TIV) and time between
views (TBV) to answer the question how long and how often the user has access to the FA?
Again, the goal is to provide the user with maximum TIV and minimum TBV. In conclusion as a
functional objective the coverage MOE consists of four MOPs: FA, IAA, TIV and TBV. Relative
weighting and determination of dropdead, threshold and objective values for each of these
measures are provided in Chapter IV. Figure 18 and Figure 19 provide a graphical review of the
terms presented in this section.
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Coverage
Footprint Area Instantaneous Access Area Time In View Time Between Views
Figure 18. Coverage Measures of Performance
MOE s COVERAGE
The ability to dynamically focus
required satellite capabilities
when and where needed.
GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
The discrete portion of the
earth's surface that receives a
usable amount of a system's
power.
TIME COVERAGE
Answers the question how long
and how often does the user



















Given a Standard Terminal:








Most communications engineering textbooks define capacity as the "maximum rate of
reliable information transmission over a given channel." [Haykin, 1983] Prior to the late 1940's the
leading information transmission theorists believed that the "output of a noisy channel could only
be imperfect data."[Stark, 1988] It was known that output errors could be decreased by increasing
power, channel bandwidth or both, "but perfect reliability at a fixed power and bandwidth was
thought to be impossible in principle."[Stark, 1988] In 1948, in his bandwidth paper, Claude
Shannon successfully argued that "virtually perfect transmission was possible in a given channel
at any rate less than a fixed C bits/channel," where C was the channel capacity. [Stark, 1988] The
essence of Shannon's theory is that due to errors in the channel (i.e., noise in the transmission
path) the output information (symbol) may be different from the input information (symbol) and
there exists a theoretical value below which channel induced errors are probabilistically small.
Furthermore, this theoretical capacity is achieved by proper coding of the input signal. Numerous
complex yet effective coding schemes have been derived from this fundamental theorem. Each
coding scheme has distinct benefits and detractors that impact bandwidth, power and BER.
Coding theory and the engineering that goes into channel capacity optimization is not
required knowledge for naval warfighters trying to articulate their SATCOM capacity needs.
However, the basic principle that capacity comes at a price and that achieving desired capacity
involves trades that can impact mission effectiveness is essential knowledge. From this it should
also be realized that capacity is inherently a function of overall system design. Although follow-on
modification of coding schemes or information transmission protocols may increase a system's
capacity satellite hardware components and constellation design will pre-determine the
boundaries of these "soft" modifications. The naval warfighter's goal is to associate capacity
requirements with SATCOM design parameters. Doing so will indicate preference for particular
system capabilities and therefore design options.
52
The optimization of SATCOM capacity not only includes determination of frequency
(bandwidth), power, and coding scheme but numerous other variables. The CRD does a good job
of presenting throughput (capacity) as a function of some of the variables, (see Figure 20).
THROUGHPUT versus






Figure 20. Throughput Parameters [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3]
Given these parameters the CRD defines capacity of a SATCOM system as "the kinds
and amounts of throughput available to the targeted user population as measure against specific
employment scenarios. Capacity also encompasses the numbers of individual 'accesses' that can
be supported by the system." [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-3] This definition does a good job limiting



















Figure 21. Example User Network Topologies [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-5]
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The number of accesses is used to account for the number of individual demands that are placed
on the transmitting satellite. Access varies with network topology and is critical to determining
overall system loading. As presented in the CRD Figure 21 shows how the number of accesses
varies with network topology. For example, the hub-spoke topology has four accesses, H, 1,2,
and 3. [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-4] It is important to realize that a SATCOM broadcast is one access,
because it only places one demand on the satellite transponder. However, when an individual
receiving element attempts to reach-back to the hub an additional access is created. Furthermore,
each access does not have to require the same capacity.
The complexity of characterizing a user's capacity should now be evident. Required
capacity depends on the situation. However, in an attempt to define capacity such that it can be
used to evaluate competing wideband concepts for naval use across a wide spectrum of
operations and situations is important to include this flexibility in the definition. This flexibility is
represented in the definition displayed in Figure 22. What this definition means and what
performance measures are used to represent is the focus the section titled, 3. Measuring
Capacity.
CAPACITY
The maximum rate of reliable information
transmission.
Figure 22. Capacity Defined
2. Why is it Required?
Given a definition for capacity the next step in the process is to identify what user
characteristics are addressed by the capacity MOE. In general capacity requirements are driven
by an increase in the warfighter's need for information. New weapon technologies (i.e., precision
guided munitions), new reconnaissance systems (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles) and emerging
surveillance and targeting systems such as the Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC) require
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wideband communications for effective employment. Wideband SATCOM, possibly commercial
wideband SATCOM will be used to met these needs. In an ideal situation naval forces at every
level would have enough wideband capacity to satisfy user requirements. Translation of the CRD
joint level capacity requirements to naval force requirements is shown in Table




Capacity Warfighter information demands
are growing in response to
doctrine and technology.
Information + C4ISR + Precision
Munitions = Combat Power
Connectivity cannot be a limiting
factor in the application of combat
power.





Expeditionary nature implies a need
for capacity on the move (when and
where needed).
Structured to project power implies
adequate capacity to support
advanced weapon systems.
Capacity can not limit combat
power.
Self-supporting implies a capability
to provide user required level of
capacity.
Unrestricted implies assured
access to required capacity.
Scalable implies the ability to surge
to meet increased demand.
Table 5. Capacity Justification
As with the other MOEs the lack of capacity should not hinder naval forces' operational
concepts. Capacity should advance and contribute to the Navy and Marine Corps' expeditionary
nature and enhance the naval forces' ability to project power ashore.
3. Measuring Capacity
As previously presented, capacity is defined as a system's maximum rate of reliable
information transmission. Critical to this definition is the determination of reliable information. For
use within this evaluation hierarchy reliable information equates to the BER as stated by the user
in the definition of a standard terminal. Recall that a standard terminal was defined as a terminal
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with a user specified; weight, volume, BER, location, operating environment and minimum
operational elevation angle. This same standard terminal will be used as a constant parameter for
all of the capacity MOPs.
It is proposed that a system's capacity be measured by three performance parameters;
terminal mobility, quantity of accesses, and terminal data rate. Each of three MOPs has sub-
attributes that are used to compute a numerical value to represent each MOP. In effect these sub-
attributes account for a 4
th
level in the evaluation hierarchy and are MOPs to the MOPs. However,
since this level is not present across all MOEs it was not originally presented. In an effort to
reduce confusion, capacity will remain labeled a MOE; mobility, quantity and data rate are
capacity MOPs; and the characteristics that define the individual MOPs will be referred to as sub-
attributes. Discussion of how these sub-attributes are integrated to create a MOP value is
presented in Chapter IV, Section E, Capacity MOPs.
a) Data Rate
A basic desire and fundamental design parameter is a system's maximum
throughput to a single operator. This is best measured assuming ideal conditions. Use of ideal
conditions removes external variables that can bias vendor supplied results. In this case ideal
conditions are those conditions specified by the user defined standard terminal. The goal of this
performance measure is to allow the vendor to tell the user what the system is capable of
providing to a single standard terminal under ideal conditions. For the commercial vendor this may
be equivalent to the data rate that is advertised to the civilian customer. The naval user's
specification of a standard terminal is analogous to the fine print in the advertisement that defines
the boundaries of vendor's claims. The data rate MOP has two sub-attributes; terminal transmit
data rate and terminal receive data rate. These two data rates are separated to account for the
user's tendency to conduct asymmetric communications.
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b) Mobility
User mobility is a critical naval user parameter. In terms of SATCOM design
specifications user mobility has a significant impact on terminal design. The 21 s1 century naval
warfighter will need to have wideband capacity on the move. Just how much capacity is required
is a point of debate. It is the author's opinion that the warfighter desires the same amount of
information on the move as is required at the halt. The warfighter does not want to stop physical
motion to get information (i.e., communications on the "pause"). However, given a choice naval
warfighters favor mobility to capacity. Although speed of information exchange is as an element of
warfare (i.e., information operations) and therefore critical to survival in combat, a platform's (i.e.,
ship, plane, or vehicle) ability to physically move has a more direct relationship to survival. The
bottom line is that a moving target is harder to hit; no matter how fast it processes information.
With these thoughts in mind evaluation of a system's ability to deliver a fixed amount of capacity
to a mobile user is an important MOP.
Just how much capacity is available to the mobile user is driven by how a mobile
user is defined. 13 For use within this evaluation hierarchy a mobile user will be characterized by
four sub-attributes; velocity, pitch rate, roll rate and yaw rate. Each parameter is evaluated in
isolation. Therefore one of the four parameters is varied while the remaining three are held
constant. Capacity is also held constant and use of a standard terminal is assumed. The
parameters are assumed to be measured using a standard terminal mounted on any platform
capable of 3-axis motion (i.e., ship, plane, submarine and vehicle). The goal is to identify
maximum velocity, pitch, roll and yaw rates for a fixed amount of capacity. It is assumed that the
terminal remains in the FA throughout the period of motion. Therefore, the sub-attributes are
actually measuring the antenna's tracking ability. The fixed capacity value that is used in this
evaluation should be user determined and constant across all evaluated systems. Therefore, for
13 International regulations concerning FSS to a mobile user are not accounted for in this
performance parameter and are assumed to not effect mobile SATCOM capacity.
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the capacity mobility MOP the user must specify a capacity value in addition to characterization of
a standard terminal.
A user's velocity is consider to be the rate of change in linear motion (i.e., pitch
rate = roll rate = yaw rate = 0) on a ideal (flat) surface. The goal is to identify a terminal's
maximum attainable speed along a flat surface (i.e., a truck on a paved highway) for a fixed
capacity. An example use would be an in-flight video collaborative planning session between
assault forces embarked on multiple C-17 & C-141 enroute to a combat area. The velocity sub-
attribute can be measured in either; knots, miles per hour, meters per second, or kilometers per
hour.
Pitch, roll and yaw rates are also intended to measure a terminal's ability to
provide a fixed level of service while executing tactical maneuvers or operating in harsh
environments. Each parameter is measured in degrees per second (or radians per second) while
the other three sub-attributes are held constant (velocity, and the other two axis motions). Pitch,
roll and yaw are defined as (refer to Figure 23):
• Roll: is motion about the X-axis.
• Pitch: is motion about the Y-axis.
• Yaw: is motion about the Z-axis.
Pitch
Roll
Note: (0,0) of the coordinate
frame is assumed to be
located at the vehicle center
of mass.
Figure 23. Mobility Attributes
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Taken together the four mobility sub-attributes capture a system's ability to
provide wideband service to a mobile user. Antenna steering wold most likely be accomplished
with a combination of phased array (electronic beam shaping) and mechanical tracking.
c) Quantity
Quantity of accesses is a desired parameter in that it provides a measure of
overall system capacity. Naval vision publications and future naval concept recognize that the
power that information has on the battlefield is related to the number of participants in the
information network. Network participants not only receive information but they inject information
and data into the network. The often cited Metcalfe's Law, "the power value of a network
increases as the square of the number of nodes on the network (N 2)," (Robert Metcalfe, inventor
of the Ethernet) is used to express the contribution that increased participants provide. [Boyd,
1 997] Therefore two sub-attributes are used to measure quantity of access. These sub-attributes
are, 1) total accesses available in a theater14 , and 2) available excess capacity (in terms of
accesses) within a theater. Each of these two attributes are defined and justified below.
Naval users will not be the sole users of a commercial wideband SATCOM
system, and in a worldwide crisis demands for more SATCOM accesses will be made by the
commercial customer. The Navy and Marine Corps will directly compete with other interested
parties (i.e., television and news organizations, relief organizations, other allied military forces, and
possibly enemy forces) for commercial wideband resources within the theater of operations. This
fact is one of the major detractors for military use of commercial satellite service, wideband or
otherwise. Assured access in terms of contractual guarantees during times of congestion is
addressed in the Chapter III section titled Access and Control.
The total sub-attribute is used to identify the maximum number of accesses that a
vendor can provide to a theater. Accesses for a theater (MTW) vice any of the other coverage
14 Theater as defined in the coverage MOE section of this thesis. Where a theater is a MTW and
defined as an area approximately 1000km x 1000km.
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regions is intentional. In terms of communications capacity management, concentrated need for
SATCOM service is often a more difficult problem to handle than dispersed need. This is a
common characteristic for any supply and demand driven service provider. The theater is the
smallest geographical region and has the potential to have the highest concentration of military
users. Therefore, it makes sense to identify a provider's ability to accommodate large numbers of
user in a fairly small region.
A vendor's capability to quickly respond to increased theater demand is
measured using the excess sub-attribute. The goal of this sub-attribute is to validate a vendor's
stated capability to surge to meet demand, independent of any contractual agreements with users.
This sub-attribute does not attempt to measure the vendor's ability to dynamically increase theater
capacity by launching additional satellites or activating on-orbit failure-mode spares as peak
capacity spares. Instead the sub-attribute is intended to answer the question, how much excess
capacity does the vendor have (on average) for a specified theater?
The naval user's desire for surge capacity is in direct conflict with a commercial
vendor's desire to operate a cost effective full time at or near capacity system. Among other things
the commercial vendor associates profit with cost per unit of on-orbit capacity. A system that
operates below capacity is under utilized and reduces profit. For the commercial vendor there is
little difference between "war time" and "peacetime" each presents its own opportunities and
market environment. The commercial vendor (other than a minor operating margin) has little
incentive to maintain a robust surge capacity (i.e., hold capacity in reserve) in order to meet naval
wartime requirements. Therefore, it is evident that commercial surge capacity will come at a price
(monetary cost) to the naval community. It is the author's opinion that within DoD there is little
willingness to fund a "surge incentive," that would pay for reserve capacity. This does not imply
that other solutions to the problem do not exist, 15 it is only intended to highlight the competing
interest of the naval forces and commercial SATCOM providers in terms of surge capability.
15 An option would be to purchase more capacity than is required for peacetime operations and
allow the service provider the option to resell unused capacity. DoD would receive a rebate for re-
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Within the proposed evaluation hierarchy, excess capacity is reflected as a
percent of the total capacity after naval peacetime access requirements and commercial access
requirements within a given theater of interest have been taken into account, (see Figure 24).
Evaluators will have to provide the commercial vendor with a chosen theater of operations, and
rely on the vendor to supply an expected total commercial customer capacity value. Vendor
supplied capacity information should be easy to verify using open source company financial, legal
and technical records (e.g., annual reports, ITU and FCC filings). Naval peacetime theater
requirements, the number of required accesses need to conduct routine underway operations are














Figure 24. Notional Excess Capacity Chart
4. Summary
The capacity MOE is intended to reflect a system's maximum rate of reliable information
transmission. It is measured using three MOPs; data rate, mobility and quantity, each of which
has sub-attributes (see Figure 25). Drop-dead, threshold and objective values are presented in
the capacity section of Chapter IV.




The maximum rate of reliable information
transmission.












1) All MOPs assume a Standard Terminal: with a specified weight, volume, BER, location,
environment and elevation angle.
2) Mobility assumes a user determined fixed capacity.
3) For Quantity a theater of operation is specified.





Figure 26 provides the CRD and therefore the joint (JROC) agreed upon definition of
protection as it applies to MILSATCOM. This definition not only applies to the communications
path (i.e. the pipes) but also to the information flowing through those pipes.
PROTECTION
A system's ability to avoid, prevent, negate, or mitigate
the degradation, disruption, denial, unauthorized
access, or exploitation of communications services by
adversaries or the environment.
Figure 26. Protection Defined [CRD, 1998, pp. ED-5]
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2. Why is it Required?
It is no secret that U.S. military forces rely on information exchange and transfer as a
fundamental warfighting capability. All of the current and future DoD doctrine publications state
that success in warfare will be supported by information dominance. Therefore, most readers
would inherently understand that protection of capability and security of information is a
fundamental military requirement. As presented in Table 6, naval force protection requirements
are analogous to the DoD requirements as presented in the CRD. The expeditionary nature and
the ability to project power from the sea require naval forces to make extensive use of C4I
systems. Therefore it is natural that naval forces require protected communication services in
order to protect lives and effectively carry out their missions.




Protection C4I is a prime target and a center
of gravity, which the U.S. expects
adversaries to attack.
Must deny adversaries the ability
to decapitate U.S. C2 and ISR
capabilities.
Nuclear deterrence remains a top
DoD priority and requires
survivable C2.
Must provide anti-jam, protection
from SIGINT, information security,
and other defensive information
operations measures.
Expeditionary nature implies a
reliance on C4I and therefore a
need to protect this center of
gravity.
Structured to project power and
therefore need to have protected
communications capability between
all warfighting elements.
Self-supporting implies the ability to
unilaterally act to counter a C4I
attacker.
Unrestricted implies the ability to
combat or limit intrusion and attack
of C4I intended to restrict
operational capability.
Scalable implies that levels of
protection can be increased or
decreased to meet the existing
threat.
Table 6. Protection Justification
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3. Measuring Protection
Given that protection is a system's ability to "avoid, prevent, negate, and/or mitigate the
degradation, disruption, denial, unauthorized access, or exploitation of services or resources" the
CRD divides communication services into four categories. [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-15] These
communication service categories are: survivable; anti-jam; low probability of intercept (LPI) and
low probability of detection (LPD); and U.S. control. [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-15] Each of these
measures focus on the communications path, (i.e. the pipe) and not the information traveling
through the system. Within in the context of naval use of commercial wideband service, it is the
author's opinion that while important these "comms pipe" protection categories are not the
measures that should be used to characterize the protection MOE within this hierarchy.
Justification of this position and presentation of more appropriate MOPs is the focus of the
remaining portion of this section.
Survivable SATCOM is intended for use by the national strategic nuclear forces, the
national command authority and the upper echelons of the military hierarchy. While some naval
assets are part of the nation's strategic nuclear forces use of commercial wideband SATCOM by
these platforms for critical nuclear force communications links is highly unlikely. Survivable
SATCOM is intended to provide communications capacity during and after a nuclear strike. Given
that there is little commercial market for this type of communications and further that the cost of
the technology involved is quite high, it is highly unlikely that commercial providers will construct
survivable systems. This does not mitigate the naval users need for survivable communications it
is only intended to state that use of a survivable MOP within this hierarchy provides no added
value. That is, it is highly likely that all evaluated commercial wideband systems would receive a
utility score of 0.0 (i.e., not survivable) under this MOP.
Many commercial wideband vendors envision their systems will be extensions of the
Internet extending the worldwide web to millions of international customers. In terms of system
design drivers, commercial wideband producers are not concerned with operation of their systems
in a traditional hostile environment (i.e., hostile actions other than information operations). Their
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product is intended to be operated by the corporate and home user operating in a peaceful (i.e.,
not directly engaged in armed conflict) environment. Characterization of this operating
environment is not intended to imply that hostility does not exist, only that overt physical conflict
(i.e., jamming and destruction of hardware) is considered to have a low probability of occurrence
and therefore is not a design driver. Instead commercial providers recognize that many of their
customers require specified levels of confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity16 in order to protect
against hostile information operations. Protection against these types of threats is where naval
wideband SATCOM evaluators should focus their attention. Furthermore, for these reasons use of
an anti-jam MOP is not included in this hierarchy. Justification of this position follows.
Protection against active jamming is a desired military capability, however it does not rank
high on the commercial users list of requirements. In terms of engineering trades during system
development it is probable that commercial designers would trade the cost of jamming protection
for increased capacity or some other more commercially desired capability. This does not imply
that commercial systems will not have some limited capacity to mitigate frequency or co-channel
interference. Instead it indicates that active nulling or jamming detection to the levels desired by
naval users will likely not be provided. For this reason evaluation of a commercial system's
capability to detect and counter the effects of a sanctuary or tactical jammer provides no
discriminating input to the evaluation hierarchy. If all systems score a utility of 0.0 for jamming
then no discrimination between systems has been provided. Again this does not imply that naval
users should suppress their need for anti-jam capability, instead naval users should not expect
commercial systems to meet this need.
The protection requirement of "location covertness" as represented by the LPI/LPD
measure refers to the ability to locate a user by intercepting or detecting the SATCOM terminal
16 "Confidentiality
. Bad guys can't read our traffic. Confidentiality includes secrecy of the data
itself and at least in the definition, traffic analysis immunity (bad guys reading the addresses and
deriving intelligence from knowing who's talking to whom). Authenticity . Bad guys can't fake my
traffic to you. Nobody forged my messages. Integrity . Can't tamper with my traffic. What you got is
what I really sent you." [Buddenberg, 1995]
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radio frequency transmissions. This need is predominantly a military exclusive need that is not
widely (if at all) represented in the commercial community. Use of covert forces, covert sensors,
the desire to execute surprise operations and mask force strength all contribute to the military's
need to employ LPI/LPD systems. Similar survivability and anti-jam, measurement of a
commercial system's LPI/LPD ability is not likely to add value the evaluation hierarchy. First, the
civilian user who is using a terminal to perform legal information transactions as little need for
LPI/LPD. Second due to the high frequency and therefore narrow beam width (i.e., Ka band and
higher) most of the commercial systems have some intrinsic LPI/LPD capability. Differences in
detection capability could potentially stem from the power levels required to close the link between
the earth terminal and the satellite. 17 Regardless these differences are most likely minor and
LPI/LPD capabilities would be nearly identical. For this reason within this hierarchy an LPI/LPD
MOP will not be used as a measure of protection.
The CRD states the U.S. Control "usually means the system is under the direct
operational control of a corporate, private, or government activity that is subordinate or
immediately responsive to the national legal direction of U.S. authority." [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-19]
Within this hierarchy levels of control and the United States' ability to control access to a system is
addressed under the Access and Control MOE, and the relationship and legal MOPs. For this
reason within this evaluation hierarchy U.S. Control is not a MOP under the protection MOE.
As previously mentioned the protection concerns that commercial vendor's will address
are those that the civilian market sees as important. Civilian users were identified as requiring
various levels of confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, or stated another way information
protection. It was suggested that naval evaluation of the "comms pipe" protection measures
provides little value, however the analysis of a system's information protection capability has
significance. Historically these measures of information security have been viewed as network
17 For a fixed capacity, fixed antenna size and fixed BER more power would be required to close
the link between an earth terminal and a GEO satellite than that required for the link between a
LEO satellite and the same earth terminal.
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only measures that do not directly apply to a SATCOM system (i.e., the telephone company is
only responsible for protecting the line not protecting the information on the line). That is SATCOM
is seen as only a pipe and therefore the SATCOM provider must ensure that the pipe is protected.
This line of thinking is short sighted and fails to recognize that SATCOM is an extension of the
information network and security of the information flowing through the pipe is just as critical as
security of the pipe. A possible reason for the separation of path protection from information
protection is that communication service providers did not want to be legally liable for protecting
user information. This "use our system at your own risk attitude" is understandable given today's
litigious environment, however it does not reflect the growing commercial demand for information
security.
It is the author's opinion that effective information security (over SATCOM) can and will
only be accomplished when SATCOM designers start thinking of their systems as information
networks and not only as the "pipes that information flows through." Stated another SATCOM
providers have historically consider themselves first and foremost as designers/providers of layer
1, the physical layer of the ISO 7-Layer reference model. As a result SATCOM providers give less
attention to the six remaining layers and fail to fully exploit the information security capabilities that






Layer 2 Data Line
Layer 1 Physical
Figure 27. The Historic ISO 7-Layer Reference Model [Comer, 1997, pp. 157]
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By adapting the attitude that SATCOM service is more than a "comms pipe," designers
are then free to make trades across layers of the ISO model and subsequently design a system
that optimizes information security. For example, effective security measures that are employed at
the transport layer (layer 4) maybe driven by physical layer design. It is understood that the ISO
model was developed to enhance integration by creating definable boundaries and interfaces.
However excessive compartmentalization while increasing "within layer" innovation has reduced
cross-layer optimization, and as a result overall solution optimization has suffered. As a general
rule of thumb "the higher the layer (ISO model) at which you can gain appropriate security service,
the less you have to depend on the network to provide the service." [Buddenberg, 1995] The
following quote further demonstrates this concept:
For example, with secure email - an Application Layer implementation of a
security service -- all security functionality is provided in end systems, none is
required of the network infrastructure (links, routers, gateways, etc). This means
that it is not necessary to own or control the network in order to have secure
service. In concise terms, with application layer security we have confidentiality
and authenticity over untrusted networks. [Buddenberg, 1995]
What the quote implies is that by creating an open network that allows for application
layer security, information can be successfully protected. It is within this context that the proposed
hierarchy evaluates protection using three MOPs; confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. The
goal of the MOPs is to highlight design concepts that incorporate multi-layer information
protection.
a) Confidentiality
Confidentiality extends from protecting transmitted information to protecting users
from traffic analysis and in this case protecting the user's geo-location. Although encryption can
be used to protect the confidentiality of transmitted information it does not protect the user from
traffic analysis. Significant intelligence can be collected by a user who can monitor who talks to
whom, and at what time the information exchange occurs. It is desired that commercial systems
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allow naval users to employ encryption (at the application layer) as well as allow users the ability
to protect and hide their addresses. Address hiding is a potential sticky point for commercial
providers in that it maybe a primary method for user billing. Despite this problem naval users need
to remain autonomous and should not have their traffic patterns analyzed. A final aspect of
confidentiality is the desire to protect the user's physical location. As a communication network
that employs moving transmitters and receivers (both user terminals and spacecraft) SATCOM
systems require accurate geo-location to efficiently close the communications link. Accurate
customer billing is also another reason for geo-locating every user terminal. A standard method
for tracking user location is to create a geo-location database or at least a file that provides the
location of various user terminals. Exploitation of this geo-location data can be detrimental to
naval forces regardless of whether forces are trying to remain covert or not. A significant amount
of intelligence can be obtained from an accurate list of the location of each and every naval
terminal within a given theater. Therefore confidentially encompasses data secrecy, traffic secrecy
and geo-location secrecy.
Measuring how a vendor intends to protect a user's confidentiality is difficult and
therefore it is proposed that the confidentiality MOP be reflected as a subjectively determined
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Figure 28. Confidentiality Spectrum
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The intent of this spectrum is to allow a group of informed users to categorize a
system's ability it provide confidential service. This measure is intended to be subjective and
therefore allow evaluators to discriminate between competing systems. The boundaries presented
in Figure 28 are not all inclusive and are certainly open to debate. Recall that the goal of
confidentiality is to characterize a systems ability to protect information travelling through the pipes
not the pipes themselves.
b) Authenticity
Authenticity reflects a system's ability to ensure that hostile users can not forge a
naval user's message (spoofing). The goal is to protect user identify and increase the faith that
users at both ends of an exchange are actually talking to who they think they are talking to. In
general authenticity can be accomplished at the network layer, transport layer and the application
layer. [Buddenberg, 1995] Again measurement of an "authenticity capability" is difficult to quantify
and therefore evaluators should subjectively attempt to identify how the vendor intends on tackling
the authenticity problem. Subjective evaluation should be derived from a vendor presentation in
which the vendor articulates how authentication will be addressed within their system. The vendor
would then receive an authenticity score based on a user derived authenticity spectrum similar to
the confidentiality spectrum. Elements that should be included in an authenticity spectrum are:
• The protection of billing databases that associate a user's SATCOM address with his
actual identification.
• Use of application layer authentication keys.
• Implementation of procedures that prohibit dual use of user IDs.
• Implementation of procedures that notify authorized users that their ID may have
been compromised.
c) Integrity
Integrity attempts to capture a system's ability to ensure that a user's message is
not tampered with enroute to the intended destination and that what the sender transmitted is
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indeed what the receiver received. [Buddenberg, 1995] Protection against message modification
can be accomplished at various levels of the network and is closely coupled with confidentiality
and authenticity. The ability to modify a user's transmitted message implies that the user's
confidentiality and authenticity has been compromised. Measurement of message integrity or
rather a system's ability to ensure message integrity should also be a subjectively determined
user value. As with confidentiality and authenticity evaluators should debate and subsequently
create an integrity spectrum. The spectrum should equate a vendor's ability or inability to provide
adequate integrity security to a numerical score.
4. Summary
Commercial systems are not likely to provide survivable, anti-jam, or LPI/LPD
communications and therefore within this hierarchy these factors are not considered as protection
MOPs. Instead the focus is on information protection, and the intent is to measure a system's
ability to protect the information flowing through the SATCOM pipes. It was within this line of
reasoning that three information protection performance measures were presented;
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity (Figure 29). In an effort to not restrict future evaluations
specific quantitative values for these measures were not determined. Instead each measure was









National Military Strategy as well as joint vision and naval vision documents recognize that
most future military operations will be joint and/or combined operations. Shared information
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promotes a "common interpretation and understanding of the battlespace fundamental to ensuring
unity of effort and synchronization of action," and therefore is critical to effective joint operations.
[CRD, 1998, pp. 4-38] Interoperability enables information sharing. As indicated in Figure 30
interoperability refers to a force's ability to communicate with others in a mutually beneficial
manner that increases overall combat effectiveness. Interoperability extends beyond the naval
forces and the other military services and includes non-DoD agencies as well as allies and
potential coalition partners.
INTEROPERABILITY
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide
information services to, and accept information
services from, other systems, units, or forces and
then to use the services so exchanged to enable
them to operate effectively together.
Figure 30. Interoperability Defined [CRD, 1998, ES-8]
2. Why is it Required?
As already mentioned future conflicts will rarely involve a single U.S. service. More than
likely operations will be executed by a joint force operating in cooperation with allied and/or
coalition forces. [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-38J. Furthermore, DoD has placed significant effort into
developing interoperability policy to ensure that current and future acquisition of information
technology systems will provide "the needed seamless interoperability." [JTA V2.0, 1998, pp. iii]
The recently published Joint Technical Architecture Version 2.0, (JTA V2.0), is an information
technology (IT) policy document that is produced by a team consisting of all DoD components as
well as components of the intelligence community. [JTA, 1998, pp. iii] In its scope JTA V2.0:
Mandates the minimum set of standards and guidelines for the acquisition of all
DoD systems that produce, use, or exchange information.
Shall be used by anyone involved in the management, development, or
acquisition of new or improved systems within DoD. [JTA, 1998, pp. 1-3]
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Furthermore the reasoning that went into defining JTA standards matches naval force
interpretability requirements. That is the JTA states that achievement and maintenance of a
seamless information environment requires interoperability:
Within a Joint Task Force/Commander in Chief (CINC) Area of Responsibility
(AOR)
Across CINC AOR boundaries.
Between strategic and tactical systems.
Within and across Services and Agencies.
From the battlefield to the sustaining base.
Between US, Allied, and Coalition forces.
Across current and future systems. [JTA, 1998, pp. 1-3]
JTA requirements are periodically reviewed and updated and are intended to ensure the
procurement of "the envisioned objective of a cost-effective, seamless integration environment."
[JTA, 1998, pp. 1-3] The bottom line is that JTA V2.0 is applicable to the procurement of
commercial wideband SATCOM intended for naval use (see Table 7). As a complementary
document JTA requirements are consistent with other DoD programs and initiatives including the
Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DM COE). [JTA, 1998, pp. iii]
Therefore adherence to JTA requirements provides a good measure of a wideband system's
interoperability.
Although the JTA V2.0 describes and mandates standards for procurement of DoD
systems it does not and can not enforce or require interoperability among competing commercial
vendors. It is possible that since JTA V2.0 attempts to set standards that are "stable, technically
mature, and publicly available" that conformance to JTA may inadvertently encompass some of
these external requirements. Any capacity (i.e., a third party terminal that provides multi-vendor
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compatibility) that increases a commercial system's ability to interoperate with other vendor
systems has potential value to the naval user.




Interoperability MILSATCOM is the space portion
of the Defense Information
Infrastructure.
Most operations are joint in nature
and execution (Land, Air, Naval,
Mobility, Combat Support and
Special Operations Forces).
US Forces conduct missions with
Allies, Coalition Partners, and
Government Agencies.
Warfighters use a variety of
communications to effect needed
information transfers.
Expeditionary nature requires the
ability to act instantaneously without
delay caused by information
translation or communication system
"work arounds".
Structured to project power using a
variety of different assets that rely on
effective information exchange to
increase combat effectiveness.
Self-supporting requires the ability to
share logistics and supply
requirements with all layers of
support hierarchy in a timely fashion.
Unrestricted implies that information
exchange is not constrained by
unique hardware or software
technologies.
Scalable implies that information
exchange between all participants is
possible at all levels of conflict.
Table 7. Interoperability Justification
3. Measuring Interoperability
Measurement of interoperability should be discrete. That is a commercial system should
be categorized according to its full capabilities not its partial capabilities. For example if a system
conforms to a majority of JTA standards but not all JTA requirements then the system is not JTA
compliant. In terms of interoperability, degrees of conformity do not apply. A system that is
advertised to meet 75% of DoD's interoperability requirements is not an interoperable system.
Given this reasoning only one measure of interoperability is needed. Therefore within this
hierarchy the interoperability MOE does not have any MOPs and the MOE itself is the
performance measure.
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Webster's dictionary defines access as "the right to enter or use." In terms of SATCOM
the right to use has two elements; the ability to physically connect to the system (i.e. receive the
downlink), and the authorization by a controlling authority to use the system. Recall that the
coverage and capacity MOEs addressed the connection part of access. The coverage MOE had
four MOPs that defined when and were access could occur. While the capacity MOE relates how
much service a system can provide once connected. The access and control MOE is used to
account for the permission to use the system part of the definition. Naval warfighters firmly believe
that regardless of a communication system's technical capabilities it has no value if there is no
assurance that permission to use the system will be granted when it is needed. For this reason
assured access to SATCOM is a fundamental and primary need of warfighters. [CRD, 1998, pp.
4-31] Within this hierarchy access reflects the permission aspect of the definition and is defined,
as the authority to use SATCOM service when and where required, (refer to Figure 31). MOPs
that reflect the level of assured access or certainty that access will be granted are presented in
the Measuring Access and Control sub-section.
Another fundamental naval force need is have the authority and ability to responsively
"apportion and reapportion" SATCOM resources. [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-31] This authority and ability
to dictate resource utilization is called control. SATCOM control has multiple levels of meaning
and can imply the authority to grant access to system resources on up to having the ability to
command individual satellites. The CRD defines control as "the ability and mechanisms needed to
effectively plan, monitor, operate, manage, and manipulate the available MILSATCOM
resources," (refer to Figure 31). [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-31] This definition implies the ability to dictate
what occurs in all aspects of the MILSATCOM domain. Potential overlap with the protection MOE
is clearly evident, however this hierarchy attempts to limit control to control over resource
allocation, while protection covers information and system security measures. The MOPs
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presented in the Measuring Access and Control sub-section should make this difference more
visible.
ACCESS
The authority to use SATCOM service when and
where required.
CONTROL
The ability and mechanisms needed to effectively
plan, monitor, operate, manage, and manipulate
the available SATCOM resources.
Figure 31. Access and Control Defined
2. Why is it Required?
As previously stated a fundamental naval force need is assured access to and control of
SATCOM resources. Table 8 translates the DoD access and control needs as presented in the
CRD to naval force access and control needs. The single pillar that supports the access and
control needs is represented by the standard saying, "fight as you train." Naval warfighters can
train and patrol in peacetime making effective use of commercial SATCOM, however that same
capability must be immediately and continuously available throughout any and all hostile
encounters. At the minimum loss of a capability that was extensively relied on during training will
create operational inefficiencies, and at the maximum warfighters will die. Assured access is a
fundamental SATCOM requirement.
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Access to information and
communications on-demand:
fundamental need of the
warfighter.
Warfigthers must have control
over their information and
MILSTCOM domains.
Resources be rapidly and
dynamically reconfigured to
respond to changing operational
situations and priorities.
Expeditionary nature requires
assured access and control in order
to support forward deployed
dispersed forces.
Structured to project power requires
the authority to grant access to and
maintain control of SATCOM assets
during direct hostile action.
Self-supporting implies capability to
dynamically configure and
reconfigure SATCOM architecture.
Unrestricted by international or
political regulations that limit the
force's expeditionary or power
projection capabilities.
Scalable implies the ability to
apportion and reapportion SATCOM
assets as dictated by the operational
situation.
Table 8. Access and Control Justification
3. Measuring Access and Control
SATCOM access and control are rudimentary naval warfighter needs and should drive the
selection of alternative concepts. Furthermore, evaluation of commercial systems must highlight a
system's ability or inability to meet these two needs. The desire to "jump on the commercial band
wagon" should be tempered by the user's valid need for access and control. Clearly full naval
control of a commercial system is not likely, however this does not imply that commercial systems
have little value. Naval use of commercial SATCOM has occurred in the past, is currently
occurring and will continue to occur in the future. What system evaluators must do is clearly
articulate the risks (in terms of access and control) involved in the use of a particular commercial
SATCOM provider. Once articulated, user (i.e., operational warfighter) opinion through MOE and
MOP weighting must be honored as the ultimate measure of value. Although politically difficult,
compromise on SATCOM access and control beyond the recommendations of experienced
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operators can threaten the lives of naval warriors. Operators clearly understand that trades and
compromises in capability are fundamental to achieving success and therefore further recognize
that despite potential short comings in access and control commercial SATCOM can play a vital
role in battlefield success.
The goal to be accomplished in measuring access and control is not to restrict the
solutions that can be evaluated, instead the desire is to clearly articulate the relative risk that
different alternatives possess. Warfighters understand risk, accept that risk exists, and train to
operate in a risk filled environment. Once relative risk is identified and understood naval operators
will adapt to it and identify ways to work within the acknowledged level of risk. Identifying what
level of access and control risk a system possesses is the output of the access and control MOE.
Two MOPs are used to represent access and control risk, each of which is presented and defined
later in this section.
It should be clearly evident that in order to be profitable commercial SATCOM providers
must possess the same level of access and control that DoD desires. The vendor must be able to
authorize access and maintain the ability and mechanisms needed to effectively plan, monitor,
operate, manage, and manipulate the available SATCOM resources. In as much as access and
control are fundamental naval force needs they are also service provider needs. The pillar
supporting commercial access and control needs is profit, generated by providing quality service.
Quality service critically depends on a corporation's access and control capabilities. For these
reasons it is highly unlikely that commercial vendors will give up access and control to U.S. forces.
Both access and control can be evaluated at different levels (regions). The region that
should be evaluated within this hierarchy is the interface between customers and the commercial
vendor (see Figure 32). The customers own the level below this interface, and the region above
resides with the commercial vendor. As the previous paragraph describes the SATCOM provider
will retain access authority and resource control for the satellite system as a whole. The provider
must maintain this control in order to operate a quality system that continues to retain and attract
customers. Within the Vendor Region the provider positions individual satellites, tracks customer
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billing, activates and deactivates customer accounts, reconfigures system components in reaction
to failures and performs any of the other required control activities. The naval user should not
expect direct access to the Vendor Region.
Vendor Region
Vendor maintains access authority and resource control.
Interface Region
Area where evaluation hierarchy should focus.
Customer Region
Naval Customer Qmr Customers
Naval Commander maintains Others maintain access authority
access authority and resource and control their own resources,
control.
Figure 32. Access and Control Regions
On the other hand naval forces will maintain access authority and resource control over
the users and components that reside in the naval customer area of the Customer Region. All of
the (naval) leased or purchased terminals and the users associated with those terminals reside in
this region. Within this hierarchy it is assumed that naval forces have an overarching resource
management and control mechanism that provides the ability to authorize access to and
apportion, reapportion, configure, and reconfigure assets. This implies capabilities analogous to
the current management of commercial telephone service throughout DoD. That is naval resource
managers determine user priorities, allocate capacity, deny service to unauthorized (naval) users,
and perform a whole host of other network management responsibilities. Naval force authority
does not extend into the "other customer" section of the Customer Region. Other customers, quite
possibly threat countries, maintain access authority and resource control within their specified
regions.
There remains one region to discuss, the Interface Region. No specific equipment or
hardware capability exists within this region. Instead this area accounts for the political and legal
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factors that influence access and control. As the term interface implies, these political and legal
parameters affect both the Customer and Vendor Regions. It is the author's opinion that the only
way to influence control or access authority over a commercial system is to do so through the
Interface Region. That is political and legal action is the mechanism by which naval forces will
gain (loose) access authority and resource control capability. Characterization of these political
and legal factors is the focus of the access and control MOPs.
Due to the high cost of wideband SATCOM constellations most proposed and emerging
ventures are internationally funded. International SATCOM consortiums enhance and provide
access to foreign markets, assist in the resolution of foreign legal restrictions, and share
development risk over a wider base. Due to their international makeup, politics and legal
regulations drive consortiums and therefore the risk associated with doing business with a
consortium is also driven by political and legal factors. For this reason two MOPs, relationship to
the U.S. and legal restrictions are used to characterize the access and control MOE.
The intent of the relationship MOP is to characterize the risk associated with a particular
vendor due to the type of relationship that the owners (i.e., consortium members, major stock
holders, associated financial institutions) of the service have with the United States military.
'"Owners" is intentionally a very broad term and indicates a desire to include all people,
organizations or countries that have significant influence over the SATCOM vendor. Classification
of a provider's relationship to the U.S. military is a multi-variable problem that does not have a
clear-cut template style solution. For use within the hierarchy relationship should be thought of in
terms of a relationship spectrum, where potentially hostile corporations are on the left and entirely
U.S. friendly corporations are on the right. For some it maybe valuable to divide the spectrum into
three primary regions; high risk, medium risk and low risk. High risk implies a consortium that
resides on the left third of the spectrum and implies that the probability of access denial and loss
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Figure 33. Relationship Spectrum
Although the author has provided adjectives to assist in relationship classification it is
critical to realize that this is not intended to be a clear-cut template. The boundaries between
areas are gray. Numerous resources can be used to assist in classification of a corporation.
Products produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Central
Intelligence Agency and any of the other government agencies whose job it is to understand and
characterize other nations and international organizations can be helpful in defining the
relationship spectrum.
The relationship MOP attempts to reflect the risk involved with the political part of the
Interface Region. For example, a vendor that was classified as a staunch friend of the U.S. may
willingly, (through intense political pressure and possibly monetary incentive) disallow service to
existing customers (i.e., threat countries) during a time of U.S. military crisis. It is important to
recall that a corporation in a particular country is in most cases an independent organization (i.e.,
not state run) and national policy rarely dictates the corporation's actions. However when a vendor
resides in a country that is a staunch U.S. ally there is an increased probability that the country
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also has troops committed to the same military crisis. In this case the corporation will be under
significant political pressure to cooperate with U.S and allied forces. At what price that cooperation
is achieved is another unknown element of risk. It is critical to point out that the political process is
a two way street and pressure can be applied to deny U.S. access and control. There in lies the
value of the relationship MOP, in that it should be used as a predictor of negative political
influence.
The legal MOP attempts to characterize the risk associated with contractual regulations of
a particular service provider. Similar to the relationship MOP the legal MOP is presented as a risk
spectrum (see Figure 34). Legal measures that restrict the effective operational use of the system
during all phases of military action (peace through hostile action) are considered high risk and
probability of access denial and loss of control are high. These high risk regulations are
represented on the left-hand side of the spectrum. Naval friendly legal measures are represented
on the right-hand side of the chart. As with the relationship MOP the subdivisions presented in
Figure 34 are not intended as a template but as a point of departure for evaluator discussion.
There are numerous combinations of legal measures that can be evaluated however three
overarching legal concerns must be considered. These three concerns are: 1) restrictions on war




















































Figure 34. Legal Spectrum
A war clause includes any legal terminology that restricts access or message content
during time of overt or covert military action. It is obvious that naval forces desire not to have to
switch communications systems as they transition to hostility. Any restrictions on message
content (i.e., calls or orders to engage a hostile target) or service access dramatically reduces a
system's contribution to combat effectiveness. However, if the system is relied on for providing
non-mission critical service (i.e., tv to sailors) then these restrictions maybe acceptable. The
bottom line is that a war clause is unacceptable for a system that is going to provide mission
critical communications. Furthermore, the specific and detailed definition of what type of message
traffic is allowed and disallowed must be clearly evident and uniformly interpreted.
The second legal restriction is the constraints imposed by international and national
regulatory agencies. The primary international regulatory agency is the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and within the U.S. the national regulatory agency is the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Both of these agencies place constraints on satellite
communications providers in an effort to assure reasonable protection from interference. [Vuong,
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1997] It is important to realize that most nations have a national electromagnetic spectrum
regulatory agency that performs duties analogous to the FCC. It is often the case that national
regulations are not only stricter than ITU regulations but what is restricted in one country is not in
another. This fact dramatically increases a service provider's legal concerns. However, in general
adherence to ITU standards is a good indicator of international acceptability.
Of primary importance is how the service provider has registered the system with the ITU.
As a regulatory body of the United Nations one of the ITU's tasks is to authorize electromagnetic
spectrum use for different types of satellite service in order to prevent communication system
interference. The ITU has defined different types of satellite service and associated frequency
bands and priorities to each service type. There are three service types that are of particular
interest to the naval force user; fixed satellite service (FSS), broadcast satellite service (BSS) and
mobile satellite service (MSS). Priority of service implies that within a given frequency band one
service category is considered primary and others are classified as secondary and authorized to
operate on a not to interfere basis. It is important that naval evaluators clearly understand the
difference between the three primary service categories mentioned above.
BSS is a radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or
retransmitted by satellites are intended for direct reception by the general public.
FSS is a radiocommunication service between earth stations at specific fixed
points when one or more satellites are used.
MSS is a radiocommunication service between mobile earth stations and one or
more satellites, or between satellites used by this service or between mobile earth
stations by means of one or more satellites. [Vuong, 1997]
In general terms BSS is used for service such as DirectTV in which the user has a receive
only terminal and constraints are therefore placed on the transmitting satellite. FSS is primarily
used for communications between fixed earth terminals and GEO satellites. For this service
restrictions are placed on both the transmitting satellite and the earth terminal transmitter. Given
that GEO satellites either appear motionless for move very little relative to a position on the earth
terminal transmitter restrictions focus on limiting antenna gain patterns. MSS implies that the earth
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terminal is capable of motion as well as two-way communications. Because the earth terminal can
move frequency interference is more difficult to predict. Historically, due to antenna technology
limitations FSS was the dominant form of service and significant international infrastructure has
been constructed to support FSS. The recent growth of the mobile user market coupled with
increased demand for an ever more congested spectrum has put MSS in direct conflict with FSS.
As indicated the service definitions were created to assure a reasonable amount of
interference protection, they do not assure interference free communications. However, "because
no additional radio frequency interference is generated, it should be acceptable (by the ITU) to
use:
• FSS and MSS frequencies for BSS,
• MSS frequencies for FSS or BSS,
• BSS frequencies for receive-only FSS or receive-only MSS, and
• FSS downlink frequencies for receive only MSS." [Vuong, 1 997]
What is important to gain from the listing of acceptable service is that it is unlikely the ITU will
allow other service combinations. [Vuong, 1997] Exceptions to these rules have been granted,
however the most critical component of the discussion is the realization that two way, (i.e., full
duplex, transmit and receive capability) MSS is not an acceptable use of FSS frequencies. 18
Therefore, MSS conducted on FSS frequencies is a secondary service and can only be conducted
on a not to interfere basis. This point is critical because most of the emerging wideband
commercial systems are filed as FSS providers operating in the Ka band (a FSS designated
band). As mentioned exceptions to these rules have occurred (without ITU approval). For
example, the Navy's use of Intelsat's C-band global transponders for the Challenge Athena
18 Unless international regulations are modified the following is true under current ITU regulations.
"Inorder to provide communications from mobile earth stations (i.e., naval planes or vessels), it is
necessary to use MSS frequencies to comply with ITU's rules and regulations." Furthermore, "the
MSS frequencies available commercially (now or in a foreseeable future) are very limited in
bandwidth (only available at VHF/UHF, L-band, and S-band) and are all used for "off-the-self"
services that provide only voice and low bit rate (<64 kbps) data communications." [Vuong, 1997]
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Project, which is by definition a MSS, was authorized by Intelsat and COMSAT (not the ITU) on a
non-interference and experimental basis. [Vuong, 1997] Obviously there is inherent risk
associated with developing warfighter reliance on non-approved "illegal" communications
systems. In the case of Challenge Athena interference with other users while operating in the
open ocean is not a significant concern, however the potential for interference increases when
littoral operations are required. Given the naval force focus on littoral warfare this legal risk can be
quite significant and must be accounted for when evaluating wideband systems intended for use
by naval forces. It is the author's opinion that naval forces are inherently mobile, their mission
demands it. Attempts to mitigate this mobile characteristic to improve a FSS provider's evaluation
score should not occur. Use of FSS in a MSS mode must be taken for what it is; a calculated risk.
The final legal hurdle that international SATCOM users must contend with is that of host
nation approval. As previously mentioned most nations have some form of national
electromagnetic spectrum and communications systems regulatory agency. The motivations of
each agency vary from country to country and include such topics as; spectrum control for
collection of tax revenue, control of communications systems to ensure political stability (i.e.,
authoritarian governments), and restrictions requiring domestic participation in all foreign
ventures. Regardless of the motivation host nation approval (HNA) is required prior to operation
and generally includes three things;
• landing rights: refers to the placement of terminals on host nation soil
• site operations licenses: approval documents for installing and operating terminals
• public switch telephone network (PSTN) connection approvals: which may provide critical
links to the. other communication systems. [Vuong, 1997]
Accomplishment of HNA often requires presentation of numerous supporting documents
detailing possible frequency interference problems and system capabilities. It is a significantly long
process that can take years to complete. In this instance established commercial providers or
providers with an internationally diverse consortium can speed the process up. Furthermore, the
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ideal commercial provider would minimize individual customer involvement in the HNA process
and handle the entire action by itself. Given that naval force doctrine calls for global mobility and
the capability to project power anywhere in the world at anytime acquiring HNA must be done far
before a projected need occurs. Evaluation of what a vendor supplies in terms of HNA provides
insight into the potential legal risk of using that provider.
4. Summary
In summary, military use of commercial SATCOM implies acceptance of access and
control risk. When using a commercial provider it is unlikely that DoD will have total access or the
ability to control all SATCOM resources. Therefore, DoD is forced to inadvertently and indirectly
control access through political and legal means. The predicted ability or inability to politically or
legally influence a SATCOM provider is the suggested way for measuring access and control risk.
Lastly it is important to realize that there is no templated definition of access and control risk, the
users and evaluators must classify systems based on a subjective categorization of what a vendor
can provide. A graphical representation of access and control is provided in Figure 35.
MOE = Access and Control
\
I MOP = Relationship MOP = Legal
Figure 35. Access and Control Summary
J. QUALITY OF SERVICE
1. Defined
As indicated in Figure 36, quality of service (QoS) reflects a system's ability to conduct
responsive and accurate information exchange. A fundamental concept is that QoS is service
quality as determined by the user, not the vendor. The user must choose metrics that accurately
reflect quality desires. However selection of metrics is difficult because within a wideband system
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numerous design parameters affect QoS. The focus in this hierarchy is to identify a few of the
primary metrics and encourage future evaluators to add or remove measures that better reflect
the given situation. Furthermore, there is significant potential for overlap between QoS and
interoperability. Within the gray area between the two MOEs evaluator's should identify QoS
measures as those measures that do not specifically define interface standards. QoS focuses on
the service capabilities and constraints unique to a particular system. In essence the goal of the
QoS MOE is to quantify vendor service, just as customers rate the quality of commercial cable
television or Internet service providers.
Quality of Service
The ability of satellite systems to adequately
conduct required information transfer in a timely
and accurate manner.
Figure 36. Quality of Service Defined [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-47]
2. Why is it required?
Given their expeditionary nature naval forces must have faith that the C4I systems that
they use will provide a consistent level of service when and where ever it is required (see Table
9). Of course anomalies in service will occur, however repeated outages, corrupted messages, or
consistent congestion reduces customer faith. Loss of faith due to poor quality forces warfighters
to seek alternatives that may reduce expeditionary capabilities. Furthermore, in order to project
combat power users expect wideband systems to provide accurate, unambiguous, and
responsive mission critical information. For example, congestion that increases the probability of
loosing a message or increases the probability that a corrupted message will be delivered reduces
customer faith. Reduced faith constrains the force's ability to project power. At the extreme
corrupted or delayed information could cost the lives of combat forces relying on the system to
provide accurate and responsive command and control connectivity. Given the desire to enhance
expeditionary capability forces also need the ability to predict reduction in quality due to weather.
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This is especially important in littoral regions where weather is affected by both the sea and
coastal landmass. It is recognized that due to their short wavelengths the Ka and higher frequency
wideband systems are impacted by precipitation however this does not mitigate the user's need to
know and understand rain effects. Therefore in order to establish the boundaries for unrestricted
operations the user must know and understand system weather constraints (i.e., loss of quality
due to rain fade). In the case of commercial SATCOM where the provider owns and operates the
satellite the military user does not need to be immediately concerned about space weather.







combat support systems drive
performance criteria.
Information must be transferred
accurately and unambiguously.
• Expeditionary nature implies the
expectation of a consistent level of
service when and where required.
• Structured to project power requires
accurate, unambiguous, and
responsive mission critical information.
• Self-supporting implies a high quality
system in which there is little need to
interact with vendor on quality issues.
• Unrestricted by weather and natural
phenomena within accepted
standards.
• Scalable implies graceful degradation
and restoral.
Table 9. Quality of Service Justification
The nature of naval forces and the way that the NSS intends to employ these forces often
results in naval forces being the first on the scene. Once on scene other forces come into the
area of operation and information needs expand. A scalable system that increases and decreases
in capability in a graceful manner is invaluable to maintaining effective military force integration.
Furthermore, if an anomaly should occur and service is discontinued the system should be able to
be restored in a responsive and appropriate manner. Finally, the last naval force characteristic to
be addressed, self-supporting, implies that naval forces should not be encumbered by poor quality
systems that require placement of numerous trouble calls to the vendor.
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3. Measuring Quality of Service
Ideally QoS would be evaluated with operational testing however this may not be possible
given the immaturity of the commercial wideband technology at this time. With this constrain and
since the focus of this thesis is to evaluate emerging concepts as they are represented on paper,
performance measures that anticipate quality service must be developed. The author proposes
that the following six performance measures be used:
Availability, reflects the probability of getting a "dial tone" (i.e., not busy).
Delay, reflects the probability that no delay in information exchange occurs.
Blockage: reflects the probability that no blockage of information occurs.
Robustness: a binary measure that reflects the existence of an automated customer
priority scheme.
Data Integrity, the advertised BER.
Weather, reflects the intensity of rain that causes mission critical outages.
Although the measures presented above are not exactly identical to those presented in
the QoS portion of the CRD, the reasoning behind their selection is the same. As stated in the
CRD:
Timeliness of information and immediacy of access are critical factors in ensuring
combat effectiveness in the modern, dynamic battlespace. Much of battlefield
information's' value is highly perishable and critical. Target acquisition and
engagement opportunities are becoming especially fleeting and of limited duration
and must be acted on immediately upon being offered. Warning information must
be transmitted immediately to be of any use. [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-48]
a) Availability
Simply put when a user desires access to the system, the system should be
available. The capability being measured here is identical to a customer's desire to hear a dial
tone every time he picks up the phone or a "web-tone" every time he attempts to access the
90
Internet. Users must have faith that the system is available. It is assumed that the user is a
qualified user (i.e., the access authority has authorized the user) and is within geographic and
time coverage of the system. Within this hierarchy availability is measured as the probability of
access, P(access). This measure should be provided by the vendor and reflects his contractual
responsibility to provide an assured probability of access. The goal here is to have a vendor
guarantee a probability of access regardless of system congestion. The military user needs to
have faith (i.e., 98% probability of access) that the system will be available during periods of high
network traffic. The military user is not concerned how the vendor will actually ensure that
availability is achieved (i.e., bring more systems on line to handle surge demand) only that access
is assured at a certain probability. Achievement of assured access during high traffic times may
require enforcement of a priority user scheme (refer to the sub-section on Robustness), where
lower priority users are preempted by higher priority users. In this case a vendor may supply the
user with a priority-based probability of access. For example, a high priority is guaranteed 98%
across the board availability, where a low priority user is guaranteed a 95% off peak probability of
access and an 80% peak probability. The user should expect compensation should the vendor fail
to meet these contractual guarantees. It is highly probable the naval forces would desire
(purchase) the highest degree of service and then control access to individual users by controlling
access to the SATCOM terminal. 19
b) Delay and Blockage
Untimely delivery and failure to deliver information are clearly critical quality
concerns. The user desires a consistent level of service and therefore desires to know how
reliable the system is in terms of message delivery. When evaluating blockage and delay the
assumption is made that the system is completely available and the user has access. Delay and
blockage are measured as the probability of no delay P(no delay), and the probability of no
19 For example, if a commercial wideband system was included as part of ADNS on board a ship
(i.e., a commercial CAP written), then the ADNS priority scheme could control the shipboard
usage of the high priority line.
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blockage, P(no blockage).20 Again the user desires consistent service regardless of the network
congestion level and therefore these values should be associated with advertised level of service
(i.e., high priority user versus low priority user). If the vendor does not provide a priority-based
service then worst case maximum network congestion should be used to model and predict delay
and blockage values. This will obviously decrease a vendor's delay and blockage performance but
naval users can not afford (in dollars or lives) delayed or blocked messages during a crisis.
Furthermore, the penalty for not providing a priority-based service should create an incentive to do
so. In the author's opinion priority based service is not a uniquely naval need, critical financial
networks or powerful news organizations desire the same capability.
c) Robustness
The robustness performance measure reflects a system's ability to degrade
gracefully and then restore service gracefully. Naval force users continually train to handle
unexpected failures and then effectively and efficiently recover from those failures. If is certainly
recognized that anomalies can cause significant service degradations. These anomalies can be
due to an unexpected hardware or software failure, sabotage, poor network management or a
host of other causes. The robustness performance measure doesn't attempt to predict when and
how degradation will occur, instead the goal is to identify vendors that possess the ability to
efficiently and effectively handle the problem. As a customer DoD will not be able to dictate how a
vendor trains their employees or what procedures the vendor uses while handling a network
emergency. Instead DoD and therefore the Navy and Marine Corps will rely on contractual
agreements that guarantee through monetary incentives (i.e., user fees and vendor rebates)
consistent levels of performance during system anomalies. It is clearly understood that unless
some degree of negligence can be proven the vendor should not be held accountable for failure to
20 The inverse P(delay) and P(blockage) is not used because it conflicts with the human tendency
towards the notion of "bigger is better." Objective values of P(delay) and P(blockage) would be
very small values (i.e., <2%), whereas objective values for P(no delay) and P(no blockage) large
numbers (i.e., >98%).The bottom line, humans associate bigger with better.
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adhere to the contract given some magnanimous natural disaster.21 However the fact remains,
bad things happen and service will be degraded.
When these emergencies occur naval users want to know with some degree of
certainty what level of service they can rely on. As previously presented a customer priority
scheme is a way to provide a level of availability, delay and blockage assurance. During a crisis
where degradation occurs high priority customers should expect (within some contractual
tolerances) a constant level of service. This constant level of service would be achieved by
rerouting remaining capabilities away from low priority customers to high priority customers.
Furthermore, as full capacity service is restored the high priority customer would receive his full
capabilities prior to lower tiered customers. High priority customers could incur a monetary
premium for this type of service, or if the market is competitive a large customer (i.e., DoD) may
be able to negotiate for service priority in return for an exclusive use contract.
It is within this background and from this line of reasoning that within the
proposed hierarchy the robustness MOP is considered to be binary. That is the service provider
either has a customer priority scheme of he does not. In a time of crisis naval forces do not
consider themselves equal to other commercial customers. Marines and sailors lives may
depended on critical information links and those links must be there. Lack of availability, and delay
or blockage of service because of head to head (i.e., unprioritized service) competition with
civilian users is unacceptable to the naval user. Historical precedent for this need is easily cited.
For example, when a natural disaster such as an earthquake occurs in a major U.S. city
telephone networks are often degraded. The remaining networks become extremely congested by
users attempting to collect or report information about the disaster. When this occurs telephone
providers in cooperation with state and local governments attempt to restrict usage to identified
"essential users." In the case of a natural disaster essential users are police, fire and medical
services. The same idea is exactly transferable to a military crisis where naval forces consider
21 For example, a critical number of satellites are destroyed during an asteroid storm, or a major
earthquake destroys a critical network operations center.
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themselves to be essential users and therefore demand highest priority during a service
degradation. It should be obvious that politics associated with an international consortium may
impact a provider's willingness to allow the U.S. military to be a high priority user. Measurement of
that political element is reflected in the access and control MOE. The goal of the robustness MOP
is to identify if the option for priority service even exists. Lastly, this priority service should require
little manual effort to initiate. That is priority service should be an automated process that can
intervene the instant service degradation occurs. In summary the robustness MOP reflects the
existence of an automated customer priority scheme.
d) Data Integrity
The integrity of exchanged information is of critical importance to the naval user.
Inaccurate, ambiguous and corrupted data can dramatically reduce combat effectiveness. Bit
error rate (BER) is the primary means for measuring data accuracy. As presented in the
discussion of the coverage MOE (refer to Table 4, page 38) acceptable BER is determined by the
applications that the user is running. The evaluation of coverage and capacity relied on the use of
a standard terminal operating at a fixed BER. The data integrity MOP is used to identify a
system's BER and that value can be used in coverage and capacity evaluations. Simply put a
user's faith and therefore reliance on a system reduces if BER falls below a required value. Loss
of faith in an IT system (i.e., Does that message really say drop the bombs here?) constrains
naval force power project capabilities.
e) Weather
Due to their expeditionary nature and the push to operate in littoral regions naval
forces execute their mission in a variety of weather conditions. The intent of the weather MOP is
to reflect a system's capability to provide service in bad weather. Presentation of some
background information is necessary prior to defining how the weather MOP is used within the
propose hierarchy.
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Attenuation of radio waves is not only caused by free-space loss but particulate
contributions due to rain, fog, mist, and haze (dust, smoke, and salt particles in the air) as well.
[Freeman, 1991, pp. 494] Atmospheric effects can have a significant impact on radio frequencies
above 10GHz were wavelength is close to the size of atmospheric particulate. Often in link margin
calculations free-space loss is the dominant attenuation factor and loss due to particulate is
comparably small and therefore ignored. Furthermore, concentration of particulate matter is
difficult to predict and model and therefore removal of its effects for baseline calculations is
acceptable. Given a baseline, communications engineers can seek ways to introduce link margin
to "cover" attenuation caused by some pre-determined constant level of atmospheric particulate.
The communications engineer's goal is to provide enough margin to ensure a pre-determined
path availability (usually measured as a probability, i.e., P(available path)).
As indicated particulate attenuation can be negligible for most cases (i.e., fog).
However, attenuation due to excessive rainfall can be a significant problem. It is important to
realize that use of annual rainfall rates provides a poor indication of path availability. Freeman
provides a proper justification of this position when he states,
For instance, several weeks of light drizzle will affect the overall long-term path
availability much less than several good downpours that are short lived (i.e., 20-
min duration). It is simply this downpour activity for which we need statistics. Such
downpours are cellular in nature. How big are the cells? What is the rainfall rate in
the cell? What are the size of the drops and their disthbution?[Freeman, 1991,
pp. 497]
Using this justification as a defense Freeman goes on to indicate that point
rainfall rates (the rate of rain as measure over a much smaller range of time i.e., millimeters per
hour) is a more valuable measure for indicating path availability than annual rain rate.22 Loss of a
22 Freeman cites the use of high-speed range gauges that output to computers for minute by
minute analysis. Further he uses a comparison of rain rates of Florida and Oregon. Oregon has
the highest annual rainfall within the U.S. (i.e. it rains a lot), while Florida (Miami) has a short-term
rainfall rate 20 times greater (i.e., when it rains it rains fast) than Oregon. Freeman demonstrates
that while Oregon gets more annual rain average path availability for a 48GHz signal (Ka band) is
less in Florida due to the higher short-term rain rate. [Freeman, 1991, pp. 498]
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signal due to rain, or rain fade as it is often called, can be reduced using a variety of techniques.
Things such as "increasing transmitter power, improving receiver noise factor, increasing antenna
size,... or ensuring path diversity" are valid techniques to reduce rain fade. [Freeman, 1991, pp.
499] Path diversity implies that multiple paths between the transmitter and the receiver are
available (i.e., multiple satellites in view). For LEO wideband systems automatic path switching
performed by the user terminal should already be included in every terminal due to the need to
continually switch between satellites during normal operations.
The goal of the weather MOP is not to dictate how a vendor solves the rain fade
problem (i.e., how much link margin is provided). Instead the intent is to represent the level of
service that can be provided during periods of excess rainfall. Therefore the user's desire is to
measure weather in terms of path availability, reflected as probability of an available path,
P(available path). That is under what conditions does the service quality degrade to the point at
which the path is no longer available? For this MOP it is assumed that the user is operating a
standard terminal as originally defined in the discussion of the coverage MOE. The use of a
standard terminal not only fixes antenna size and receiver noise factor but it also defines an
acceptable BER. In the user's terms a path is not available if the BER falls below that established
in the definition of the standard terminal. A detailed discussion of how P(available path) is
calculated is beyond the scope of this thesis and the reader is referred to the Freeman text, pages
497 to 539, which articulates the relationship between excessive rainfall and path availability. It is
enough to say that values for worldwide rain rate (rain intensity) are used to predict the specific
attenuation to a given frequency, which in turn is then related to path availability. [Freeman, 1991,
pp. 505] Critical values for P(available path) are presented in the Chapter IV discussion of the
weather MOP utility curve.
4. Summary
There are six proposed QoS MOPs each of which relate to the user's desire for assured,
accurate, unambiguous information exchange. Robustness reflects a system's ability to provide
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priority service. Availability measures a user's probability of access. Delay and blockage are both
recorded as probabilities and reflect the probability of no delays and no blockages. Data integrity
indicates a systems ability to provide uncorrupted data and the weather MOP provides a measure
of path availability. A graphical representation of the quality of service MOE is provided in Figure
37.
Quality of Service
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The definition for flexibility used in this evaluation hierarchy is identical to that presented in
the CRD, (see Figure 38). The goal of the flexibility MOE is to identify key logistics requirements
that impact a system, specifically terminal design. Terminals that are difficult to use or those that
require extensive maintenance, negate potential benefits the system can bring to the battlefield. A
system that has poor reliability and is difficult to maintain is a logistical drain.
Flexibility
The ability to support the full dynamic range of
military operations, missions, and environments.
Figure 38. Flexibility Defined [CRD, 1998, pp. 4-41]
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2. Why is it Required?
As show on in Table 10 the CRD provides adequate justification for flexibility
requirements. As expected naval force flexibility requirements are nearly identical to those at the
DoD level. The bottom line is that the flexibility is intended to reflect a system's operational
suitability. That is, as the flexibility definition states the system must support the full range of naval
force missions.




Flexibility Warfighters prosecute military






Emphasis is on fast-paced mobile
operations.
A wide variety of operating
frequencies is required to support
the warfighters' needs.
Warfighters' must make efficient
use of limit frequency spectrum.
Systems should be reliable, easy
to use, and safe to operate.
Expeditionary nature naval
warfighters prosecute military
operations across a wide spectrum
of conflict in all regions of the world.
Structured to project power implies
the need to operate in an
environment of fast-paced mobile
operations.
Self-supporting implies high
reliability, ease of maintenance,
adequate user training and
documentation.
Unrestricted by poor reliability that
reduces operational availability.
Scalable implies the ability to
leverage and include new
technologies quickly and efficiently.
Table 10. Flexibility Justification
3. Measuring Flexibility
It is the author's opinion that the flexibility MOE should reflect the eleven traditional
logistics elements that measure operational suitability; "operational availability, reliability,
maintainability, interoperability, compatibility, logistics supportability, transportability,
documentation, manpower supportability, training requirements, safety and human factors" as well
as an additional element called upgradability. [Hoivik, 1998] However it is recognized that twelve
fully characterized MOPs (i.e., a utility curve for each, and AHP weighting of eleven items) does
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not comply with the original intent of this evaluation hierarchy. That is, the goal is to provide a
useable evaluation tool that does not severely encumber the user. For this reason the author
selected what he felt to be the three most important logistics concerns as flexibility MOPs. One
logistics element, interoperability, has already been addressed within the hierarchy as its own
MOE. The remaining logistics elements while they are discussed, they are not fully characterized
as MOPs within this hierarchy. At the very least each of the seven remaining logistics elements
should be considered as potential MOPs, even if they are included as binary measures. Table 1
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Safety and Human Factors
Upgradability
Interoperability
Table 11. Logistics Elements
a) Operational Availability
As reflected in a Defense Acquisition University (DAU) approved Test and
Evaluation (T&E) course taught at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), operational availability
(A ) is; "a measure of the degree to which an item is in an operable and comittable state at the
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start of a mission when the mission is called for at a random time." [Hoivik, 1998] Unlike the QoS
availability parameter, A is intended to reflect the availability of the user defined standard
terminal. For this reason A calculated as shown in Figure 39.
[Operating Time + Standby Time] divided by
[Operating Time + Standby Time + Total Corrective
Maint. Time + Total Preventive Maint. Time + Total
Admin Logistics Downtime]
Figure 39. Calculation of Operational Availability [Hoivik, 1998]
Obviously many design and production parameters can influence A . The goal is
to indicate how these availability design parameters impact mission effectiveness. To do this A
values are often segregated into three categories, full mission capable (FMC), partial mission
capable (PMC), and not mission capable (NMC). The boundary values for each of these
categories are user determined and should be defined prior to testing. The desire is to have a
system that has a FMC A . Anything other than a FMC system has little value to the naval
warfighter, therefore within this hierarchy A is a binary MOP, (i.e., FMC or not FMC).
Ideally A is evaluated during some form of vendor sponsored operational testing.
However as mentioned in other sections of this research due to the immature nature of the
systems involved A will probably be obtained through simulation. Evaluators must either identify a
simulation for vendor's to use or subjectively critique the vendor created simulation to identify any
potential biases. The remaining alternative is for the evaluators to create and run their own
simulations. Regardless of the method used evaluators must know and understand the model's
strengths, weakness as well as the assumptions made during its creation. Additionally simulation
duration should be long enough to reveal availability issues that may not be reflected in short term
simulation. Simulation duration should reflect standing operational timelines. For example, the
standard naval force deployment is six months with at least two months of pre-deployment work-
up. Lastly the simulation must also reflect the intended operational environment. That is
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temperature range, temperature rate of change, water vapor content (humidity), wind speed,
various form of precipitation all must be specified by the user.
b) Reliability
Reliability is defined as the "duration of probability of failure-fee performance
under stated conditions." [Hoivik, 1998] Fault free performance includes both software and
hardware performance. There is an assortment of accepted methods for measuring reliability and
in detailed reliability testing numerous measures are used to reflect all elements of reliability.
However, within this hierarchy the author has chosen to reflect reliability by a single measure.
Therefore, within this hierarchy the author proposes that "Reliability = number of hours without a
critical failure, under specified mission conditions." [Hoivik, 1998] Just as with operational
availability specified operating conditions implies that the user defines a standard terminal and
establishes guidelines for a reliability simulation. Simulation output should quantify reliability in
terms of projected mean time between operational availability failure (MTBOMF). MTBOMF
should be reflected in terms of hours and critical values should reflect desired user reliability
demands. The flexibility section of Chapter IV discusses this point further.
c) Maintainability
Maintainability is defined as "the ability of an item to be retained in or restored to
specified condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill levels,
using prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair."
[Hoivik, 1998] Accurate evaluation of maintainability should include hands on repair by qualified
personnel, however with a "paper concept" this is not possible. Therefore, evaluators that do not
have a standard terminal, or a standard terminal mock up must attempt to evaluate maintainability
by making analogies to existing systems and looking for maintenance friendly characteristics in
the engineering drawings. Evaluators, should concentrate on trying to quantify the number of
maintenance events a terminal may require, how time intensive terminal repairs will be, and at
what level those repairs must be made. Vendor's should be able to provide written descriptions of
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projected maintenance concepts and maintainer skill levels. Things such as use of built-in test
(BIT) and quick and ready access to line replace units (LRU) are things that should be identified.
From these descriptions evaluators using the input from qualified naval maintainers should
categorize systems according to their potential maintainability. Within this hierarchy it is proposed
that system maintainability (since it is being subjectively evaluated from engineering drawings and
marketing reports) be measured in terms of a maintainability spectrum. The idea is analogous to
the use of a relationship and legal spectrum under the access and control MOE. The spectrum
presented in Figure 40 is not intended to be all inclusive, instead readers should use the spectrum
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shall not exceed 1 hr
per 48 hr period.
Figure 40. Maintainability Spectrum
d) Compatibility
Compatibility is a parameter that is especially important aboard a "frequency
congested" Navy ship. A widely accepted definition of compatibility is "the ability of two or more
items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or
environment without mutual interference." [Hoivik, 1998] Traditionally compatibility extends to both
hardware and software. For the proposed hierarchy the software portion of compatibility is
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covered under the interoperability MOE, while the hardware aspect of compatibility is address
here.
Identification of the operating environment is a critical user input to this definition.
Within the naval force context operating environment must extend beyond systems that are
physically collocated on the same platform (i.e., on the same ship) but to any combat system that
can is "electronically" collocated with the SATCOM terminal. Electronically collocated implies the
entire region in which an earth terminal's transmitter power can influence other combat systems.
For example, while operating in a standard formation earth terminals from one ship should not
impede the operation of another ship's radar or communications systems. Ideally the vendor's
earth terminal should not force users to modify warfighting tactics, (i.e., force a CG to modify the
operating pattern of its primary air search radar). Lack of compatibility must not be allowed to
impact force operational effectiveness.
e) Logistics Supportability
Logistics supportability encompasses a wide range of topics however with in the
context of this discussion the author present logistics supportability in terms of supply support.
Future users of this hierarchy must be cognizant of how repair parts will be supplied and how
depot level maintenance will be performed. In recent times significant focus has been given to
"outsourcing" both of these aspects of logistics support. The intent of this discussion is not to
sway the reader either way however the desire is to present factors that should be considered
when a system is evaluated.
Given that this thesis focuses on naval use of commercial SATCOM it is
conceivable that support service could be procured with the purchase (or lease) of a large number
of terminals. Many contractual arrangements can be made in terms of what level of logistics
supportability will be provided. For example, for corrective level maintenance above the operator
level the Navy and Marine Corps could enter into a maintenance float concept with the vendor. In
this case faulty terminals are repaired by the vendor (i.e., vendor depot) and the user immediately
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receives a reconditioned (or new) item from an exiting (military controlled) stock. The critical
elements in this concept are; the terminal itself is an LRU, the vendor has a robust production and
repair capability, the military terminal is analogous to the civilian market terminal. Of course if the
military requires a highly specialized user terminal then military intermediate and depot level
maintenance may be more appropriate. Regardless system evaluators must consider these
points.
In terms of supply support military users of a commercially available product may
look to having supply support partially performed by the vendor. For example, a contractual
requirement for the vendor to supply directly to a user located in a combat zone would not be
operationally effective. Instead an agreement to have the contractor transport repair parts to a
rear area logistics support area (i.e., transport to mainland Japan for troops engaged in Korea)
would be valuable.
f) Transportability
This logistics element has already been addressed within the hierarchy through
the use of a standard terminal. A quick survey of most of the emerging commercial wideband
terminals reveals that they are intended as desk top systems for the average home user.
Furthermore it is projected that in most cases military users would seek to integrate the terminal
into different weapon systems (i.e., HMMWV) and therefore the equipment is inherently
transportable. As long as the systems being evaluated fits into this general category then
transportability should not be an issue. However, if competing systems either provide a unique
solution that greatly enhances transportability and mobility then this should be reflected in the
evaluation. The same idea holds for the reverse situation in which the vendor's equipment
impedes for increase transportation requirements.
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g) Documentation, Manpower Supportability, Training Requirements,
Safety and Human Factors
Documentation, manpower, training and safety and human factors are all items
that should be reviewed for inclusion as potential measures of performance during future
evaluations. Evaluators could also qualitatively evaluate a vendor's ability in each of these areas
and include them in a subjective measure during source selection.
In terms of documentation evaluators should seek to identify how documentation
is provided and how often it is updated. Ideally documentation should be provided electronically in
a manner that allows for easy inclusion of changes. Manpower supportability requirements should
not force naval users to create new military occupational specialties or dramatically increase the
required numbers of specific specialties.23 Ideally a vendor would supply a system that at a
minimum would be manpower neutral (i.e., no increase in manpower required) at a maximum the
system would allow for a decrease in manpower requirements.
Closely coupled to manpower, are training requirements. Ideally a user terminal
should be a plug and play system that a computer literate user can operate with minimal training.
Training should be provided to maintainers and operators in a variety of formats, (i.e., classroom,
video, written manuals). It is likely that use of a commercial system will require little training since
it will be marketed to the civilian home user.
Safety and human factors issues are best represented by their individual
definitions. Safety is defined as "freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury,
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment."
[Hoivik, 1998] It is anticipated that as a desktop computer like system a SATCOM earth terminal
(unless it is transmitting at exceptionally high power) provides a negligible hazard to naval
operators. Furthermore, given the commercial nature of the product it is unlikely that
environmentally hazardous materials (except possibly batteries) will be included in the product.
23 In general communications and computer equipment is operated and maintained by: USMC
operators MOS 2500, USMC maintainers MOS 2800, USN operators RMs, USN maintainers ETs.
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Human factors "are those elements of system operation and maintenance which influence the
efficiency with which people can use systems to accomplish the operational mission (man-
machine interface)." [Hoivik, 1998] Within the context of the proposed hierarchy future evaluators
may consider man-machine interface factors such as software interface for both the operator and
maintenance personnel and ease of use in terms of operating in a combat environment (i.e., is
there a 15 step process to turn the system on?).
h) Upgradability
The CRD accurately characterizes upgradability as the capacity to "facilitate rapid
and orderly enhancements and upgrades to operational capabilities and features." [CRD, 1998,
pp. 4-43] The fundamental premise behind this need is that warfighter requirements will continue
to grow and evolve and supporting SATCOM systems should have the capacity to "leverage
advanced technologies and new commercial offerings" in an efficient and timely manner. ." [CRD,
1998, pp. 4-43] During the evaluation process users may desire to reward or penalize vendor's for
their attempt to or failure to provide open systems that enhance upgradability.
4. Summary
In summary it was the author's decision to limit the flexibility MOE to three critical logistics
elements (refer to Figure 41). Although not include in the hierarchy as fully characterized MOPS a
discussion of seven other logistics elements is provided for evaluation by future users as potential
MOPs. Potential drop-dead, threshold and objective values for the three MOPs are proposed in






Other factors to consider: Compatibility, Logistics Supportability, Transportability, Documentation, Manpower
Supportability, Training Requirements, Safety & Human Factors, Upgradability.
Figure 41. Flexibility MOPs
L. SUMMARY
In summary seven MOEs are presented and each was derived from the JROC approved
CRD. In some cases the MOPs that represent the MOEs are identical to those issues discussed
in the CRD. However in some instances new MOEs that better reflect the issues unique to naval
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Figure 42. Evaluation Hierarchy
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IV. WEIGHTING AND UTILITY ANALYSIS
As discussed in Chapter III in order to effectively evaluate competing concepts MOEs and
MOPs must be weighted and summed to provide an overall system effectiveness value (SEV).
Prior to weighting, the critical values for each performance measure and the user's utility, or the
value that the user has for a particular capability, must be determined. In order to provide an SEV
that discriminates between each system's ability to meet user needs, utility curves are needed to
reflect the marginal value that a user has for increasing (decreasing) levels of performance.
Discussion of weights and identification of critical values are the focus of this chapter.
The final output of this chapter is "strawman" evaluation hierarchy. The methodology used
to construct the "strawman" hierarchy begins with a presentation of utility analysis to include
determination of dropdead, threshold and objective performance values. As the chapter
progresses discussions of MOP and MOE weighting are provided, however final weights are not
assigned. Instead an ordinal ranking is generated giving the user a point of departure for team
determination of MOP and MOE weights. It is the author's opinion that performance measure
weighting is highly situational dependent and should be performed by a group of concerned users
(i.e., warfighter representatives from each concerned community). Therefore determination of
relative weights is beyond the scope of this thesis24 . Additionally it is recognized that critical utility
values (dropdead, threshold, and objective) are also situational dependent. However creation of a
strawman hierarchy inherently implies that these values are subject to and should be changed as
a concerned team deems appropriate. The primary emphasis of this chapter is to present a
discussion of the topics relevant to each performance measure so that future users have a forum
from which to begin construction of a specific wideband evaluation hierarchy. The ultimate goal is
to have a future naval commercial SATCOM integrated product team evaluate competing
wideband systems using a hierarchy derived from the topics presented in this thesis.
24
It is the author's intent to present potential weighting schemes that reflect solicited user input in
a separate follow-on report.
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A. UTILITY METHODOLOGY
As a reminder, each MOP measures the degree to which a system satisfies a specific
user need by representing that need as a system design parameter. Taken together MOPs for a
given functional objective reflect a system's ability to accomplish that functional objective.
Functional objectives are reflected numerically as MOEs. Collectively the seven functional
objectives (MOEs) provide a measure of overall system performance and are recorded
numerically as a SEV. In order to effectively discriminate between the capabilities of potential
solutions user defined critical values for each performance measure. A utility function is used to
map the range of acceptable values of a MOP to a [0,1] scale. This mapping reflects the
incremental value that the user group has for increases/decreases in capability.
Construction of a utility function must begin at some point, and a traditional method is to
identify three critical points of performance. These three points are:
• Dropdead: the level of performance below which the system has no value and should not
be used
• Threshold: the minimum acceptable performance
• Objective: the ideal, desired level of performance. [MILSATCOM, 1993, pp. 5]
Once identified the points can be assigned generic starting utility values; dropdead = 0.0,
threshold = 0.5, and objective = 1 .0. From there an initial assignment of a linear function can be
used to represent the user's reward curve. Linear utility implies that an incremental increase in
performance is directly proportional to a user's incremental increase in value. Often however, the
user's preference for increased combat effectiveness is not linear and therefore linear utility is
usually not representative of the real world. The user's utility curve should reflect this non-linear
preference. Figure 43 and Figure 44 graphically represent the issues presented above and are
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Figure 43. Linear and Non-linear Utility Curves
Figure 43 represents three different preferences for value. That is, the curves answer the
question; how much value does a user have for a specific level of performance? The top curve in
Figure 43 represents a non-linear utility curve modeled using User Utility = (Level of Performance)
1/3
. Initially for this curve, the incremental change in value is greater than the incremental change
in performance therefore the "payoff" for a small increase in performance is high. However once
past the threshold, as performance approaches the objective level, utility increases at a
decreasing rate.
The bottom curve is represented using User Utility = (Level of Performance) 3
,
and
indicates the user's preference for attaining objective performance by assigning threshold
performance a relatively low utility. Furthermore as an incentive for increased performance
towards the objective level, utility increases at an increasing rate. Therefore, initially each
incremental change in performance has little value, or low payoff however increased performance
after threshold has an incrementally higher value.
The center curve reflects linear utility (in this case slope = 1). This curve implies that the
user is indifferent. An incremental change in performance is equal to an incremental change in
value over the entire range of performance values. As previously presented linear utility does not
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usually reflect real world conditions. In fact none of the three curves completely reflect real world
situations. As one would assume some combination of the three curves more accurately reflects
real world scenarios. The non-linear curve presented in Figure 44 is one of the many possible
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Figure 44. Representative Non-Linear Utility Curve
What is important about the curve in Figure 44 is that it states that the user's utility varies over the
range of performance. The user is unwilling to accept below threshold performance as indicated
by the assignment of low value. Incremental value declines as objective performance is attained
due to the fact that utility above threshold increases at a decreasing rate. The only element of
linear utility that exists in this curve is that threshold performance and utility are of equal numerical
value. Although this is not always the case assignment of 0.5 utility for threshold performance
does have value in acting as an anchor point for users. Users tend to prefer balance, and like
categorizing performance as above or below threshold. Assignment of 0.5 utility facilitates this
user desire by providing a balanced reference point. For example:
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When tasked with conducting an Operational Effectiveness Analysis as part of
the MILSATCOM Polar Adjunct COEA, Air Force Space Command identified 25
distinct MOEs. Initially each MOE was assigned a linear utility function with
dropdead = 0.0, threshold = 0.5 and objective performance = 1 .0. The linear utility
curves were presented to users who were given the chance to modify them. It
was found that users did not hesitate to modify the performance values (i.e.,
increase/decrease the range of performance) to reflect operational preferences or
desired capabilities. However, once the performance range was modified the
utilities assigned to the end points remained consistent with the original curve
(i.e., dropdead = 0.0 and objective = 1.0). Furthermore, despite the fact that
internal points were added to emphasize certain levels of desired performance,
24 of the 25 MOE threshold values were assigned a utility value equal to 0.5. In
other words the users did not modify the strawman threshold value of 0.5.
[Paraphrased from MILSATCOM, 1993, pp. 16]
What the MILSATCOM Polar Adjunct example demonstrates is that users can balance
their utility using a threshold value of 0.5. The approach taken in this thesis is identical to that
executed by the Polar Adjunct team. That is, create strawman utility curves and allow users to
refine them to reflect operational preferences.25
Lastly in order to accurately articulate user needs and value, MOPs and MOEs must be
weighted prior to summation. The reader should recall that:
• MOE, =Z(Wj * MOPj)
• SEV =Z(w, * MOE;)
The next section discusses the methodology that should be applied to accurately weight
MOPs and MOEs.
B. WEIGHTING METHODOLOGY
Ensuring that all MOPs within a given functional objective are not equally important allows
the user to indicate preference for different system design capabilities. This preference should
directly reflect a user's needs priority. That is, a higher ranked MOP implies that the need it
represents has higher relative importance than the need represented by a lower ranked MOP. A
25 As stated earlier collection of user input and subsequent refinement of strawman utility curves
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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priority ranking of MOPs is not enough, in that it does not provide a measure for comparison
between MOPs. The only information that an ordinal list provides is that number one is better than
number two. The ranking does not stay how much better number one is than number two.
Therefore, drawing on the utility theory background previously presented it is important that each
MOP is weighted relative to each other. That is, what is the relative value of MOP 1 compared to
MOP 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.? This same argument is also applicable to the weighting of MOEs to ensure
that each MOE contributes the proper (user determined) amount to the calculation of a SEV. The
Analytic Hierarchy Process is the recommended method that should be used to perform MOP and
MOE weighting.
1. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a user-friendly decision support technique.
AHP's position is that direct assignment of weights by an evaluator or group of evaluators is "too
abstract and will result in inaccuracies." [MILSATCOM, 1993, pp. 33] Therefore, pair-wise
comparisons are used to allow the evaluators to reveal their preferences. Through the use of pair-
wise comparisons AHP provides a method for revealing the relative value of a ranked set of
performance parameters.
Fundamental to the use of AHP is the construction of a decision hierarchy analogous to
the evaluation hierarchy presented in this thesis. Evaluation measures at each level (i.e., MOPs)
undergo pair-wise comparison, their relative weights are revealed and the measures can then be
summed for determination of higher level values (i.e., MOEs). The pair-wise comparison
processes is repeated and the weighted MOEs are summed to produce the SEV. The result is a
SEV that represents the users' preferences.
Pair-wise comparisons can be made numerically or verbally. The user should be allowed
to determine which method of comparison they prefer. In either case a quantitative score is still
the final product. The underlying concern is to allow the user to express a definition of relative
value. Pair-wise comparisons are conducted using a square matrix, where the header row and
header column are the measures to be compared and the intersecting cells are were the
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comparisons occurs. A comparison is stated from the perspective of the row. That is, how much




Table 12. Example AHP Matrix Using Numercial Comparison
For example, the numerical comparison takes the form: pick the number X such that
MOP#1 is X times more important than MOP #2. Table 12, provides an example using two of the
four coverage MOPs. Realistically all four MOPs would be included in the matrix however the use
of two MOPs is used to illustrate the pair-wise comparison technique. The value 2, in row 2
column 1 , states that FA is two times more important than IAA. The opposite comparison, which is
IAA compared to FA, should be the reciprocal of the FA to IAA comparison, which in this case is
1/2. The desire to automatically assign the reciprocal to the reverse comparison should be
suppressed. User response to the opposite comparison is important in that it provides a method
for determining user consistency. Consistency is discussed in more detail in the last paragraphs
of this section. A value of 1 indicates that the user is neutral and has no preference between
either of the compared MOPs. The diagonal of the comparison matrix is always 1 indicating that
when compared to itself, each element has equal importance. [Zahedi, 1986, pp. 98]
The verbal comparison consists of words that indicate levels of relative preference such
as: absolutely preferred, strongly preferred, moderately preferred, weakly preferred, or equally
preferred. Therefore each cell in the matrix would contain the word that best describes the users
interpretation of relative value. Once a verbal comparison is made the words are converted to
numerical values. Equivalent values for the words presented above could be:
• Absolutely preferred = 9
• Strongly preferred = 7
• Moderately preferred = 5
• Weakly preferred = 3
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• Equally preferred = 1
From this point AHP takes the pair-wise comparison matrices as input and produces the
relative weights of elements at each level as output. Although a rigorous proof and presentation of
the refinement of weights is not appropriate for this thesis a scaled down presentation of the
method follows.
Given the following example: [Render, 1997pp. 563-564]
MOP1 MOP 2 MOP 3
MOP 1 Equal Strongly Moderately
preferred preferred
MOP 2 - Equal Weakly
preferred
MOP 3 - - Equal
Table 13. Sample AHP Matrix Using Verbal Comparison
An evaluator verbally conducts the pair-wise comparison and indicates his preferences for
three MOPs as presented in Table 13. This evaluation is converted to numerical values and the
individual columns are summed (refer to Table 14).
MOP1 MOP 2 MOP 3
MOP1 1 7 5
MOP 2 .14 1 3
MOP 3 .20 .33 1
Column 1.34 8.33 8
totals
Table 14. Conversion to Numerical Value and Calculation of Column Totals
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MOP1 MOP 2 MOP 3
M0P1 0.746 0.840 0.625
MOP 2 0.104 0.120 0.375
MOP 3 0.149 0.040 0.125
Table 15. Cell Values Divided by Column Total
A new matrix is created wherein each cell is the result of the cell value divided by the
column total. For example, as shown in Table 15, cell (1,1) is equal to 0.746, which is 1 divided by
1.34. Weights are then determined by averaging the row values. For this example resulting
weights are:
• MOP 1 = 0.737 = (0.746 + 0.840 + 0.625)/3
• MOP 2 = 0.200 = (0.104 + 0.120 + 0.375)/3
• MOP 3 = 0.105 = (0.149 + 0.040 + 0.125)/3
MOE = (. 7*MOP#1) + (.2*MOP#2) + (. 1 *MOP#3)
Figure 45. Bar Graph Representation of Weighting and Calculation of MOE
Figure 45 provides a graphical representation of the resultant weighting. This procedure
can be used for n number of MOPs/MOEs however user's tend to become saturated when
performing pair-wise comparisons for more than nine measures. [Zahedi, 1986]
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A downfall of AHP is that the user can be inconsistent when conducting pair-wise
comparisons. For example, if a user states that A is two times more important than B, then the
user should also state that B is half as important as A. Inconsistency leads to faulty and
ambiguous weighting. A consistency ratio can be calculated and used to indicate a user's level of
consistency. A detailed derivation of consistency ratio calculation is not required for this thesis.
The reader is referred to Render or Zahedi for further clarification. For the purposes of this
presentation it is enough to say that "in general, if the consistency ration is 0.10 (10%) or less, the
decision maker's answers are relatively consistent. For a consistency ratio that is greater than
0.10, the decision maker should seriously consider reevaluating the pair-wise comparisons."
[Render, 1997, pp. 565] AHP is concluded once a consistency ratio of 0.10 or less is attained.
The primary benefit of AHP is that it allows users to become deeply involved in the
weighting process without having to learn unique processes. Users just have to conduct pair-wise
comparisons, analysts can prepare the evaluation matrices and execute the calculations.
Furthermore, AHP can be performed using automated support tools, thereby further reducing the
level of effort required by the users.
a) Automated Support Tools
There are various decision support tools that can be used to automate the
weighting process. A very brief description of two such tools is provided here. They are, Systems
Engineering and Evaluation Regime (SEER) and Expert Choice.
SEER is a decision support tool developed by The Aerospace Corporation for
Naval Space Command. It is a five stage Microsoft Excel based application that allows a small
team to execute a "customer focused benefit-cost analysis." [Leake, pp.1] The primary benefit of
SEER is that it allows the user to enter the process at different levels. The lowest level Stage 1
,
assists the user in framing the analysis by providing a method for MOP and MOE development.
Stage 1 is clearly applicable for a group that would like to refine the MOPs and MOEs presented
in this thesis. An interested team could use SEER to investigate what impact additions or
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deletions to the proposed list of MOPs and MOEs would have. Furthermore, SEER provides the
user the ability to make projects about future needs and how those needs factor into the
evaluation of a system. The second level that a user can enter SEER is at Stage 3. Stage 3
assumes that the user has framed the analysis and has identified the proper MOPs and MOEs.
From this point the SEER user progresses into Stage 4 and performs an AHP like pair-wise
comparison of performance measures, resulting in a set of weighted measures. Competing
system capabilities are entered and system effectiveness scores are automatically calculated.
The final stage, Stage 5, allows the user to inject cost considerations into the decision process.
Stage 5 output is a system benefit-cost ratio. Appendix B, is a paper that fully describes SEER
and the methodology that it embraces.
Expert Choice is a software package that was originally developed in 1984 by
Decision Support Software Inc. [Zahedi, 1986, p. 99]. It is a widely used decision support tool and
uses an AHP derived algorithm to allow users to interactively weight decision variables. An added
feature is that Expert Choice executes consistency checks for each of the input matrices thereby
automating the weight validation process.
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Critical to a decision maker's trust of an evaluation hierarchy is an understanding of how
sensitive that hierarchy is to the weighing schemes and utility functions used. The decision-maker
must feel confident that weights or utility functions are reflective of their desires and not somehow
driving at an inappropriate decision. Sensitivity analysis is the manner in which analysts determine
how sensitive a decision support system is to weighting schemes and utility functions.
Although sensitivity analysis is not performed on the hierarchy presented in this thesis26
the author does recommend that future groups assess their hierarchy in three ways. These
methods are borrowed from those employed by the MILSATCOM Polar Adjunct evaluation team.
26 Sensitivity analysis is not performed because user derived utility functions and weighting
schemes are not presented.
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[MILSATCOM, 1993, pp. 29] Each of the three methods should be compared to the outcome of
the original user defined hierarchy. Two of the methods involve manipulation of the weighting
scheme and the third and easiest to employ is modification of the utility functions.
Addressing the easiest to accomplish analysis first the analysts should attempt to quantify
how user defined MOP utility impacts SEV. This can be accomplished by redefining all utility
curves as linear functions and then recalculating SEV. Does the SEV for specific systems
change? Does the overall (relative) ranking of competing systems change? At the completion of
the MILSATCOM Polar Adjunct Operational Effectiveness Analysis, the analysts found that
relative ranking was effected to a limited extent. [MILSATCOM, 1993, pp. 59] For example,
although the same alternatives may still be the top four alternatives, the original number three
ranked system may have become the number two ranked system. This implies that if a quick
study of the competing systems is needed and user input can not be obtained then linear utility will
at least highlight the contending systems. This fact could be used to scale down the field if
numerous systems required evaluation.
The final two analysis methods modify the weighting schemes. The goal of this process is
to identify MOP and MOE weights that may "drive" the SEV. The user may have intentionally
generated this bias to create vendor incentives, or the user may have accidentally created a
driving weighting scheme. In either case the focus is on identifying the impact that the AHP
calculated weighting schemes have on the SEV.
The first modified weighting scheme is the use of uniform weights. The desire is to
compare original SEVs with those produced by a hierarchy in which all weights are equal. That is
if there are four MOPs for a given MOE then each MOP contributes 25%. Given that there are
seven functional objectives (MOEs) each MOE would be equally weighted at 0.143. Comparison
of uniform weighted SEVs with original SEVs should assist in highlighting weighting biases.
The second method involves assignment of equal importance to each pair-wise
comparison. That is uniformly apply the same importance to each compared pair. For example as
shown in Table 16 each pair-wise comparison is moderately preferred.
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MOP 2 - Equal Moderately
preferred
MOP 3 ~ ~ Equal
MOP1 MOP 2 MOP 3
MOP1 1 3 3
MOP 2 .33 1 3




MOP1 MOP 2 MOP 3
MOP1 0.602 0.693 0.750
MOP 2 0.199 0.230 0.750
MOP 3 0.199 0.076 0.250
Table 16. Assignment of Equal Importance to Each Pair-wise Comparison
Comparison of the resulting weights with those presented calculated previously (refer to
Figure 45) show that the weighting for MOPs 1 and 2 does change.
• MOP 1 = 0.60 = (0.602 + 0.693 + 0.750)/3
• MOP 2 = 0.30 = (0. 1 99 + 0.230 + 0.750)/3
• MOP 3 = 0.10 = (0.199 + 0.076 + 0.250)/3
• Where previous calculation revealed MOP 1 = 0.737
,
MOP 2 = 0.200 and MOP 3 = 0.105
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The significance of fhe change becomes evident when original SEVs are compared to
those calculated using the equally important weighting scheme. Again the desire is to identify any
weighting bias that is hidden within the hierarchy.
D. COVERAGE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
The following sections beginning with this section on coverage present the performance
measure utility and rankings for the proposed evaluation hierarchy.
1. Geographic Coverage
As previously stated linear utility is presented as a strawman for both IAA and FA utility.
Although utility and the exact performance (i.e., level of IAA or FA desired) may vary the following
ideas are expressed in the utility curves shown in Figure 46 and Figure 47:
South Polar coverage is excluded since there are currently no, too little naval wideband
SATCOM requirements in that region.
Dropdead = 0.0 = Single Theater coverage.
Threshold = 0.5 = One Region & CONUS coverage.
Objective = 1 .0 = North Polar & Worldwide coverage.
The selection of One Region & CONUS demonstrates that connectivity between CONUS
(i.e., warfighter support agencies) and a regional command has more value that
connectivity between regions. Inter-regional connectivity, other than that to CONUS is
expressed as above threshold performance.
As an example GBS would receive an above threshold IAA score between 0.50 and 0.66
because it provides for two region and partial CONUS coverage, and a FA score of 0.0 or
dropdead for Single Theater coverage.27
27 This ranking does not degrade the value of the current GBS system. What it indicates is that
GBS is the first step towards solving the wideband problem. If GBS was an across the board
threshold or better system then current plans or talk of GBS Phase III or DoD Wideband Gapfiller















Figure 46. IAA Utility Curve
5
Footprint Area
Figure 47. FA Utility
2. Time Coverage
In the author's opinion the utility functions of the remaining coverage MOPs TIV and TBV
are binary; either you have it or you don't. In almost all cases users desire maximum flexibility and
therefore tend towards a 24-hour 77V and a 0-hour TBV. Basically the user always wants to be in
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the FA. To comply with future naval doctrine and visions will be operationally unacceptable to not
have access to the wideband system. Furthermore, given the fiscally constrained environment
reliance on other wideband systems (i.e., the luxury of complete back up systems) is not practical
or probable. Although alternate communications paths will exist trades will have to be made (i.e.,
loss of operational capability) when system reconfigurations are required. Therefore, it is projected
that the user's preference is binary. The user's value for a system that can not provide 24-hour
time in view, with no gaps in coverage (i.e., TBV= 0-hours) is 0. Is this a realistic position? In the
author's opinion it is a valid position. The emerging commercial systems, (i.e., Teledesic and
Astrolink) are being designed to meet this level of need. The notion that users will be blind, and
have to wait for a satellite to come into view is unacceptable to the warfighter. Therefore for the
time coverage MOPs there are only two performance values, objective and drop-dead.
• Objective = 1.0 when TIV = 24-hours and TBV= 0-hours.
• Drop-dead = 0.0 when TIV < 24-hours and TBV> 0-hours.
It is understood that these values are situational dependent however, and significant
debate about other values should occur. However, from the users standpoint; What good is
capacity if you can't use it? The above utility values reflect this user attitude. In summary, Table 17
list the coverage utility values.
IAA FA TIV TBV Utility Score














Table 17. Coverage MOP Utility Values
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3. Coverage Measures of Performance Ranking
AHP weighting is not performed in this thesis. As previously indicated weighting is highly
situational and group dependent and therefore is best left for actual execution. However, to
provide a point of departure for weighting discussions, the author's suggest MOP ranking along
with a brief justification is provided in Table 18. Recall that ranking does not provide a value ratio.
The #1 MOP is the highest ranked MOP but how much more it is preferred over #2 is not
indicated in the ranking. User preference is only revealed after conducting the AHP weighting.
MOP rankings are intended to force users to discuss the relevant issues and concern
themselves with the topic. User agreement with the rankings provided is not the issue. Instead
disagreement that leads to debate and ultimately to a re-ranked and weighted set of MOPs
justified by valid user needs is the goal. With this in mind the coverage MOP ranking is provided
below, (refer to Table 18) with #1 being the most valued MOP.
Ranking Justification
1. TIV Coverage without access is useless. Therefore time coverage is more important
than geographic coverage. TIV implies that the user has access while operating
within a specified FA.
2. TBV Same as above, except TBV implies that the user is denied access while operating
within a specified FA.
3. FA More important than IAA because it is the only place within the geographic
coverage pattern that user can actually use the satellite.
4. IAA The least important, however very valuable in that it defines a systems geographic
coverage capability (i.e., where the FA can be placed).
Table 18. Coverage MOP Ranking




Transmit and receive data rate utility curves are presented in Figure 48 and Figure 49.
Each figure indicates drop-dead, threshold and objectives values and implies linear utility. It is the
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author's opinion that naval user's preference for increased data rate is non-linear. More than likely
a user's data rate utility, past threshold, increases at an increasing rate. In short, the user favors
data rate increases. It should be remembered that the transmit and receive sub-attributes are
intended to reflect the capabilities of a single terminal. Given the wide range of platforms on which
a terminal could be placed (i.e., aircraft, advanced amphibious assault vehicle, ship) it is clearly
possible that some users will require a terminal's full capacity and others will not use a terminal to
its fullest potential. Therefore it is possible that some platforms will require multiple terminals or a
non-standard larger capacity terminal. If multiple small volume antennas are required it is possible
that they could be networked to numerous users aboard the ship.28 However given the space
restrictions on most naval platforms it is unlikely that large numbers of antennas would be
practical. Despite the wide range of potential configurations the user desires to decrease logistics
and support costs by purchasing a common standard issue terminal for all users.
Table 19 lists the key utility values for each sub-attribute. It should be recognized that
drop-dead, threshold and objective values are very application dependent. The values presented
in the figures and tables where chosen to represent some of the factors that should be considered
in critical value selection. Transmit and receive drop-dead data rates of 64kbps was selected
solely on the basis that 1) 64kbps is the DoD definition for wideband and 2) planned use of
INMARSAT-B will provide this capability and therefore any decrease in capacity is of no value.
Threshold and objective values are estimates and certainly subject to change. The objective
values were left as greater than 3.0 Mbps to indicate that capacity requirements are unbounded.
3.0 Mbps was arbitrarily chosen and represents the author's unsupported prediction that single
terminal user needs will rapidly progress towards this value. A threshold value of 512kbps was
arrived at through informal discussions with experienced naval officers and is not grounded by any
28 The potential exists for a commercial wideband system to function aboard a naval vessel as a
sub-component of the Advanced Digital Network System (ADNS). Single or multiple wideband
antennas could be multiplexed to the ADNS controller. Use of ADNS implies coding of specific
Channel Access Protocols (CAP) for each commercial system employed.
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hard evidence. The bottom line is user's will need to spend considerable time discussing,
determining and justifying critical capacity values.













Figure 48. Transmit Data Rate Utility Curve



















Drop-dead 64 kbps 64 kbps 0.0
Threshold 512 kbps 512 kbps 0.5
Objective > 3 Mbps > 3 Mbps 1.0
Table 19 . Data Rate Sub- Attribute Utility Values
c) Sub-attribute rankings
Ranking of the data rate sub-attributes are provided in Table 20, and indicate a
preference for a higher receive data rate (asymmetric communications). To what degree receive
data rate is preferred to transmit data rate is the product of a future AHP analysis.
Ranking Justification
1. Receive Data Rate Represents asymmetric information need.
2. Transmit Data Rate A typical user generates less information that he needs.
Table 20. Data Rate Sub-attribute Ranking
d) Data Rate Measures of Performance Calculation
Data Rate




Transmit Data Rate Receive Data Rate
Figure 50. Data Rate MOP Calculation
As indicated in Figure 50 the Data Rate MOP is the weighted sum of the sub-
attributes. AHP should be used to determine the relative weighting of the sub-attributes and then
each attribute weight is multiplied by the achieved utility score to arrive at a data rate MOP value.
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2. Mobility
Recall that the intent of the mobility MOP is to measure a terminal's ability to
provide a constant capacity to a mobile user. Furthermore, the terminal platform is assumed to
remain inside the system's FA and therefore the design parameter being tested is the antenna's
ability to track system satellites regardless of platform motion. Tracking ability is measured in
terms of maximum attainable velocity, pitch rate, roll rate and yaw rate. Pitch, roll and yaw
magnitudes are not considered because it is assumed that the terminal remains within the system
FA (i.e., the terminal does not exceed elevation angle restrictions). Stated in a more direct
manner, the mobility MOP provides a measure of how stable a platform must be in order to
provide the user a constant capacity. Stability implies that the platform must remain relatively
motionless and therefore a platform's warfighting capability is directly impacted.
Determination of critical values for the mobility sub-attributes is very difficult. A
threshold value that is adequate for one platform will not be adequate for another. The difference
in values is driven by the differences in intended operational use of the platform that the terminal
is mounted on. For example, suppose a wideband terminal is installed on an air defense variant of
the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and is used to provide video from a remotely
piloted UAV as well as a receive only composite air picture (i.e. CEC or Link 16 like information).
The AAAV enters the water in Sea State 2, travels to the beach and traverses numerous sand
dunes until it reaches its objective. During the transit UAV video is being monitored and used to
identify key terrain features or enemy concentrations and the air picture is used for air defense
gunner cueing. Throughout the transit the AAAV will change speed, as well as pitch, roll and yaw
however, loss of the video and air picture should be minimized. It is anticipated that at times the
AAAV will loose connectivity because the vehicle will leave the FA by exceeding terminal elevation
angle requirements. However, for the times that the vehicle remains in the FA the desire is to
articulate the antenna's ability to provide a fixed level of service through mechanical or electronic
antenna steering. The critical values required to maintain connectivity are drastically different than
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those required for an aircraft or ship.29 Therefore specific numerical values for the mobility sub-
attributes are not presented, instead critical values are characterized by platform type. Further
analysis must be done to assign numerical values to each platform type.
For example, the velocity sub-attribute critical values are: drop-dead is the speed
of an aircraft carrier (CVN); threshold value is the maximum water speed of the AAAV (25 knots);
and objective is the speed of the F/A-18 E/F. Selection of these platforms are purely for illustrative
purposes and intended to spark discussion and debate. The goal is to get users focused on what
impact the lack of antenna tracking has on operational capability. Basically any platform to the
right of the commercial vendor's velocity, pitch, roll, yaw values will not be supported throughout
all ranges of that platform's operational capabilities.
Strawman pitch, roll and yaw rate utility curves are also presented using the CVN,
AAAV and F/A-18E/F as drop-dead, threshold and objective values. Figure 51, Figure 52 and
Table 21 show the relative utility values for each platform. Pitch, roll and yaw rate are displayed on
the same curve for ease of presentation and it is recognized that these values could be different.
In the case of pitch, roll and yaw, utility increases as a terminal's ability to accommodate less
stable platforms increases (i.e., a CVN is designed to be stable whereas a tactical aircraft is
designed to be maneuverable and therefore unstable). Of particular concern is the sea state that
the sea or amphibious platforms are operating in. The user must identify a sea state and
understand the impact that the chosen sea state has each platform. For example an AAAV in sea
state 2 will pitch, roll and yaw significantly more than the same vehicle in sea state 1 . It is critical
that the users identify, possibly by contacting the different platform program offices, the pitch, roll
and yaw rates for each vehicle in each operating condition (i.e., What is the average pitch rate for
an AAAV in sea state 1 ?).
29 Use of wideband SATCOM to tactical aircraft could provide real-time BDA to target planners
and could increase pilot situational awareness by providing real-time imagery or SIGINT
information directly to the cockpit.
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Finally it was intentionally decided that each of the mobility parameters should be
evaluated in isolation. Although this does not reflect real world conditions in which each of the four
motions are coupled and occur simultaneously it does provide a "feel" for terminal capability.
Evaluation of four parameter-coupled motion would require the use of a computer simulation or
actual terminal testing and in the author's opinion it is not worth the added effort (unless the
commercial vendor wants to do it at his own cost). The idea here is if System A has a higher
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Drop-dead CVN CVN CVN CVN 0.0
Threshold AAAV AAAV AAAV AAAV 0.5
Objective F/A-18E/F F/A-18E/F F/A-18E/F F/A-18E/F 1.0
Table 21 . Mobility Sub-Attiribute Utility Values
a) Sub-attribute Rankings
Ranking of the data rate sub-attributes is provided in Table 22, and indicates an
equal weighting for each measure of mobility. Equal weighting is the author's way of accounting
for motion coupling. In the real world each of the motions does not occur independently and
therefore one form of motion rarely exists without another. Weighting one motion over the other
implies that one motion has a greater impact on mission success. If this is the case and the user
can validate the claim then unequal weighting should be used. In that case relative preference
would be determined using AHP.
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Ranking Justification
1. Velocity, Pitch, Roll, Yaw All four measures are of equal importance (w =25%), and
demonstrate the user's desire to conduct communications on
the move in a wide range of environments.
Table 22. Mobility Sub-attribute Ranking
b) Mobility Measures of Performance calculation
Mobiity






Velocity Pitch Roll Yaw
Figure 53. Mobility MOP Calculation
As indicated in Figure 53 the mobility MOP is the weighted sum of the sub-
attributes. Given that the author's opinion is that each of the sub-attributes are equally ranked
Mobility MOP = 0.25*(Velocity + Pitch + Roll + Yaw).
3. Quantity
Determination of quantity critical values depends entirely on what the evaluation team
deems important. The team needs to decide how the commercial system will be employed. Is it
intended to play a limited role and augment existing wideband service, or is it intended to be the
sole source or primary means of wideband service? The answer to this decision drives the sub-
attribute critical values. For example, if the commercial vendor is going to be the sole supplier of
naval wideband communications for a given theater then the total access value must exceed
anticipated naval requirements. Furthermore, naval forces may desire to be that vendor's primary
or at least largest customer in that region. Being the largest customer gives naval forces more
influence over the vendor. Under this example, a threshold total access value could be written as;
threshold total access = [the number of required naval access + 25%]. This implies that all naval
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requirements are meet and naval forces constitute 75% of the vendor's customer base in that
region. Clearly the Navy and Marine Corps would be able to influence the vendor. Figure 54
represents this point of view, and reflects a drop-dead position of naval requirements accounting
for 25% of the customer base, and an objective value of 100% of the customer base (i.e., naval













Figure 54. Total Accesses Utility Curve Given a Desire to be the Largest Customer
On the other hand if the user's desire is to use the commercial system as a
complementary component to an overall wideband architecture (i.e., the commercial system is not
the sole provider of service) then the above use of the total sub-attribute is not appropriate.
Furthermore given the nature of the emerging commercial wideband systems it is unlikely that the
international partnerships that support these companies would allow U.S. military forces to be
their primary customer. In this case the total critical value only identifies a vendor's capacity limit.
For naval users as long as the required amount of capacity is available when it is needed then the
vendor meets naval needs. Therefore, in this case the utility of the total sub-attribute is binary,
either the vendor has the available capacity (utility = 1.0) or he doesn't (utility = 0.0). This is a
realistic scenario especially if commercial systems are being used to provide non-critical (i.e., lives
do not dependent on it) capacity.
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Determination of critical values for the excess capacity sub-attribute is also a function of
how naval forces intend to use the commercial system. In the scenario where the commercial
service is the only wideband service large amounts of excess capacity would be desired. In the
case where the vendor-supplied service provides just one piece of the overall requirement then
less excess capacity can be tolerated. It is clearly understood that existence of capacity does not
mean that excess capacity will be given to naval forces. Instead in time of crisis this capacity will
hotly competed for. The excess capacity sub-attribute only indicates how much capacity exists.
DoD use of that capacity is certainly not guaranteed. Figure 55 provides arbitrary selected values
for excess capacity given that naval forces are relying solely on one commercial vendor for
service. The curve is therefore the companion curve of Figure 54. The values on the x-axis are
provided in terms of percent above naval theater peacetime requirements. Therefore the drop-
dead value of 10% suggests that at a minimum naval forces would like the ability to compete for
an excess capacity that would met needs equal to 10% of existing peacetime requirements.
Stated another way, a system that maintains excess capacity that will not meet at least 10% of
naval peacetime requirements has 0.0 utility. Threshold and objective values indicate significant
surge capability and imply that the commercial vendor is carrying significant amounts of capacity
in reserve. As previously mentioned this type of action is highly unlikely. However, if the naval
forces are intent on using a single source provider it is in the warfighter's best interest to insure
that surge capacity is available. In the time of war or increased tension it is not at all unreasonable
to assume that wideband requirements would increase by 50 to 100%, if not more. [Boyd, 1997]
Clearly the values are open for debate and future evaluators are encouraged to thoroughly












Excess Capacity (as % of naval peacetiem requirements)
Figure 55. Excess Capacity Utility Curve
a) Sub-attribute Rankings and Measures of Performance Calculation.
Ranking of the data rate sub-attributes is provided in Table 23. As with the other
sub-attributes relative preference would be determined using AHP. Figure 56 presents the formula
for calculating the quantity MOP.
Ranking Justification
1 . Total The total quantity of accesses indicates as system's theater capacity and
therefore a maximum operational capability.
2. Excess Excess capacity is not owned by naval forces and therefore must be competed
for. Excess does not represent a known level of operational capability.
Table 23. Quantity Sub-attribute Ranking
Quantity
MOP = (w * Total) -+- (w * Excess)
r l
Total Excess
Figure 56. Quantity MOP Calculation
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Capacity Measures of Performance Ranking
Ranking Justification
1. Quantity Indicates the user's preference for creation of a network of users (large number
of accesses). Increased participation (i.e., smaller amounts of input from more
users) has greater combat effectiveness than large amounts of input from few
users, (i.e., network centric warfare expresses this notion).
2. Mobility The fundamental warfighter tendency to favor speed and agility of movement
over increased information availability.
3. Data Rate Important but not the most important of the three. Supplied capacity has
historically lagged and will likely continue to lag user needs. Capacity for
capacity sake is of less value than increased network participation and
mobility.
Table 24. Capacity MOP Ranking
Table 24 provides a strawman ranking and justification of that ranking for the capacity
MOPs. The fundamental element that drives this ranking is that achieving a high data rate is less
important than increasing the number of informed users, and increased data rate should not
negatively impact a platform's ability to maneuver.
F. PROTECTION MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
As presented in Chapter III all three of the protection MOPs are based on subjective user
analysis. Therefore characterization of utility curves is not possible. It is enough to indicate that in
all cases users will define characteristics that establish boundaries for acceptable (i.e., threshold)
levels of confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity protection. Furthermore users should recall that
there is no requirement to indicate linear utility for any of the performance measures. Figure 58
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The most important MOP because it encompasses data security, traffic
security, and location security.
More important than integrity because integrity exploitation is
accomplished through authenticity exploitation.
An important measure but usually requires on lack of confidentiality and
authenticity to be effective.
Table 25. Protection MOP Ranking
G. INTEROPERABILITY MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
The discussion of interoperability in Chapter III resulted in the determination that the
interoperability MOE directly represents system design characteristics and therefore does not
require any MOPs. Although many elements go into defining interoperability (i.e., hardware and
software standards) the level of detail that those elements represent is beyond that required for
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sufficient for comparison of commercial wideband systems. The principle behind this argument is
that the warfighter needs an interoperable system. Degrees of interoperability represented by
fulfillment of various hardware and software standards do not imply a completely interoperable
system. The JTA provides guidelines that if followed results in an interoperable system, or at least
a system that conforms to accepted DoD interoperability standards. Therefore as represented in
the figure and table (Figure 58, Table 26) adherence to JTA standards is assigned a drop-dead
utility value of 0.0. This assignment represents the author's opinion that in the current and
foreseeable future naval forces will only procure IT systems that adhere to DoD interoperability
standards. Anything less than full compliance will not suffice give the joint and fiscally constrained
defense environment. It could be argued that this drop-dead assignment is too rigid and that
perhaps drop-dead utility should be set at partial JTA compliance with an approved waiver. Of
course this is an option, but it undermines DoD's goal of seamless integrated information
exchange. Regardless, the true utility curve will be derived from what the users and evaluators
decide is most important and perhaps interoperability will be traded for increased performance
elsewhere in the system.
The threshold and objective values were assigned as a direct result of the author's
position that a system is expected to meet JTA requirements (i.e., drop-dead = JTA compliant).
Basically a system's interoperability score only increases with interoperability capabilities above
JTA compliance. That is, threshold interoperability is assigned as the capability to interoperate
with multiple wideband SATCOM systems in addition to being JTA compliant. Obviously the word
multiple does not define a specific amount of vendors, and therefore it is recommended that users
give credit to vendors according to the number of systems they interoperate with. For example a
system that is two vendor compatible may receive a score of 0.5 while a four vendor compatible
system may receive a score of 0.6. Despite this range of values the idea is that threshold
requirements should truly reflect the naval users desire to possess multi-mode, JTA compliant IT
systems. The objective value, universal terminal, is listed and likely represents an unachievable
goal. As the name implies the user is provided a terminal that can interoperate with all known
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wideband systems. Given that achievement of a universal terminal is doubtful (besides being cost
prohibitive) the author expects that user utility will increase at a decreasing rate (i.e., utility curve is
























Table 26. Interoperability MOE Utility Values
In summary interoperability is not defined by any MOPs and therefore is represented in
the hierarchy as a stand alone MOE. The interoperability MOE awards value to service providers
that seek to increase interoperability across commercial boundaries. Satisfaction of naval
interoperability requirements is accomplished if competing systems comply with JTA standards
and it is assumed that systems will receive and interoperability score of zero otherwise.
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H. ACCESS AND CONTROL MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Relationship and legal MOP utility curves are presented in Figure 59 and Table 27. Both
relationship and legal are measured in terms of user determined risk and for ease of presentation
are displayed on the same curve. Although both curves display discrete linear utility it is important
to recall that the MOPs are continuous and it is assumed that evaluators will modify the curves to
















Relationship & Legal Risk
Figure 59. Relationship and Legal MOP Utility
Relationship Legal Utility Score
Drop-dead High Risk High Risk 0.0
Threshold Medium Risk Medium Risk 0.5
Objective Low Risk Low Risk 1.0
Table 27 . Access and Control MOP Utility Values
1. Access and Control Measures of Performance Ranking
It is the author's opinion that relationship risk out weighs legal risk. Or stated another way
legal risk can be influenced by a consortium's political relationship. If a consortium is considered
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friendly then within the legal gray areas the tendency maybe to give the benefit of the doubt to the
U.S. In essence if the consortium doesn't deem a user's actions as illegal then they aren't illegal
and service will not be denied. Although this statement skirts along the borders of ethics it reflects
political reality; allies assist each other. This works both ways, depending on the relationship with
the vendor. The medium risk organization may not be willing to give U.S. forces any "slack" and
may choose to interpret legal restrictions in a rigid manner.
Ranking Justification
1. Relationship Political relationship drives how legal restrictions are interpreted.
2. Legal Enforcement of legal restrictions are significantly influenced by politics.
Table 28. Access and Control MOP Ranking
I. QUALITY OF SERVICE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
The discussion of QoS Chapter III resulted in the presentation of six MOPs; robustness,
availability, delay, blockage, data integrity and weather. This section discusses and proposes the
critical utility values and final ranking of the MOPs. The reader is reminded that because a user
survey was not conducted linear utility is assumed.
1. Robustness
As presented in Chapter III robustness reflects the existence of an automated customer
priority scheme. It is the author's opinion that this MOP is binary, either the vendor has or does not
have an automated priority system. Therefore existence of an automated scheme receives a fully
utility value of 1 .0, and non-existence receives a score of 0.0. It could be argued that a threshold
value of 0.5 could be added to reflect existence of a manually executed priority scheme. However,
given the naval user's need for consistent service manual priority routing is likely to not be
responsive enough to meet naval needs. Of course representation of robustness utility is
ultimately up to the user and therefore should be debated prior to system evaluation.
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2. Availability, Delay and Blockage
Availability is measured in terms of probability of access, P(access), while delay and
blockage are measured in terms of P(no delay) and P(no blockage). A value for each of these
MOPs will most likely be obtained using some form of system simulation. Evaluators must either
identify a simulation for vendor's to use or subjectively critique the vendor created simulation to
identify any potential biases. The remaining alternative is for the evaluators to create and run their
own simulations. Regardless of the method used evaluators must know and understand the
model's strengths, weakness as well as the assumptions made during its creation. The critical
values presented in the utility curves below (Figure 60, Figure 61 , Figure 62 and Table 29) are the
derived from the author's interpretation of naval needs and are certainly subject to debate and
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Figure 61. No Delay Utility
No Blockage (% of time)
Figure 62. No Blockage Utility
Availability No Delay No Blockage Utility Score
Drop-dead 95% 90% 90% 0.0
Threshold 97% 95% 97% 0.5
Objective 99.9% 98% 99.9% 1.0

















Figure 63. Data Integrity Utility
Data integrity is measured in terms of BER. BER determines what products and
applications the customer can use. Acceptable BER should be entirely user determined and
needs driven. Table 4, page 38, lists the acceptable BER for different applications. Critical values
for the data integrity and justification for those values are provided in Figure 63 and Table 30.








Requirement for efficient operation of
computer networks.
The current GBS requirement.
Objective 1x10 12 1 .0 An objective value that reflects the user's
desire for uncorrupted data.
Table 30. Data Integrity Utility and Justification
4. Weather
As presented in Chapter III, the weather MOP is reflected as P(available path) for a given
rain intensity. In order to accurately compare vendor weather claims the evaluator needs to
provide the vendor with a rain climate region. The most frequently used rain attenuation model is
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the Crane Model, which "provides median distribution estimates for eight rainfall regions, A-H,
covering the entire globe." [Freeman, 1991, pp. 512] Evaluators should provide the vendor with a
standard terminal located in a selected rain climate region. As a point of reference region A
covers to the poles and indicates a dry tundra region while region H refers to wet tropical regions
of the earth (i.e., Amazon rainforest). It is anticipated that since most of the wideband systems
intend to operate in the same frequency band P(available path) will be very similar. Differences
will result from available link margin and path diversity due to differences in the numbers of
satellites for each system. As with the other MOPs presented in this section weather critical




















Table 31. Weather Utility
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5. Quality of Service Measure of Performance Ranking
Recall that the AHP weighting method is not used within this thesis. However the author
provides a strawman ranking (refer to Table 32). Also it is important to remember that the ranking
does not provide a value ratio. The fact that robustness is ranked as the number one concern
does not provide any indication of its weight relative to the other MOPs. In conclusion, the









Is the highest rank MOP because without an automated priority service
scheme availability, blockage and delay as defined in this hierarchy have
little value.
The second ranked MOP because the remaining MOPs have no value if
the user does not have access to the system.
More important that the remaining values because a message that does
not get to the user is worthless.
If a user has priority, access and is not blocked then the message should
be transmitted uncorrupted.
In terms of likelihood of occurrence a message delay is more likely than
reduction in service due to rain fade.
The least important QoS MOP because it has the smallest impact over the
life of the system.
Table 32. Quality of Service MOP Ranking
J. FLEXIBILITY MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Recall that flexibility is intended to represent a system's ability to support the full dynamic
range of military operations, missions, and environments. The "ability to support" can be
characterized by the eleven traditional logistics elements plus an additional factor called
upgradability. However for use within this hierarchy only three elements were presented as MOPs
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and used to represent the flexibility MOE; operational availability, reliability, and maintainability.
This section discusses and proposes the critical utility values and final ranking of the MOPs. It is
recommended that the user evaluate the other logistics elements for potential use as MOPs.
1. Operational Availability
As presented in Chapter III operational availability A reflects how mission capable a
system is. It is the author's opinion that this MOP is binary, either the system is full mission
capable (FMC) or it is not. Of course representation of A utility is ultimately up to the user and
therefore should be debated prior to system evaluation. It is important that prior to evaluating
systems, users determine the A scores that represent the FMC, PMC and NMC ranges. Although
scores below FMC will not have value (utility = 0.0) within the hierarchy defining PMC and NMC, it
is important so evaluators can provide feedback to vendor's. User's will have to carefully select a
simulation, or clearly articulate the parameters of a simulation that can be used to generate A
scores. If a simulation is not used and the hierarchy is employed as a "first cut" evaluation then
vendor provided A values accompanied with calculation assumptions can be used. In conclusion
as a binary MOP, an A score of FMC would receive a utility score of 1 .0, and a score of not FMC
would receive a score of 0.0.
2. Reliability
Reliability represents the number of hours without a critical failure under specified mission
conditions within the hierarchy. It is reflected as mean time between operational mission failure
(MTBOMF). The goal is to specify how often the user terminal will not be mission capable due to
failure of some component. Again for accurate head to head comparison of different systems
evaluators may have to mandate use of a particular simulation, however first cut comparison can
be done using vendor provided values. When vendor values are used recall that those values are
derived for the "home user's environment" and not the deployed naval environment. The utility
values presented in Figure 65 and Table 33 represents the author's recommendations and are
loosely derived from GBS system requirements. Future evaluators are not only encouraged to
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Table 33. Reliability MOP Utility Values
3. Maintainability
Recall that in Chapter III, maintainability is defined as "the ability of an item to be retained
in or restored to specified condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having
specified skill levels. Using prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of
maintenance and repair." [Hoivik, 1998] Further it was proposed that since evaluators will most
likely be comparing "paper concepts" that maintainability be measured as a spectrum (refer to
Figure 40, page 102). Users must debate and determine the characteristics that define poor,
acceptable and outstanding maintainability. This measure is clearly subjective and reflects the
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user's opinion of how maintainable a system based on intended maintenance concepts. Table 34





Table 34. Maintainability Utility
4. Flexibility Measures of Performance Ranking
Proposed ranking of the three flexibility MOPs is provided in Table 35. It is assumed that







The most critical parameter of the three because it reflects
when the user can employ the system.
More important than maintainability because reliability drives
corrective maintenance.
Critical because it directly impacts the naval forces ability to be
self supporting.
Table 35. Flexibility MOP Ranking
K. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS RANKING
As originally stated the author's intent is to provide a strawman hierarchy. Within this
strawman AHP was not used to generate relative rankings (weighting) instead the author provided
ordinal rankings for each MOE. This has also been done for the MOEs and is displayed in Table
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36. Recall that this ranking does not provide any indication of relative value and is intended as a








5. Quality of Service
6. Flexibility
7. Interoperability
Assured access is a fundamental and the most important naval
user requirement, (coverage and capacity without access is
useless). Control over user access to include the ability to deny
access to other users is a critical naval requirement.
Without coverage (as defined in this hierarchy) the user does
not have any capacity. Furthermore a system's coverage
dictates the geographic regions in which a naval user can use
the system.
The fundamental reason that naval users desire wideband
systems is because of their high capacity. Without this high
capacity there is no reason to even investigate the use of
commercial wideband systems.
Protection of naval user confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
are basic user requirements that are critical to mission success.
Naval users must have the ability to transfer information in a
timely and accurate manner.
The logistics requirements of a system must not impede the
operational utility of the system.
Any selected system must meet joint interoperability standards.
Table 36. Strawman MOE Ranking
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESULTS
RECALLING THE PROCESS
The Process
1) Define top level question.
2) Accept CRD required characteristics as
functional objectives and therefore as MOEs.
3) Create a user profile.
4) Using the user profile identify and define MOPs
for each functional.
5) Create strawman utility curves for each MOP.
a) Utility
i) Dropdead = 0.0
ii) Threshold = 0.5
iii) Objective = 1 .0
b) Performance
i) Dropdead = no value
ii) Threshold = minimum acceptable
iii) Objective = desired
6) Use AHP to pair-wise compare MOPs and
generate weights.
7) Use AHP to pair-wise compare MOEs and
generate weights.
8) Perform sensitivity analysis to examine the
effects of different weighting schemes and utility
functions.
9) Introduce CAIV by conducting a market survey
to create a SEV vs. Cost curve.









Figure 66. The Evaluation Process
This document does not attempt to provide an all-inclusive list that applies to every naval
wideband issue. Instead the "strawman" hierarchy should serve as a point of departure for future
naval wideband discussions. The primary intent of the evaluation hierarchy presented in this
research is:
• That it be used as a starting point by DoD (Naval) integrated product teams (IPTs) that
are investigating COMMER wideband systems.
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That it be used by COMMER SATCOM providers as a way to identify how their system
meets or fails to meet naval needs.
B. USE BY A DOD INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAM
First and foremost the IPT must define the top level question. Given the question the
focus should then be directed towards creation of a user profile. The level of detailed provided by
the profile is entirely a function of how far the IPT wants to investigate and characterize the user.
Defining a profile and subsequent translation of user characteristics to SATCOM system design
parameters (MOPs) will be most effective if the IPT contains a balanced mix of operators and
SATCOM specialists. The operators bring the user needs and the specialists provide the technical
knowledge. Together they should be able to cooperatively develop MOPs that reflect user needs
and have meaning to both designers and users. It is important to point out that the MOPs and
MOEs presented should be debated and challenged. They may not be applicable to every
independent situation. However, use of the hierarchy as a starting point and framework for the
analysis will provide structure and a common focus. A market survey should be conducted in
conjunction with or prior to refinement of the source selection hierarchy. Utility curves need to
reflect user preference and the current state of technology. If the user truly intends to seek cutting
edge performance then utility should reflect that desire. Additionally, utility should not over reward
old or passing technologies. Once a refined hierarchy is developed sensitivity analysis should be
used to determine if and how the weighting schemes bias the SEV. If bias is found and is not
intended then the team should re-structure the hierarchy. As a final effort (refer to Appendix A) the
refined and completed evaluation hierarchy should be freely given to the competing commercial
vendors. Source selection should be accomplished through comparison of competing alternative
SEVs. Furthermore, the team should compare their independently developed SEV for a particular
system with the SEV provided by the particular vendor. This will give the team some visibility of
vendor injected bias. Source selection should not be solely based on the team's SEV results,
however SEV should have considerable weight in the decision process.
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C. USE BY A COMMER SATCOM SERVICE PROVIDER
Although the commercial (civilian) SATCOM community would have a difficult time
creating an evaluation hierarchy with utility and weighting schemes that exactly reflect naval
warfighter needs, some usefulness still can be derived from the parameters presented in this
document. At the very least they provide the commercial vendor a more focused and defined view
of naval requirements and how they relate to SATCOM design parameters. Although the topics
presented in this research are not "new," at a minimum the document serves as a single point of
reference for naval wideband SATCOM concerns. Furthermore, an enterprising vendor can use
the hierarchy to structure a solicitation response. In blunt terms this document connects SATCOM
performance parameters to concepts that mean something to the naval warfighter. This enhances
the vendor's ability to present his system in a manner that appeals to the user's definition of value.
The bottom line, the hierarchy can be used to assist in the marketing and sale of service.
Additionally, as presented in Appendix A, access to the user's evaluation hierarchy gives
the commercial designer insight into the naval user's needs. This insight allows the designer to
make value added trades that increase the user's perception of system effectiveness. Potentially
these design trades may come at no or little cost to the designer. That is, the designer may have
the ability to include naval needs with out compromising original system (commercial) priorities.
Furthermore, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, the military need for advanced technology
(i.e., aircraft, Internet, GPS, the SATCOM industry itself), often leads commercial interest and
need for the same technology. Therefore, the evaluation hierarchy could also be used as a
commercial market-forecasting tool. Most of the performance measures presented represent
commercial as well as military needs (i.e., international finance requires levels of protection equal
to or greater than military requirements). In the cases where military needs exceed current
commercial requirements the author's opinion is that it only reflects an immature under-developed
market. For example, the Navy's use of tele-medicine for aircraft carriers at sea30 demonstrates
30 Currently being conducted using the commercially provided Challenge Athena program.
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the ability to conduct wideband communications with a mobile platform. Is there a commercial
market for this technology? Yes, potentially a wideband terminal could be installed in domestic
ambulances and once on scene the medical personnel could do an "at the crash site" video
consult with an emergency room doctor located at the receiving hospital. If phase array antenna
technologies progress and satellite regulatory restrictions31 are modified the capability could exist
to conduct a video consult while the ambulance is enroute to the hospital. One last example is the
potential desire for company executives to be able to conduct two way video tele-conferences
while in-flight to an overseas or cross-country destination. Both of these ideas represent needs
that the military currently has and desires to fulfill (i.e., highly mobile real-time video for
collaborative planning and situational awareness). Therefore use of the naval evaluation hierarchy
can assist in forecasting emerging commercial uses and therefore should be used to influence
spacecraft and constellation design.
31 In most cases wideband fixed-satellite service (FSS) has priority over wideband mobile-satellite
service (MSS) in terms of frequency (spectrum) conflicts. Therefore, mobile wideband service
although it may become technologically possible is restricted to operating on a "not to interfere"





The evaluation hierarchy presented in this thesis is not intended to be a one size fits all
solution. It was recognized that the selection of commercial SATCOM service is a multi-variable
decision and that attempts to account for every possible combination of design parameters often
result in a sluggish and ineffective evaluation. With this spirit in mind it is intended that the
performance parameters presented in this thesis will be used to focus future groups intent on
evaluating commercial wideband providers.
In this thesis the author presented commercial wideband performance evaluation
measures that were:
• tied to user needs,




• and sensitive to system design thereby highlighting differences in competing concepts.
[SMAD, 1992, pp. 60]
Critical to the usefulness of these performance measures is the identification of a user
profile and the construction of an evaluation hierarchy. A naval user profile was constructed using
joint and naval doctrine and vision publications. A proposed evaluation hierarchy that articulates
users needs through user defined utility and weighting was presented in Chapters III and IV. The
hierarchy allows evaluators to incrementally sum the weighted performance measures up each
level of the hierarchy ultimately leading to a system effectiveness value. This value can be used to
compare the relative abilities of competing systems to satisfy user needs. Ideally, this proposed
evaluation hierarchy will be used by future naval SATCOM integrated product teams to evaluate
competing commercial wideband systems intended for naval use.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Across DoD a significant amount of resources have been dedicated to the search for
solutions to meeting the Navy and Marine Corps future wideband SATCOM needs. Regardless of
the method, selection of a system ultimately comes down to comparison of alternatives based on
their perceived value. Perceived value is appropriate because system value should be a
subjective measurement defined by the warfighter and directly tied to his needs. Therefore any
efforts that maintain the same central focus of evaluating commercial technologies using
warfighter derived needs, whether they expand on or criticize the results presented in this thesis
has value to the naval forces. Specific areas of related research include:
• Conduct a market survey to define the relevant SEV utility curve.
• Perform a source selection or system comparison using the hierarchy presented above.
This includes refinement of user utility curves and MOP and MOE weighting. For
example, answer the question, What commercial system best meets USCINCPAC's
wideband needs?
• Use the hierarchy to evaluate commercial systems that could DoD could directly purchase
and subsequently own and operate, (i.e. meet the Wideband Gapfiller need).
• Evaluate current and emerging commercial wideband systems using the hierarchy, (i.e.,
Astrolink, Hughes Spaceway, Loral Cyberstar, Skybridge, Teledesic, and West).
• Modify the hierarchy to reflect user needs and the trade space required for the design of a
DoD owned and operated wideband SATCOM system, (i.e., Wideband Gapfiller).
• Work with a commercial vendor to see where system modifications can be made to better
meet naval needs as reflected in the hierarchy.
• Refute the hierarchy above and provide a better solution for representing naval wideband
SATCOM needs in system selection.
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APPENDIX A. COST AND COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
The entire focus of this thesis has been on system performance. The reality of today's
fiscally constrained environment is that DoD can not afford to pay for increased performance for
performance sake. The notion of cost as an independent variable (CAIV) is used to inject cost
considerations further into the acquisition decision process. There are numerous definitions and
methodologies for using CAIV in the acquisition process. This appendix presents the author's
approach (opinion) to the use of CAIV in the acquisition of COMMER wideband SATCOM service.
As with any program, balance between cost, schedule and performance must exist.
However, it is also true that balance does not imply that all three are equally weighted. Most would
argue that whatever the weight, performance is the most important (highest weighted) of the
three. The thrust of this argument is that for military systems performance is critical; lives are at
stake, poor performance kills. Therefore the focus on performance begins with requirements
definition and extends through system evaluation. It is the author's opinion that a program must
maintain this ultimate singular focus. This does not imply that cost and schedule are not
important. What it does insinuate is that the focus should be to maximize performance
constrained by cost and schedule. This statement is different from the two-focus strategy of
maximizing performance while minimizing cost. Trying to execute the two-focus strategy implies
that performance and cost are both simultaneously goals and constraints. While maximizing
performance, cost is constrained, which confuses attempts to minimize cost while constraining
performance. The contradiction resides in the fact that performance can not be maximized
(optimized) if it is simultaneously a constraint. Furthermore, cost is not an independent variable if
it is both a constraint and a variable trying to be optimized. When performance is used as a
constraint a portion of the entire range of possible values is "out of bounds", "off limits" and
therefore can not even be considered. When used as the goal, (i.e., maximize performance) the
entire range of values are considered. Once considered values are ruled out if they do not fall
within the constraint requirements. Although slight, the difference between the single and dual
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focus strategies is significant. The analogy of an employee having two bosses with equal authority
exemplifies this difference. The first boss is performance oriented, the second is cost motivated,
the employee is stuck in the middle often torn in conflicting directions. The idea of a trying to
simultaneously maximize performance while minimizing cost for a particular system creates the
same confusion. Simply stated, a single unified focus (i.e., unified commander) reduces confusion
and facilitates the efficient execution of system trades. For military use systems, where lives
depend on effectiveness, performance must be the driving focus. Cost and schedule should be
seen as constraints and not as optimization goals.
The focus on performance extends to the handling of sub-standard performance. It is the
author's opinion that below threshold performance requirements should not be accepted as a way
to reduce costs or schedule.32 Not only can below threshold performance threaten lives but below
threshold systems can actually increase dollar costs. Opportunity costs increase since time and
money are wasted on a system that doesn't meet user needs. The resources would have had
more value if committed towards another program. Dissatisfied users will at the least under utilize
and at the worst reject the sub-standard system. Any savings that were forecasted to occur due to
the fielding of the "improved" system will not be realized. Often times these costs are not easily
identifiable because they are hidden in increased man power requirements related to logistics
support and maintenance of the new system. The bottom line is that performance compromises
that extend below user designated thresholds should not be done. If the applicable constraints
(i.e., cost) prohibit meeting or exceeding threshold performance requirements the program should
be canceled or delayed until the constraints are adjusted.
Given a single performance-oriented focus and unwillingness to compromise for below
threshold performance the next step in the process is to clearly specify the user's performance
utility. The user should know and understand his performance utility and therefore be able to
32 This statement is made knowing that in all cases trades are a reality and that in some
instances below threshold performance in one area must be accepted in order to achieve
threshold or objective performance in another. However the desire to maintain across the board
threshold or above performance should be the driving focus.
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associate service (system) value with cost. That is the user should be able to state that an
incremental increase in performance of X% is worth Y dollars and Z time. This is how the cost
performance trade is conducted, with cost introduced as an independent constraint (independent
variable) not as the goal of the problem. Again this does not imply that fiscal limits can not be
imposed. In fact the word constraint clearly implies that costs are and can be restrained. The user
creates their utility curve after conducting a detailed market survey. The market survey should be
used to estimate a realistic threshold cost position. Threshold price is a function of market
conditions and the state of technology and is critical to the creation of an accurate cost utility
curve. Using the threshold cost as a starting point the next step is to determine how much
more/less the user is willing to pay for an incremental increase/decrease in performance.
Characterization of the utility curve should extend from the drop-dead performance requirements







Linear Utility for Reference
Drop Dead
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
System Effectiveness Value (SEV)
0.8 0.9 1.0
Figure 67. Suggested User Utility Curve
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Figure 67. Suggested User Utility Curve, represents what the author projects a typical utility
curve for the acquisition of a commercial service or system may look like. In general the curve
should have the following characteristics:
• The user's utility curve is non-linear. (Figure 67, provides a linear curve for reference).
• Performance (SEV) below threshold requirements has very little utility, but as SEV
increases utility increases at an increasing rate. (Represented in Figure 67 as Utility =
(SEV) 3).
• As performance (SEV) approaches the objective level utility increases at a decreasing
rate. (Represented in Figure 67 as Utility = (SEV) 1/3 ).
• Utility of an objective system = 1 00% (SEV =1
.0)
• Utility of a threshold system = 50% (SEV =0.5)
• Utility of a drop-dead system = 0% (SEV = 0.0)
A primary assumption in the acquisition of a commercial service or system is that the DoD
may not be the primary user of the commercial item. As a minority user the DoD's ability to
influence the design may be limited. This does not imply that the DoD should accept sub-
threshold service, neither does it imply that DoD won't be a powerful customer. However, given a
reduced ability to directly influence the design of a system DoD should seek to introduce
incentives that encourage vendor upgrades that reach towards objective requirements and further
satisfy DoD needs. In an effort to direct the vendor towards system improvements in which DoD
places high value, the author believes that DoD should reveal its utility curves to the vendor.
The idea of showing the vendor how the user assigns system value (utility) is traditionally
seen as reducing the purchaser's price negotiating power, and therefore a naive thing to do. The
author agrees that in telling the vendor how the user assigns value the user does give away a
portion of the negotiating position. However, given that for a commercial system the DoD user is a
minority user the DoD's negotiating power is already significantly diminished and therefore DoD
must seek ways to encourage vendor innovation.
By revealing user utility DoD will introduce incentives. The informed vendor understands
that, an upgrade that meets X additional requirements is worth Y to the user. Now it is up to the
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vendor to identify the areas in which to make improvements. If user utility (value) curves are
accurate the vendor will attempt to incorporate system enhancements in which he receives the
most return (i.e., those areas with the highest utility for smallest investment). Let the vendor travel
down the user's system evaluation hierarchy and identify functional objectives and measures of
performance that give him the "largest bang for the buck." The vendor knows his own product
development process and should know where he can find or generate efficiencies in that process.
Let the vendor match user utility with his own utility and leverage the two, to produce a mutually
beneficial product or product upgrade.
As previously indicated the naval user's wideband SATCOM utility curve should be non-













total, for a 0.08
increase in SEV
S100M for Threshold Service 25% premium, $125M
total, for a 0.275
increase in SEV
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System Effectiveness Value (SEV)
0.8 0.9 1.0
Figure 68. Calculation of Increased Performance Costs
The closer threshold requirements are to state-of-the-art the steeper the slope will be for
performance greater than threshold. Vendor's will have to be enticed with monetary incentives to
surpass and go beyond state-of-the-art to reach towards objective requirements. This argument is
justified given the greater risk and therefore cost associated with development of cutting edge
technologies. This is represented in Figure 68. Calculation of Increased Performance Costs. The
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non-linear utility curve implies that the user's market survey indicated that threshold requirements
are state-of-the-art and that increased demands for performance will require significant
investment, and therefore significant monetary incentive for small increases in performance. The
linear utility curve insinuates that threshold requirements are not state-of-the-art and that
progression towards objective performance can be achieved with a proportional increase in
funding. Again the exact shape of the curve is determined by a rigorous market survey.
An opposing argument to the idea of "openness" and sharing of utility (value) curves is
that once revealed the vendor will use the information to exploit the user. For example, assume
that the user's utility curve indicates a willingness to pay a 25% premium for an incremental
increase in performance. After conducting a thorough review the vendor realizes that the
improvement can be accomplished for a 10% increase in overall expenses. The vendor is now in
the position to potentially make a 15% gain by implementing the change. Some argue that this is
not fair the vendor should reduce his price because he is now making too much profit. The author
argues that since the user receives the upgrade at a price he originally considered fair (with in the
user's utility) the vendor should be allowed to retain the profit.33 Additionally, the user should be
thrilled that the company providing his product is so efficient and lean that it is able to out perform
the market (perform better than predicted by the market survey) and provide increased service at
less cost than competitors. The user should now return to his utility curve, adjust it to reflect the
new market conditions (i.e., the providing company raised the "quality bar"), and resubmit them to
the vendor, so that the vendor can identify other areas of mutually beneficial improvement.
Another negative that is presented is that users may understate or inaccurately state utility
in order to control (limit) vendor profit. Understatement of utility is counter-productive in that it only
serves to reduce the potential for development and implementation of upgrades. From the
33 The author recognizes that this argument is presented without validation or supporting
evidence. Interested readers are referred to literature that discusses the theory of optimal
contracts, and principal agent theory.
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vendor's point of view understated utility is seen as an inadequate, not worth the risk, incentive.
Therefore, effective utility should accurately reflect market conditions.
There are those who will argue that the process of continually encouraging improvement
only serves to ratchet up user costs to a point beyond the user's fiscal reach. Keepers of this
mindset often fail to account for the reality of the commercial (high tech) market; product
improvement reduces costs for threshold requirements. That is, threshold requirements are
generally "less than cutting edge" requirements, and therefore provided at a lower cost than
objective requirements. As a user pays for product improvements the basic cost for the threshold
system should decline, therefore total costs should remain relatively flat. Furthermore, as system
enhancements are made the overall "quality bar" among commercial vendors raises. This
increase in quality attracts more commercial customers (recalling that the DoD user is not the sole
customer) and increased competition among the commercial providers. More customers and
increased competition generally results in decreased pricing. This is where the DoD will gain
negotiating leverage. Increased competition implies an increased vendor willingness to negotiate
with a valued customer. Having established itself as a valued customer DoD should be able to
contract for improved threshold rates and/or services. The underlying premise is that the user's
utility curve stays tied to the market and is continually updated.
In summary, it is the author's opinion that in the acquisition of COMMER wideband
SATCOM service CAIV implies:
• That the goal should be to maximize performance constrained by cost and schedule.
• If cost constraints prohibit greater than or equal to threshold performance then 1 ) don't
build the system or 2) wait until constraints change.34
• The user should conduct a thorough market survey to establish a realistic utility curve
and threshold system cost.
Vendors should be given the user's evaluation hierarchy including the user's utility curves.
34 Again it is recognized that this hard line, "either you have or you don't" methodology is not
always practical. In some cases slightly below threshold performance can be accepted as
compensation for increased performance elsewhere in the system.
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Let the vendor demonstrate how his system best meets naval needs at an acceptable
cost. Let him demonstrate how he can tweak, refine and enhance his design to better
fulfill naval needs.
Let the vendor retain the gains that he creates by fielding a product upgrade.
Continually update user utility to reflect increases in product quality and decreasing
market costs.
Seek negotiating advantages resulting from increased market competition.
Remain a valued customer through open sharing of user requirements and utility.
Despite the fact that the case presented describes an ideal solution void of numerous
influencing factors (i.e., politics) which would impede the effective implementation of such a
system the fundamental theme still remains; a single performance-oriented focus coupled with a
desire to encourage innovation through openness will produce a better product.
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APPENDIX B. THE SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND EVALUATION REGIME (SEER)
This paper was taken in its entirety as it was presented to the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and is not the work of the thesis author. It has been declared
a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
OPTIMIZING SPACE SYSTEMS SUPPORT
FOR NAVAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES*
L. W. Leake and R. Mamiaro
The Aerospace Corporation
Los Angeles, CA




A five stage methodology is presented describing systematic and quantitative analysis approaches
for determining contributions alternative candidate space systems make in support of modern
naval warfare tasks. This analysis process and the companion software may also be used to
perform similar analysis on any requirements or needs-driven military or civil analysis task. The
analysis methodology is developed following a specific application, the analysis of space system
support for needs derived from littoral and expeditionary naval warfare. The first stage of the
analysis bounds the problem by establishing key relationships among military requirements and
space system capabilities. The second stage introduces the impact of future weapons, platforms
and tactics. Stage three synthesizes the prior results into a system of measures for a future time
frame. Stage four provides the decision maker with a system analysis tool to help define an
acquisition strategy. The final stage assesses the systems' initial and life-cycle costs and provides
a final benefit-cost trade-off analysis tool. This methodology has been developed into a software
program that operates as an application under Microsoft Excel. Refinements to both the
methodology and software are planned.
Introduction
The importance of support from an appropriate mix of space systems acting across the spectrum
of modern warfare is seldom questioned and has indeed been amply documented in our nations
most recent conflicts. Accounts of Desert Storm describe the key role played throughout the
conflict by satellite communications, navigation, and other space systems.
For many years the United States Navy has viewed itself as the biggest "user" of space systems
among all of the services. This assertion will not be questioned here and is intuitively agreeable,
however, it would be extremely useful in determining the right mix of supporting space systems to
167
know precisely how modern naval warfare missions and space support are related. These
relationships and the measures for analyzing the implications of these relationships should be
developed and described quantitatively where possible.
This paper documents both a methodology and a software tool developed to help formalize the
analysis process. The Aerospace Corporation working with the Naval Space Command,
developed a customer focused, benefit-cost analysis concept. The associated software tool is
called Systems Engineering and Evaluation Regime (SEER) and was developed to operate as an
application under Microsoft Excel. The methodology will be described here in the context of its
application to the analysis of space system support for needs derived from littoral and
expeditionary naval warfare.
Unfortunately, established capital investment analysis techniques traditionally and effectively
employed by businesses in making capital investment decisions (e.g. Equivalent Worth, Rate of
Return and Replacement Cost Analysis) are not equally adaptable to analysis of government
investments. This of course is the case, because of the vastly different objectives businesses and
government organizations define for themselves. Businesses nearly always seek to either
maximize profits or minimize costs. Government organizations, including the Department of
Defense (DoD), usually seek maximum public benefit or utility at an acceptable cost. Benefit-cost
analysis therefore becomes the capital investment analysis technique most adaptable to DoD
investment decisions. With shrinking DoD budgets, proper investment strategies become critical
to providing the best possible warfighter support for each available dollar.
Five stages are used to develop a benefit-cost ratio. The first four stages focus on the benefit part
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The concept of "customer" focus is central to the successful application of this methodology. By
this we mean that early, meaningful, and continued dialog with the Navy grass roots end users
supported by the analyzed space systems is essential. This customer focus is also central to the
SEER tool's flexibility. Through user initiated changes in the analysis parameters and judicious
selection of the missions and systems examined other services, the DoD and other agencies can
utilize the process and the SEER tool.
Figure 1 illustrates schematically the process we have practiced and advocate as a means of
maintaining the desired "customer" focus.
Framing the Analysis
Analysis of space systems support to naval warfare must be firmly anchored in and rigorously
traceable to the post cold war doctrinal changes described in "...From the Sea" and "Forward...
From the Sea." This axiom is often overlooked in analysis of space systems support to warfare
missions. This premise is a fundamental element of this analysis and the methodology developed
to conduct the analysis.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military began a
process of redefining its global mission and warfighting strategies. For the Navy, this meant a
transition away from a long standing blue water, War-at- Sea doctrine. Instead of planning for
large scale conflict with a powerful Soviet navy on the world's oceans, the Navy's focus had to
shift to operations against lesser (but still dangerous) adversaries in regional contingencies of
various magnitudes. Missions such as embargo and sanction enforcement, Non-combatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO) , and shallow water Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) have replaced
choke point control and outer air battle fleet defense.
These fundamental changes raise the question, what sort of support is required from space
systems in this new warfighting environment? Littoral warfare is characterized by the projection of
seapower against an enemy's military and strategic assets, launched from ships and naval
platforms operating in shallow, restricted waters near to shore, and including all associated and
supporting operations. Intuitively, it would seem that the requirements for space system's support
to this kind of warfare would be different from that required for blue-water combat against an
opposing superpower. Certainly differences in operational cycles and timelines, engagement
ranges, threat capabilities, and operating environments would be expected.
Expeditionary warfare is a key concept. Recent Naval doctrine states "Expeditionary" implies a
mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operated forward and to
respond swiftly." "Expeditionary implies the ability to operate where there was previously no
supporting infrastructure..." and "An expeditionary force is an organization tailored for a specific
mission, vice a structure." In essence, our naval expeditionary forces are characterized by
forward deployment, and ability to swiftly respond to crises, a structure to build power from the sea
when required, sustainability for long-term operations, and freedom from the need for transit or
over flight approval from foreign governments in order to enter the scene of action. The key
concept is one of a flexible, deployed force that can address the complete range of operations in
support of vital national interests from peacetime presence through warfare in a fully developed
regional conflict.
Expeditionary warfare concepts applied to a littoral environment are used to demonstrate the
SEER methodology and the software. The goal is to link these naval missions with their space
support requirements.
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Bounding the Problem .
In stage one, the problem is bounded by considering the relationships between functional missions
and the attributes of the systems used to accomplish these functions. The software arranges the
relationships in a matrix where the functions (also known as the "whats" for what needs to be
done) are on the vertical axis and the attributes (also called the "hows" for how things get done)
are on the horizontal axis. The matrix then maps the relationships between the functions and the
attributes (or the "whats" and the "hows"). Each square on the matrix represents a direct
relationship between the function and the attribute. Normal practice is to identify strong, medium
or weak direct relationships. Numerical values are assigned to the intensity of the relationship.
Strong relationships have a high numerical value and weak relationships have a low numerical
value. This stage can be contentious and time consuming, but when done correctly it forms the
solid foundation upon which the rest of the analysis is performed.
The need to properly bound the problem and reduce, where possible and appropriate, the sheer
amount of data to be analyzed is readily apparent.
Department of Navy (DoN) doctrine describes 82 DoN warfare tasks. Recently the DoN has
prioritized these warfare tasks placing 26 tasks in a top priority category, 40 tasks at a middle
priority category and the remaining tasks in a lower priority category.
Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1) describes the operational capabilities of naval expeditionary
forces in the joint warfare environment in four separate categories: Command, Control, and
Surveillance, Battlespace Dominance, Power Projection, and Force Sustainment. For our analysis
it is convenient to include each of the 82 DoN tasks in one of these four lists of operation
capabilities.
The space force enhancement mission area is comprised of capabilities in four broad areas:
reconnaissance and surveillance, targeting, tactical warning and attack assessment;
communications; navigation; and environmental monitoring. Each of the four space force
enhancement capabilities may require up to a dozen attributes to describe the function.
The magnitude of the stage 1 task is apparent. Each of the four lists of approximately twenty
naval operational capabilities must be evaluated against each of the four traditional space force
enhancement mission areas. This task is even more intimidating when each of the mission area's
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Figure 2. Mission/Space Support Relationships
Bench Marking
Implementation of the SEER software stage 1 process automatically yields, not only an indicator of
where the strongest relationships exist between requirements and space systems, but also a set
of quantifiable benchmarks.
Once complete, stage 1 ranks the attributes and identifies those with the strongest impact on the
described functions. It also provides quantifiable benchmarks which can be used later. From this
list, the analyst may choose those attributes with which to continue the analysis. This is how stage
1 acts as a sieve to reduce the sheer volume of material to be considered. Figure 2 illustrates the
stage 1 process.
Domain Experts and SEER
Ideally stage 1 of the SEER analysis process is completed by a group of recognized "domain
experts." In this case the "domain experts" are mid-grade naval warfare specialists with recent
fleet experience. The benefits of using this type of expert in the analysis cannot be
overemphasized. Without this expertise the result can never be vetted.
This process allows the domain experts to work in the present. We believe it is important to focus
the initial analysis in the present since this is the realm of requirements best understood, most
easily and forcefully articulated and most commonly agreed upon. The SEER software stage 2
method provides a process for projecting these quantified requirements into a future time frame.
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Identifying Future Requirements
Accurate descriptions of future requirements are often elusive. Stage 2 provides a process for
projecting the previously quantified requirements into a future time frame. Identifying and
quantifying future requirements is critical to the process of determining the relative worth of the
various system alternatives under consideration.
The process we have employed successfully in developing future space system requirements
takes advantage of the fact that space force enhancement functions are accomplished to support
terrestrial forces. Space communication, navigation, surveillance, and environmental systems are
all intended to support terrestrial military forces. Therefore, the requirements for space systems to
fulfill force enhancement functions can and should be derived from a careful examination of
support requirements for new platforms, weapon systems, and tactics.
STAGE 2
The A in space capability due to weapon
systems/tactical development is a "vector" in
the direction of increased requirements.
The A in space capability
due to weapon systems/tactical
development is a null vector. No
significant change in requirements
Scale
+3 New Weapon System Is Key Driver of Quality or Quantity of Space Support
+2 Quality or Quantity of Space System Support Increased Significantly
+1 Quality or Quantity of Space System Support Increased
Quality and Quantity of Space System Support Is unchanged
-1 Quality or Quantity of Space System Support Is Decreased
-2 Quality or Quantity of Space System support Is Decreased Significantly
-3 New Weapon System Does not Require this Space System Capability
Future Platforms,
Tactics, & Weapons
The A in space capability due to weapon
systems/tactical development is a "vector" in
the direction of decreased requirements.
Figure 3. Effect of New Platforms, Tactics, & Weapons
The introduction of new platforms, weapons, and employment tactics will in many cases have a
significant effect on the quality and quantity of support required from space systems. Identifying
and quantifying these effects as early as possible is critical to planning for the right future space
systems.
The effects of new platforms, weapon, and employment tactics on future space systems
requirements can be described as a vector. A new capability requiring additional space system
support results in a vector with a positive value. Conversely, some new capabilities may result in
a diminished requirement for space system support and thus result in a vector with a negative
value . Figure 3 illustrates this concept.
Developing Measures
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Developing system measures for a future time frame is a relatively straightforward process now
based on the information we have developed in the first two stages. Two key products of stage 1
and the output of stage 2 will be used.
In stage 1 we developed a set of matrices showing the key relationships between naval
operational requirements and the attributes of the systems supporting these requirements. The
system attributes showing the strongest relationships, as determined by the normalized numerical
scores recorded, are candidates for development as system measures. The analyst may chose to
draw the line at any point selecting only those attributes which appear most relevant and
discarding others.
Recall also that stage 1 associates a benchmark value with each of the attributes. For example, a
medium communications data rate may have been the current requirement for the attribute. This
current communications MDR requirement would then be used as the benchmark from which the
stage 2 vector is applied.
If the new platforms, weapon systems, or tactics considered in stage 2 show a need for higher
data rate communications, by exhibiting a large positive value, the analyst may chose to write a
future MOE for HDR communications. Conversely, if the rate of change is a minus value the
future MOE may be written as LDR. If no change was indicated (a value of near zero) then the
requirement would continue to be for MDR communications in the future.
Care must be taken at this stage to understand that the future MOE is only applicable to the set of
new platforms, weapons, and tactics considered. There may be other platforms, weapons, or
tactics driving the requirement in a different direction.
This process of developing future measures of effectiveness is exercised as illustrated in figure 4.
Measuring System Performance
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SYSTEM MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
• KEY RELATIONSHIPS • FUTURE TIME FRAME
DOES THE SYSTEM MEET THE FUTURE REQUIREMENT'
Figure 4. System Measures of Performance
Thus far, our analysis methodology has yielded a set of system performance measures directly
traceable to the key relationships identified between Naval missions areas and space support
functions. These performance measures have also been adjusted to account for the effects
produced by the introduction of new platforms, weapon systems, and tactics.
This, the fourth stage of our analysis methodology, will use the system performance measures we
have derived to compare the capabilities of the various alternatives proposed as solutions to the
warfighting requirements. The result of this comparison will be presented as two different figures-
of-merit (FOM) we will use to supply values for the benefit side of the benefit-cost ratio.
Before we describe these two figures-of-merit further, we will focus on an intermediate step to this
solution which involves establishing relative weightings among the measures of performance. At
this point in the analysis it is expected that the process has yielded several performance
measures. It is also anticipated that some of these performance measures are relatively more
important to the analysis than others. To account for this relative ranking we will use the weighting
process illustrated in the upper left hand corner of figure 5. This process is a simple pair-wise
comparison which involves comparing each of the performance measures with each of the other
performance measures and deciding which is the more important. A value between 1 to 4 is used
to score each comparison. These individual scores can be summed to form a raw numerical
score which is then convert into a weighted category. In the example (last column) we break the
raw scores down into three weighted categories. These MOE weightings will be carried forward to
the System Evaluation Matrix.
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STAGE 4























MOE# 1 3 2 3 8 3
MOE #2 1 3 2 6 2
MOE #3 2 1 2 5 1

















SYSTEM A SYSTEM B
EXP PERF CONFID TTL VAL DISC VAL EXP PERF CONFID TTL VAL DISC VAL
MOE # 1 3 YES HIGH 30 27 YES HIGH 30 27
MOE #2 2 YES MED 20 10 NO HIGH
MOE #3 1 YES MED 10 5 NO HIGH
MOE #4 1 YES MED 10 5 NO HIGH
TOTALS 70 47 30 27
CONFIDENCE 67.14 90.00
SYSTEM EVALUATION MATRIX
Figure 5. Measuring System Performance
The next step in our analysis process involves developing a system simulation matrix which
describes the expected performance of each of the system alternatives in relation to each of the
performance measures. This involves scoring each alternative in terms of its ability to fulfill the
requirements of the individual performance measure. Each system receives a score of yes,
partial, or no with regard to each measure. Since this score is an analysts judgment based on
available knowledge regarding the alternative systems a confidence level is also assigned for each
performance measure score. The confidence level is important since we are often required to
compare the capabilities of systems at various stages of maturity. At one end of the spectrum we
have system alternatives in the concept development phase where confidence regarding future
performance is usually low. At the opposite end of the spectrum we have existing or deployed
systems where extensive well documented information is available regarding performance. With
these systems we have a high confidence in the expected performance. One can easily find
examples at various levels in between these two extremes. This system simulation process is
illustrated in the upper right hand corner of figure 5.
The final step in stage 4 is development of a system evaluation matrix displaying two system
performance figures-of-merit (FOM). A FOM is developed showing the total value and the
discounted value of each alternative system.
The systems' total value is based on a simple calculation accounting for the weight assigned to
each individual MOE and the expected performance of the system with regard to that MOE. Total
value scores for each system alternatives are arrived at by multiplying the weight assigned to that
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MOE by a numerical value assigned based on the expected performance with regard to that MOE.
In the example in figure 5, if the entry with regard to expected performance is yes a value of 10 is
used, if the entry is partial a value of 5 is used, and if the entry is no a value of is used.
A system total value score is computed by summing the value for the individual MOEs. The total
value for each of the system alternatives can be used by a decision maker as a means of
comparing performance of the alternatives.
STAGE 4
• Alternative System Total Values
• Alternative System Discounted Values
STAGE 5
A
• Software options for system cost data input
DoD categories (R&D, Procurement,0&S)
Various formats (Single estimate, annual)
Record uncertianty associated with cost data
• Software automatically adjusts cost data
Computes and corrects for inflation effects
Inflates/discounts to common value year
• Provides cost comparisons based on
Total Lifecycle Cost (LCC)
















Figure 6. Benefit/Cost Analysis
The discounted value for each alternative system is arrived at by adjusting the systems total value
score to account for the analyst confidence in his assessment of that alternatives expected
performance. A numerical value between and 1 is assigned for each confidence gradient. In
our example, a value of 0.9 is used when confidence is high, 0.5 is used when confidence is
medium, and 0.1 is used when confidence is low. These adjusted values are then summed to
provide and overall discounted value for each system alternative. This second FOM provides
another means for comparison of system performance.
Benefit Cost Analysis
This final analysis stage provides a tool to develop and displaying benefit-cost comparisons. This
stage uses stage 4 total value and discounted value figures-of-merit as entering arguments for the
benefit side of the ratio. Data for the cost side of the ratio is included as described below.
It should be noted that the SEER software is not a cost estimation tool. Cost data for system
alternatives must be obtained from external sources. A variety of cost estimations models are
available. The SEER software provides various options for inputting system cost data,
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automatically adjusts the data where necessary, and provides a common basis for comparison of
alternative system costs.
Cost data input options allow the analyst to enter estimates for each of the standard DoD cost
categories: research and development (R&D); procurement; and, operations and support (O&S).
Estimates for these cost categories can be entered in several formats. For example, estimates
can be entered as a single aggregated estimate of system cost for each category or the estimates
can be entered on an annual basis for each year of the systems expected life-cycle. These
options are necessary since it is likely that cost estimates will exist in various forms dependent
upon the maturity of the system alternative. Systems in early concept development phases may
have only aggregated estimates available. Systems well advanced in the development cycle
should have detailed cost information available. To further account for the varying maturity of the
system alternatives under consideration the analyst can also enter an assessment of the
uncertainty associated with the cost estimates.
The SEER software automatically adjusts the cost estimates to correct for the effects of inflation
and inflates or discounts the data to a common value year to ensure comparability. The analyst
enters an estimated value for inflation and selects a common value year for cost comparison.
With these inputs and corrections factors the SEER computes the total life-cycle cost (LCC) and
the average annual cost (ACC) for each system alternative.
In stage 5B the SEER software develops four benefit-cost analysis figures-of-merit (FOM). These
FOM are illustrated in figure 6.
• FOM # 1 develops the ratio of system total value (TV) to total life-cycle cost (LCC).
• FOM # 2 develops the ratio of system discounted value (DV) to LCC.
• FOM # 3 develops the ratio of system TV to average annual cost (AAC).
• FOM # 4 develops the ratio of DV to AAC.
Each of these figures-of-merit can be used as a means for direct comparison of the worth of
alternative systems. All of the FOM should be considered during a comparison of alternatives.
The FOM will often provide different relative rankings depending upon whether total value or
discounted value is in the ratio. The selection of a FOM using LCC instead of ACC can also affect
the relative ranking of the alternative systems if the life time of the systems are significantly
different.
The software produces graphics which make these comparisons easier. These graphics are
constructed so the analyst can also consider various weighting for benefit and cost. The relative
ranking can change depending upon how heavily the analyst weights benefit versus cost. 6
Summary
Faced with diminishing budgets, and an increasing demand to justify every dollar spent by the
DoD on space systems, the Naval Space Command needed a tool to conduct quantitative
evaluations of its requirements. The long held assertion that the Navy is the biggest user of space
systems among the services needs to be elaborated in much greater detail. The Navy needed a
tool to conduct in-depth analysis describing specific needs and assessing proposed space system
solutions. The Aerospace Corporation, working with the Naval space Command, first developed a
methodology and then the SEER software package to help the Command optimize its space
investment strategy.
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This paper shows the application of the methodology to the original space command task. In
stage one, a set of matrices were developed to bound the example problem and provide the
foundation of a benchmark to focus the analysis. Stage two provides a method for understanding
how changes in the platforms, weapons, and tactics of modern Naval warfare will effect future
requirements for space system support. Stage three provides a disciplined process for developing
measures of effectiveness appropriate for a future time frame. The fourth stage compares the
different system alternatives considered as solutions and produces the figures of merit for the
benefit side of the benefit-cost ratio. The final analysis stage provides a variety of method for
inputting cost data for alternatives systems and produces several graphic display options for
benefit-cost comparison.
The ability to determine and quantify the optimum mix of supporting space systems for the Naval
warfighter drove the development of both this methodology and the companion software. The
result, as outlined in the paper, has applications exceeding the original limited scope. The five
stage process can be easily applied to nearly any problem where competing options can be
compared against a baseline set of requirements. Refinements to both the methodology and the
SEER software are planned and will be based on user applications and comments.
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